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INTRODUCTION
There is a widely held perception that scientific research on the
long-term safety of products is produced spontaneously and in abun-
dance, irrespective of the law. Some commentators even appear to
believe that, to the extent the law matters, it encourages safety re-
search.1 For the vast majority of potentially toxic products,2 however,
these perceptions are wrong. No toxicity research is available for over
eighty percent of the chemicals in commerce,3 and the common-law
rules are, in part, responsible for this dearth of information.
Indeed, rather than promoting safety testing for latent harms, the
current common-law liability rules act to penalize it. Before a com-
plaint can be filed against a manufacturer for latent harms, the com-
mon law requires victims to produce scientific research that
demonstrates a cause-and-effect relationship between the manufac-
turer's product and the plaintiff's injuries. Unfortunately, it is the
manufacturers that are better able, but disinclined, to produce this
research due to pervasive failures in both the market and government
regulatory programs. 4 Manufacturers can thus minimize their liability
I See infra note 63. Not all scholars, however, have made this mistake. See, e.g., John
S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Sub-
stances Contro4 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 261, 318-32 (1991) (proposing modifications to the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA) to enable the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
require industry to produce information); Heidi L. Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass
Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REX'. 1, 41 (1995) (observing that the plaintiffs' burden of
proof in toxic tort cases may create incentives for defendants to forego clarifying uncer-
tainties in causation); Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YaE J. ON RFG. 137,
149-50 (1995) (arguing that "[t]he fact that a particular harm comes as a surprise when
discovered may reflect the innovator's choices during innovation more than the inherent
difficulties of discovering the side effect").
2 For an excellent definition of what constitutes a "toxic" substance or waste, see
Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1993).
3 See infra Part I.B.2.
4 See infra Part I.B.3.
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through their research programs. A manufacturer that conducts no
research can generally avoid liability because plaintiffs and govern-
ment research programs are unlikely to conduct scientific research on
their own.5 Voluntary safety research, on the other hand, might re-
veal a long-term risk associated with a product, a revelation that could
provide vital evidence for aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys and ulti-
mately increase, rather than reduce, the manufacturer's exposure to
lawsuits and potentially catastrophic liability.6 The failure of the com-
mon-law courts to provide manufacturers with reliable immunity after
the manufacturer has conducted an exemplary safety testing program
exacerbates the self-incriminatory effect of voluntary safety research. 7
Given this common-law treatment of safety research, it would be
surprising if manufacturers ever conducted voluntary research on the
long-term hazards of their products. H.L.A. Hart has likened the law
to a "choosing system, in which the individuals can find out, in general
terms at least, the costs they have to pay if they act in certain ways"8
and make choices accordingly. If manufacturers face virtually no pen-
alty for remaining ignorant about the latent health risks of potentially
toxic products, but risk crushing liability if they learn of long-term
hazards, it is only rational for manufacturers to choose ignorance.
Studies documenting the paucity of testing available for most prod-
ucts confirm that manufacturers are making this rational choice.9
Tobacco, DES, the Dalkon Shield, and asbestos provide particu-
larly vivid examples of the social calamities that attend inadequate
legal accountability for ensuring the long-term safety of products
before they are marketed.' 0 Even for more common products, such
as crayons,"' hair dyes, 12 and gasoline,13 which probably present at
5 This observation appears to be true for generic latent harms, see infra Part IV.B.1,
but may not hold true for harms that manifest themselves immediately after exposure or
for signature harms that are exceedingly rare and can be finger-printed to exposure to a
particular substance, because in the latter cases causation is typically much easier to
establish.
6 See infra Part IIA.
7 See infra Part I.B.
8 H.LA. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmIry 28,
44 (1968).
9 See infra Parts I.B.2, IV.A.
10 See infra notes 170-80 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., S.C. Rastogi & G. Pritzl, Migration of Some Toxic Metals From Crayons and
Water Colors, 56 BULL. EN-ri.. CONTAMINATION & Tox[COLOw 527 (1996) (reporting the
leaching of toxic metals from crayons and watercolors).
12 See Michael J. Prival et al., Mutagenicity of a New Hair Dye Ingredient: 4-Ethoxy-m-
phenylenediamine, 207 SCIENCE 907 (1980) (reporting on mutagenicity of new hair dye ingre-
dient that replaces former hair dye ingredient, 4-methoxy-m-phenylenediamine, which was
also mutagenic).
13 See, e.ag Thomas M. Burbacher, Neurotoxic Effects of Gasoline and Gasoline Constituents
13 (Nat'i Inst. of Health Envtl. Health Persp. Supp. No. 6, Dec. 1993) (reporting that
various components of gasoline are "neuroactive," at levels currently found in gasoline,
1997]
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worst a low risk of latent harms, the existing liability system creates
social costs that are undesirable and unnecessary.' 4 But until some
preliminary safety testing is done, it is virtually impossible to sort prod-
ucts into their appropriate risk categories and, ultimately, to make
safer products legally superior and financially more competitive.
This Article investigates this failure of the common-law causation
rule in toxic torts, explores the problems it creates, and discusses how
this failure might be corrected without radically overhauling the tort
system or imposing devastating costs on manufacturing firms.15 The
analysis proceeds in five sections. In Part I, two very distinct categories
of scientific uncertainty are identified that courts and commentators
tend to blur together when considering proof requirements for causa-
tion-information that cannot be known due to the limitations of sci-
entific experimentation ("trans-scientific uncertainties") and
information that could be known, but is not, due to a lack of reason-
able investment in scientific research ("preventable scientific uncer-
tainties"). Part II discusses the common-law courts' failure to separate
these two very different types of uncertainty in adjudicating causation.
Rather than assigning responsibility for basic testing to the manufac-
turer, the courts place the entire burden of developing both types of
information on the plaintiff. Part III highlights the theoretical defi-
ciencies of the common-law approach. Part IV considers the adverse
social ramifications of the current causation rule, which include dis-
couraging scientific research, underdeterring manufacturers, un-
dercompensating victims, and applying an otherwise clear causation
rule inconsistently. Finally, Part V argues for a legal reform that better
aligns the law with tort theory and public expectations.
and that the neurotoxic effects of chronic, low-level exposure to gasoline have not been
studied).
14 See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
15 Little theoretical attention has been focussed on the effect of liability rules on in-
centives to obtain optimal safety information. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation
Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1122 (1993) (noting that not enough is
known about how liability rules create incentives for obtaining information on risk to de-
sign an effective system); Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about
Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259, 259 n.1 (1992) (observing that incentives for obtaining infor-
mation regarding risks created by liability rules "have not been studied systematically"). It
appears that no effort has been made to determine the effect of liability rules on safety
testing for latent harms, either empirically or through a systematic analysis of the case law.
Yet this inquiry provides the foundation for both liability rules and regulations governing




THE TYPES OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES IN Toxic
TORT CASES
Toxic tort cases typically involve claims against manufacturers for
a variety of harms that result from occupational, environmental, or
consumer exposures to toxic products or wastes.' 6 In most toxic tort
cases, a person is exposed to a toxic product and decades later be-
comes afflicted with cancer or another ailment that cannot always be
traced to a single substance or cause. 17 The scientific uncertainties
that plague proof of cause-and-effect in such cases fall roughly into
two categories-(1) "trans-scientific uncertainties" that cannot be re-
solved by contemporary science due to the limitations of experimenta-
tion, and (2) "preventable scientific uncertainties" that result from
incomplete testing.18
A. Trans-scientific Uncertainties in Toxic Tort Cases
Some of the information critical to determining cause-and-effect
between a chemical and resulting latent harms is simply unknowable
due to inherent limitations in scientific experimentation. Nuclear
physicist Alvin Weinberg first identified these gaps in knowledge as
trans-scientific-"questions which can be asked of science and yet
which cannot be answered by science."19 In contrast to the uncertainty that
is characteristic of all of science, in which "the answer" is accompa-
16 Included in the definition of "toxic tort" for the purposes of this analysis are
worker compensation suits arising from a worker's exposure to a toxic substance that alleg-
edly causes latent harms such as cancer. For detailed definitions of toxic tort cases, see
Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1222-26 (1987) (providing an
overview of toxic torts in a nutshell); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Expo-
sure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HIARv. L. Rv. 851, 851-55 (1984)
(describing the characteristics and increased frequency of toxic tort litigation). For an
extended discussion of specific mass and isolated toxic tort cases, see Gerald W. Boston, A
Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experi-
ence, 18 COLUM.J. ENvrL. L. 181, 274-351 (1993).
17 See generally SHEILAJASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
IN AMERICA 119-23 (1995) (discussing the imperfect state of scientific knowledge used to
prove causation in toxic tort cases).
18 For alternative frameworks for analyzing scientific issues at stake in toxic tort cases,
see Boston, supra note 16, at 191 (arguing that "[t]he mistake of many commentators and
courts is to assume that all cases should be decided by precisely the same standards of
proof regardless of the mass or isolated nature of the exposures"); Troyen A. Brennan,
Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and
Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 23-26 (1989) (cate-
gorizing cases based on types of toxicological uncertainties at issue in proving causation);
Farber, supra note 16, at 1251-58 (chastising scholars for not recognizing the diversity of
toxic tort cases and breaking causation questions into six subcategories of cases).
19 Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209 (1972). As Dr.
Weinberg pointed out, trans-scientific gaps typically result regardless of large investments
in time, funding, and scientific effort. See id. at 213.
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nied by some level of unpreventable statistical noise or uncertainty,
the answers to trans-scientific questions are uncertain because scien-
tists cannot even perform experiments to test relevant hypotheses.
These limitations on testing arise from various ethical, informational,
and technological constraints. 20
In toxic tort cases, the greatest trans-scientific uncertainties relate
to whether the results of studies on animals are applicable to humans,
an extrapolation made unavoidable because ethical mores typically
prohibit direct testing on humans.2 1 Although researchers generally
assume that animals can serve as surrogates for humans in research
related to the carcinogenicity of a substance,22 considerable uncer-
20 For example, some of the data that would provide critical information regarding
the effects of a toxin are too expensive to obtain. Thomas 0. McGarity notes that:
[In order] to demonstrate with ninety-five percent confidence that the car-
cinogenic response rate [in animals] is less than one in a million, an experi-
menter need only feed three million animals at the human exposure rate
and compare the response with three million control animals that have
been raised under identical conditions but with no exposure to the
chemical.
Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. Lj. 729, 733-34
(1979) (footnote omitted). Obviously such "mega-mouse" experiments are never under-
taken since "it would require feeding and caring for six million rodents for eighteen to
twenty-four months." Id. at 734. Time constraints also limit the ability of science to answer
a causation question. See Nicholas A. Ashford et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of
Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 297, 313-14
(1983) ("Depending on the available data base, a study may take from two to forty years to
complete.... In the many situations where a delay will be inappropriate, the agency will
have to treat the question of carcinogenic risk as if it were a trans-scientific issue."). Finally,
a bona fide split in the theories accepted by the scientific community on a particular point
may cause certain questions to remain unresolvable. See id. at 314 ("Even when dealing
with a scientific issue rather than a trans-scientific one, scientists may disagree on the
proper scientific interpretation of the data .... For these issues, as for trans-scientific
issues, science cannot now provide an answer.").
21 See, e.g., COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB.
HEALTH, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAG-
ING THE PROCESS 22 (1983) (describing limitations in toxicity testing due in part to the
moral prohibition against releasing untested chemicals into environment); cf. McGarity,
supra note 20, at 743 & n.67 (observing that while carcinogenicity testing on humans is
morally unacceptable, some officials at EPA nevertheless proposed a study in which mas-
sive doses of cancer-causing fungicides were to be fed to Mexican citizens and to convicts
who volunteered at the Tennessee state prison). Thus, for public health studies, scientists
must be satisfied with extrapolations from studies on animals which cannot, in most cases,
be based completely on scientific inferences. See id. at 743-45. For an excellent in-depth
discussion of the specific limitations of science in establishing the causal relationship be-
tween toxic agents and latent harms, see Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency
of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy ofAgent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,
86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 646-58 (1992).
22 See, e.g., I. Bernard Weinstein, Mitogenesis Is Only One Factor in Carcinogenesis, 251
SCIENCE 387, 388 (1991) (reporting on how "virtually all of the specific chemicals known to
be carcinogenic in humans are also positive in the rodent bioassays" and how additional
chemicals known to cause cancer in animals may later be determined to be carcinogenic);.
see also COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUN-
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tainty remains regarding the comparative sensitivity of animals and
humans to potential toxins.23 The relationship between the ter-
atogenicity (propensity to cause birth defects) of a product on animals
and on humans is even more tentative. 24
The trans-scientific uncertainties associated with determining a
cause-and-effect relationship are also problematic, even when some
segment of the human population has been exposed to a potentially
toxic substance.2 5 The inability of epidemiologists to rule out many
factors that can adversely affect an individual's health often preclude
statistical conclusions regarding the effects of a particular substance
on exposed populations. For example, persons who smoke compli-
CIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 58-59 (1994) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND
JUDGMENT] (concluding that studies on animals can be used in risk assessments when epi-
demiological data is unavailable and listing their comparable advantages and
disadvantages).
23 The Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants for the National
Research Council has observed:
There are reasons based on both biologic principles and empirical observa-
tions to support the hypothesis that many forms of biologic responses, in-
cluding toxic responses, can be extrapolated across mammalian species,
including Homo sapiens, but the scientific basis of such extrapolation is not
established with sufficient rigor to allow broad and definitive generaliza-
tions to be made.
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 22, at 59 (citation omitted). The committee identified
"[o]ne of the most important reasons for species differences" as inter-species variation in
"chemical metabolism." Id.
Other areas of scientific uncertainty include whether all tumors are indicative of
chronic effects or whether only malignant tumors should be counted in determining carci-
nogenicity, whether the results of high-dose tests can demonstrate possible effects at low
doses, and even whether the selection of the test animal was appropriate. See, e.g., id. at 85-
86; Green, supra note 21, at 654-56.
24 See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, REPRODU-TIVE HEALTH HAZARD IN THE WORK-
PLACE 168 (1985) [hereinafter OTA, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS] (pointing out the
many differences in reproductive processes between humans and animals). Nevertheless,
animal studies have proven very enlightening in some cases. See, e.g., DAVID BRUSICK, PRIN-
CIPLES OF GENETIC TOxICOLOGY 109-10 (1980) (discussing the usefulness of rodent studies
in determining the causes of some genetic mutations in humans that may express them-
selves as reproductive disorders).
25 Epidemiology studies are often conducted in workplace settings when exposure
rates are more consistent from individual to individual, although the limited pool of work-
ers may make the sample size too small to detect statistically significant associations. See,
e.g., OTA, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS, supra note 24, at 166-67. Epidemiology studies
are also conducted on exposures occurring in other environments. Statistically significant
results may be even more unlikely in these latter studies, however, since exposure rates are
often more variable and difficult to measure ex ante. (Even in occupational settings, epi-
demiologists can encounter difficulties in determining exposure rates and separating out
other causal factors. SeeJOSEPH H. HIGHLAND ET AL., MALIGNANT NEGLECT 48 (1979)).
Even when results are significant, they typically are regarded as demonstrating only an
association between a suspected carcinogen and various types of cancer that must be re-
fined and clarified through laboratory studies. See Norton Nelson, Environmental Cancer:.
Interplay Between Laboratory and Field Studies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS ON TOxICoLOGY., TOxICOLOGY AS A PREDICTrE SCIENCE 327, 327 (Gabriel L. Plaa
& WAM. Duncan eds., 1978).
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cate epidemiological analysis because smoking can act synergistically
(as in the case of asbestos) to dramatically increase the risk of can-
cer.26 In addition, scientists may be unable to draw definitive conclu-
sions regarding cause and effect due to uncertainty regarding the
causal mechanisms of many birth defects and cancers.2 7 As a result,
epidemiological studies often provide only limited assistance in deter-
mining the human toxicity of a substance.
B. Preventable Scientific Uncertainties in Toxic Tort Cases
1. Preventable Scientific Uncertainties Defined
Although the "trans-scientific" limitations of science are signifi-
cant, science can provide considerable information about the long-
term risks a chemical poses to human health.28 Over a decade ago,
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences
("NRC") recognized the need to conduct cost-effective toxicity tests.
As a result, it identified a battery of thirty-three laboratory tests that
scientists can use to reach some general conclusions regarding the
potential of a chemical to cause cancer, neurological and reproduc-
tive hazards, and birth defects.2 9 Such tests generally provide, within
26 See, e.g., OTA, REPRODUCTIVE HEATH HAzARDs, supra note 24, at 167 (explaining the
effects of confounding factors, which are variables that are "correlated with both exposure
and outcome"). Other potentially devastating methodological constraints include (1) the
need for large sample sizes (required to obtain statistically significant results); (2) large
variations and uncertainties in measuring individual exposures; and (3) difficulties associ-
ated with identifying specific harms. See id. at 165-67. These methodological constraints
are particularly significant when attempting to quantify risks just slightly above background
levels. See, e.g., Green, supra note 21, at 653 (discussing the literature demonstrating that if
a toxic "agent has only a small or modest effect, it will go undetected in a cohort study
unless a massive number of subjects are included").
27 See JUDITH S. MAUSNER & SHIRA KRAMER, EPIDEMIOLOGY. AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT
180-87 (2d ed. 1985) (describing role of interpretation in drawing inferences regarding
cause and effect from epidemiology studies); see also BRIAN MAcMAHON & THOMAS F. PUGH,
EPIDEMIOI.OGY PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 18-20 (1970) (same).
28 In answering the larger question regarding the human health effects of a sub-
stance, the subquestions that science can answer generally alternate with those that science
cannot answer. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1622-27 (1995) (describing how science and trans-scientific questions
alternate in risk assessment); see also Applegate, supra note 1, at 266 (noting that "not all
uncertainty is 'intractable' [but] most uncertainty results from the difficulty of learning
about toxic substances with limited resources");John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk,
Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 286
n.35 (1992) (noting that "given a lack of understanding of carcinogenic mechanisms,
there may be a degree of refinement of estimates of toxicity which may ultimately resist
quantification, but that level of refinement is well beyond the lack of basic data that pres-
enty plagues toxic substances regulation"). See generally Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains
and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 469, 502-09 (1988) (providing a thorough discussion of four types of studies
that can be done to determine carcinogenicity).
29 See STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF Toxic AND POTENTIALLY Toxic CHEMI-
CALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT'L TOxICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
[Vol. 82:773
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several orders of magnitude, a rough idea of the human health risks
posed by a product.30 For substances in commerce that are likely to
have more limited paths for exposure to humans, the NRC recognized
that as few as eleven of the thirty-three recommended toxicity tests
could be sufficient for a health assessment,3 ' while an initial basic
screening of the health risks posed by a substance could be accom-
plished with one or two tests.3 2
To determine which scientific uncertainties regarding a chemi-
cal's toxicity are "preventable," safety testing can be split into a very
basic or "minimal" level of research and a much higher or "compre-
hensive" level of research. Minimal safety research generally consists
Toxicnv TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 60, 151-63 (1984)
[hereinafter Toxicrry TESTING]. The NRC also listed basic criteria that should be followed
in undertaking the studies, id. at 61-62, and preferred protocols for conducting the studies,
id. at 62-64, 165-68. For a more recent and more detailed identification of the series of
tests used to determine a range of health hazards covering a wide range of exposures and
resulting harms, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 798 (1996) (providing detailed testing protocol for test-
ing under authority of TSCA). For a more accessible overview of the five major categories
of long-term tests frequently used in toxic tort cases (epidemiology, animal toxicology, in
vitro testing, chemical structural analysis, and case reports), see Green, supra note 21, at
644-58.
30 The NRC identifies five general categories of tests that provide general information
on acute, subchronic and chronic effects, effects on reproductive or development biology,
and mutagenicity. See ToxicrrY TESTING, supra note 29, at 45-49. Although these tests can-
not provide a substitute for more direct testing on humans, or for better understanding
the "'how' and 'why' of toxic injury itself," the NRC determined that the tests provided a
"'basic measuring stick'" for determining the hazardous propensities of a chemical. Id. at
82; see also SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 22, at 57-67 (discussing types of studies that
provide preliminary information about the toxic hazards of a chemical). When they are
available, "[e]pidemiologic studies clearly provide the most relevant kind of information
for hazard identification." Id. at 57. Unfortunately, however, the assistance provided by
these studies is often very limited due to methodological and other constraints. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
31 Toxcrv TESTING, supra note 29, at 161 app. G (listing the eleven tests). Ten addi-
tional tests may be appropriate depending on "available data and information." See id. at
163. For a list of tests deemed appropriate for the major categories of chemical products,
see id. at 151-63 apps. B-G; id. at 114-16 tbl. 19 (listing tests in order of priority for seven
major chemical categories). For the purposes of government testing, in fact, the need to
devote scarce testing resources to the greatest risks led the NRC to conclude that the gov-
ernment could forgo all testing on low-risk substances, even though a modicum of testing
would be optimal. Id. at 319-36 (noting that for some untested chemicals that are mem-
bers of chemical groups not associated with cancer, limited exposure data may constitute
all that is required in NRC's model prioritization of testing needs for government testing
programs).
32 See id. at 45-47 (identifying five basic tests as necessary to obtain "minimal toxicity
information"). The NRC report is somewhat confusing with regard to which tests are nec-
essary for basic screening. It recognizes that only one test is sufficient to constitute mini-
mal toxicity information for unregulated chemicals in commerce, but it does not clarify
which tests are sufficient for conducting a "partial health assessment" Id. at 12 (distin-
guishing minimal information from information sufficient for a partial or a full health
assessment); id. at 119 (noting that for chemicals in commerce only one of five basic tests
was sufficient to satisfy the "minimal toxicity information" requirement, but not defining
what constitutes testing sufficient for a "partial health assessment").
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of one or more short-term laboratory tests designed to determine if a
product is likely to constitute a serious hazard.3 3 The second level of
testing, or the comprehensive level of research, consists of a series of
studies sufficient to resolve most remaining, scientifically answerable
questions regarding the extent of the hazard.3 4 These studies consti-
tute a full assessment. Depending on the concentration of the prod-
uct and routes of exposure, this second level of testing might require a
substantial investment of resources and time.3 5
2. The Extent Of Preventable Scientic Uncertainty
An examination of the research conducted on the long-term
safety of chemicals reveals that considerable preventable scientific un-
certainty exists, even at the minimal level of testing. In its comprehen-
sive 1984 study, which still remains largely up-to-date,3 6 the NRC
found that for approximately eighty percent of the estimated 48,523
unregulated chemicals in commerce,3 7 no toxicity information exis-
ted.3 8 For the remaining chemicals in commerce, scientific uncer-
-3 See, e.g.,John H. Weisburger & Gary M. Williams, Carcinogen Testing: Current Problems
and New Approaches, 214 Sci. 401, 404-06 (1981) (providing a decision-point approach to
carcinogen testing, with chemical structure analysis and battery of short-term in vitro tests
forming "the basis for preliminary decision-making" regarding carcinogenicity of a sub-
stance and advocating that short-term and long-term rodent studies be used more "selec-
tively" or as a "last resort" due to their time and expense). For a substance that poses, in
the worst case scenario, a de minimis opportunity for exposure (e.g., no more than fifty
persons over the lifetime of the chemical) no testing could conceivably constitute a mini-
mal level of research. Cf Arlen, supra note 15, at 1121 n.93 (arguing that "[e]fficiency
does not require that products be tested for every possible risk").
34 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. pt. 312 (1996) (listing testing requirements imposed for drugs
under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA')); 40 C.F.R. pt. 158 (1996) (identifying
testing requirements for registration imposed under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA")); id. pt. 798 (listing various preferred tests for assessing range
of impacts of chemicals on human health under Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA")).
35 See, e.g., Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States:
Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993) (reporting that the average
cost of developing a new drug in U.S. is $231 million and development takes 10-12 years).
36 See, e.g., Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENWrL. L.J. 405,
413 (1995) (arguing that "[l]ittle has changed since the National Research Council (NRC)
noted ten years ago that between seventy-three and eight-nine percent of chemicals in
commerce have almost no toxicity data upon which even a qualitative identification of
hazard can be made").
37 See Toxicr=v TESTING, supra note 29, at 12 fig.2 (documenting the number of chem-
icals in three categories of "chemicals in commerce").
38 See id. at 84 tbl.7, 94 tbl.10, 117 tbl.20. The NRC also reported that the existence of
toxicity information appeared to be independent from the extent of production: "Chemi-
cals in commerce with indicated 1977 production of at least 1 million pounds have been
tested no more often or more adequately than substances with 1977 production of less
than 1 million pounds." Id. at 119. In contrast, the NRC found that considerably more
testing was done on those categories of chemicals, like pesticides and drugs, that are gener-
ally required to undergo testing and regulatory approval before marketing. See infra note
51. For a description of the design of the NRC study, see id. at 81; see also Myra Karstadt &
Renee Bobal, Availability of Epidemiologic Data on Humans Exposed to Animal Carcinogens, 2
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tainty was also prevalent-a full health assessment could not be
completed for any of these chemicals.3 9 See Figure 1.
FicuRE 1
ToxicrIY TESTING INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON SEVEN
CATEGORIES OF CHEMICALS
Size of Estimated Mean Percent
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In addition, the NRC found that the quality of testing was inadequate
for over thirty percent of the studies that had been conducted.
40
TERATOGENESIS CARCINOGENESIS & MUTAGENESIS 151 (1982) (reporting that in 1982, only
13 of 75 animal carcinogens had been the subject of an epidemiologic study).
39 See Toxicrrn TESTING, supra note 29, at 118 fig.2, 119.
40 See id. at 94 tbl.10 (reporting that 57 of 170 total tests done on chemicals in com-
merce were "inadequate" with retesting needed and that the adequacy of the testing on 29




3. The Failure of Markets and Regulatory Programs to Resolve
Preventable Scientific Uncertainties
Market forces, internal management practices, and regulatory
shortcomings combine to create an environment where preventable
scientific uncertainty is prevalent. From a market perspective, com-
prehensive testing programs are not only costly and time-consum-
ing,41 but they do little to improve the marketability of a product.42
Consumers appear to assume that most products are safe, regardless
of the presence or absence of costly research programs. 43 The long
delay from exposure to injury, the relatively low probability of harm,
and the unlikelihood that customers will be able to link latent adverse
effects with the manufacturer provide further assurance that the mar-
ket will not discriminate between a tested and an untested product.44
41 Following TSCA protocols, the costs of conducting research on the possible carci-
nogenicity and teratogenicity of a chemical ranged in 1982 from $300,000 to $700,000 per
chemical. SeeLYNDON B.JOHNSON SCH. OF PUB. AFF., POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT No.
50, THE Toxic SuBSTANcES CONTROL ACT: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION 121 (1982); see also
Paul R. Portney, Toxic Substance Policy and the Protection of Human Health, in CURRENT ISSUES
IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 105, 136 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1978) (reporting similar
estimates). More recent reports identify the costs of carcinogenicity testing at $2-4 million.
See National Toxicology Program, Annual Plan for Fiscal Year 1996, at 2 (Nov. 1996).
These estimates do not include the costs of conducting epidemiological studies, which are
traditionally much more difficult to gauge due to the varying designs and test subjects.
42 Scholars have observed market failures in the production of safety information on
latent hazards. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette &James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138
U. PA. L. REX,. 1027, 1038 (1990) (arguing that "[c]ommonly, producer firms simply won't
have good information about risk (often because, as we shall see, they are not stimulated to
have it) or, if they do, won't act on it or share it with typically underinformed consumers
and employees"); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795, 1810-17 (1989) (describing market
failure in safety testing of chemical products). See infra Parts IVA-B.
In addition, safety research in its present form is a "free good": if a manufacturer
conducts safety tests and determines that a product is safe, other manufacturers benefit
from this research but pay nothing. See Applegate, supra note 1, at 298-99 (noting that
safety information regarding chemicals "is a public good... which reduces to practically
nil any return to these persons on investment in research"); see also infra note 272 (discuss-
ing how to solve free-rider problems).
43 See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 15, at 1120-21 (arguing that market failure exists in the
manufacture of toxic products because consumers do not know of risks, do not discover
risks on their own, and often "do not expect the product to be risky in the first place").
The same assumptions are often made by employees who encounter latent risks in the
workplace. See, e.g., W.L.F. Felstiner & Peter Siegelman, Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deter-
rence for Latent Injuries, 11 L. & POL'Y 309, 317-18 (1989) (arguing that for a number of
reasons employees may not discover or understand the extent of latent risks at the
workplace).
44 See GEORGE FADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RE-
SPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 49-51 (1983) (recognizing that, de-
spite the importance of reputation as an incentive, the decades of time that pass and the
likelihood that hazards will remain undiscovered unless a product causes a signature dis-
ease may significantly mute this reputational incentive); Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at
1039-40 (describing the latent, probabilistic, and diffuse nature of public risks as
"dampen [ing] the incentives otherwise created by reputation and profit concerns," and
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In contrast, if a manufacturer does invest in testing, and in doing so
discovers that some risk of latent harm exists, marketing the product
typically will be much more difficult.45
Internal management practices common to most firms also con-
tribute to the failure of manufacturers to develop scientific informa-
tion on the safety of their products. In their study of nine companies,
Eads and Reuter observed that the fractionated nature of the design
process and the individual incentives for staff and management to get
a product to the market are likely to lead to an underestimation or
undertesting of hazards, or to lead corporate officials to mistakenly as-
sume that someone within the corporation has conducted safety test-
ing.46 The well-established short-term profit motivations of corporate
officials, who tend to concentrate their efforts on "pursu[ing] tangible
gains, rather than ... avoid[ing] ethereal losses,"47 further reinforce
the bias against testing. Ethical codes are viewed as providing little
that these "characteristics skew the incentives of presumably self-interested producers and
consumers" to discount such risks); cf. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the
Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 776-77
(1983) (making a similar observation regarding the tendency of manufacturers to discount
their potential liability based on the "possibility of escaping part or all of their responsibil-
ity in the long run as a result of government intervention").
45 See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 42, at 1813-14 (describing toxicity data as "negative
features of chemical products" which potentially deter consumers); Shavell, supra note 15,
at 266-67 (noting that obtaining information on the toxicity of a product may have a nega-
tive value).
46 EADS & REtJTER, supra note 44, at 56-57 (describing the fractionated divisions
within companies typically involved in product-design and concluding that "unless a spe-
cific decision is made to incorporate [safety considerations] in the design reviews and asso-
ciated design activities, there is likely to be no way of assuring that safety considerations are
surfaced and resolved appropriately"). Corporate structure may insulate top management
from information about safety issues because this information is dispersed among various
"subordinate parts of the organization." Id. at 60-61. Eads and Reuter's review of the liter-
ature and their own case study research reveals that ultimately the commitment of manage-
ment to safety exerts the greatest influence on the extent and quality of safety research. Id.
at 64-65, 99-101. For a different view, see Albert Flores, Engineering Ethics in Organizational
Contexts: A Case Study, in DESIGNING FOR SAFETY. ENGINEERING ETHICS IN ORGANIZATIONAL
CoNTEXTS 3, 7, 35 (Albert Flores ed., 1982) (concluding that Monsanto Co. dedicated
careful attention to safety concerns in product development). ButseeEADS & REuTER, supra
note 44, at 87-88 (raising questions about Flores's research). See generally discussion infra
note 144 (discussing Monsanto's safety program).
47 Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1041. Tangible gains take the form of immediate
liability and market pressures, rather than the threat of liability that will be delayed for
decades. See id. at 1040 (observing that "[t] he lag between cause and effect shelters manag-
ers from the consequences of their decisions: evidence disappears, or the managers do").
In his review of the literature, James Henderson observed:
[M]anagers who defer taking necessary action may reasonably assume that
they will be rewarded for the short-run benefits derived from their deferral
tactics and that they will have been promoted to another position, possibly
with another corporation, by the time the negative, long-run implications
of their tactics have fully materialized.
Henderson, supra note 44, at 781; see also infra note 143.
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counterbalance to the tendency of businesses to ignore long-term
safety concerns in the manufacture of potentially toxic products. 48
Governmental efforts to correct the underproduction of safety
information only partially offset a manufacturer's tendency to remain
ignorant regarding the latent effects of products. Several federal
regulatory programs do require safety testing prior to, and in rare
cases after, registration of the product,49 but these testing require-
ments have been severely criticized for their less than perfect
implementation.50  Even giving these testing requirements
48 In their study of safety research, Eads and Reuter conclude that although ethical
concerns might influence some design decisions, "there is little to suggest that the raised
ethical consciousness of professional groups involved in product design is likely to have a
major influence on the safety performance of U.S. manufacturers." EADS & REUTER, supra
note 44, at 44. They base this conclusion on several professional realities that serve to
supplant individual or societal ethical concerns. First, in contrast to doctors, engineers
engaged in the design of products do not work independently; instead their concerns are
supplanted by the larger interests of the firm. See id. Second, as a profession, engineers
are fragmented and hence there is little opportunity for a unifying ethical code. See id.
Third, professional associations do not appear to require many of the engineers to be
licensed in order to practice. See id. at 44-45. Fourth, there appears to be little evidence of
enforcement action taken against those engineers who are members of professional as-
sociations for ethical violations. See id. at 45. Fifth, many professional societies do not
appear concerned with ethical codes in any case. See id. Sixth, a product goes through a
complicated series of stages of innovation and review, making any particular individual or
unit typically unable to control the outcome. See id. Seventh, and finally, ethics remains an
under-emphasized concern in the education of design professionals. See id. at 46. Eads
and Reuter also observe that likely.
the most fundamental problem is that the safety of a product is not a matter
that can be readily determined by a single individual involved in the design
process. The typical product goes through many stages of design review;
each individual is responsible for only some component of that review.
Id. at 45.
49 The primary statutes requiring such testing are the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), (c) (5) (D) (requiring that for
licensing under FIFRA the registrant has the initial burden of demonstrating "it will not
generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment"); the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994); see, e.g., id. § 2603(a) (requiring
testing when there is an "unreasonable risk of injury" and insufficient data on a chemical
substance or mixture, or when substantial quantities will enter the environment and "sig-
nificant or substantial human exposure" will result); id. § 2604(a), (b)(1)(A) (1994) (re-
quiring submission of test data at time of manufacture of new chemical or use); id.
§ 2604(e) (providing EPA with the powers to impose follow-up testing on chemicals of
concern); and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (TFDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994);
see, e.g., id. § 348(b) (2) (requiring manufacturers of a food additive to file a petition detail-
ing testing before additive can be used); id. § 355(b) (requiring same for new drugs); id.
§ 350a(b) (2) (B) (requiring same for infant formula); id. § 351(b) (same for drugs that
vary in strength, quality, and purity than approved drugs); id. § 360b(b) (1) (same for new
animal drugs).
50 There is substantial evidence that the regulatory agencies have done a disap-
pointingjob overseeing safety testing for many products within theirjurisdictions. See, e.g.,
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAWN CARE PESTICIDES: RISKS REMAIN UNCERTAIN WHILE PROHIB-
ITED SAFETY CLAIMS CONTINUE 12-14, 20 (1990) (criticizing EPA and Federal Trade Com-
mission for inadequate testing and investigation of the long-term safety of 34 of the most
widely used lawn care pesticides); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Toxic SUBSTANCES: EPA's
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the benefit of the doubt,51 the vast majority of products remain
largely unaffected-testing is simply not required for most
chemicals. 52
CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS 17-21 (1990) [hereinafter GAO,
EPA's CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM] (reporting alarming delays in EPA's issuance of test
rules requiring manufacturers to generate additional safety data on their products, and
noting that as of 1989 the "EPA had received complete test data for only six chemicals and
had not finished assessing any of them for possible further action"); ToxlcrrY TESTING,
supra note 29, at 8-9, 97 (reporting on the low quality of toxicity testing of drugs, pesticides,
and other regulated products, although "[tihe major portion of testing need[s] [did ulti-
mately] result[ ] from failure to do required tests, rather than from conducting tests in a
manner inappropriate for the purpose of health-hazard assessment"); Applegate, supra
note 1, at 313-14 (observing that for various reasons the EPA has not been aggressive in
using its authority to force companies to generate safety information on existing chemicals
or post-license information on new ones in the implementation of FIFRA).
Some problems appear to be procedural. Under TSCA, for example, manufacturers
are required to keep records of allegations of "significant" harmful effects caused by their
chemicals, see 15 U.S.C. § 2614(3) (1994), but there is no deadline for recording the allega-
tion. See, e.g., David J. Hayes & Ann Claassen, 7SCA Section 8. Key Isues, in HAZARDOUS
WASTES, SUPERFUND, AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 191, 202 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 28-
30, 1993), available in WESTIAW, C864 AlI-ABA 191. Although the number of enforce-
ment actions threatened or filed could not be determined, published rulings for violation
of this requirement have been issued in only one case. SeeALM Corp. v. U.S. EPA, Region
II, 974 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1992). The EPA also has the statutory authority to require that
companies produce health and safety information, but it has identified only a modest list
of chemicals for which it demands this information. See40 C.F.R. § 716.120 (1996) (listing
a total of 346 chemicals requiring such study, only 45 (byJune 1997 this number will drop
to 15) of which have an unexpired sunset date). Even the "substantial risk" disclosure
requirements set forth under Section 8(e) of TSCA, see 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1994), appear
to have been underutilized. Although the EPA obtained authority in 1977, the EPA still
has not promulgated regulations clarifying its authority. See Hayes & Claassen, supra, at
208. Significant ambiguities thus still surround the point at which a manufacturer has
acquired information that "reasonably supports the conclusion that a chemical substance
or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment." Id.
51 When the NRC compared the amount of toxicity information available for seven
general product categories, it did see dramatically greater testing for those categories of
chemicals, like pesticides and drugs, that are subject to more extensive safety regulation.
See, e.g., TOxiclTy TESTING, supra note 29, at 118-21 fig.2 (concluding that categories of
chemicals subject to testing requirements have more complete toxicity testing available
and that it is possible to conduct "at least a partial health-hazard assessment" of 94% of
pesticides, 92% of drugs, 62% of cosmetic ingredients, and 95% of food additives, but that
this type of assessment is possible only for about 10% of the unregulated chemicals in
commerce).
52 See ToxicTy TESTING, supra note 29, at 48 tbl.4 (listing number of chemicals in
various categories, 74% (over 48,000) of which are identified as largely unregulated chemi-
cals in commerce). Only a subset of drugs, food additives, pesticide products, and a small
universe of chemicals are actively regulated by agencies, although in theory existing statu-
tory authorities would allow agencies to do far more with regard to their regulation. See,
e.g., Applegate, supra note 1, at 318-32 (proposing refinements to TSCA to better allow the
EPA to obtain toxicity information on more chemicals). For example, although testing is
not required, statutes or regulatory authorities often require manufacturers to disclose in-
formation suggesting that a product is hazardous. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c) (1994) (stating
that the EPA may require industries to keep records of "significant adverse reactions...
alleged to have been caused" by a regulated chemical); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136f(a) (1994)
(same under FIFRA); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1) (1994) (same under RCRA); id. § 9603(d)
(same under CERCLA).
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In fact, in some circumstances existing regulatory programs may
create additional incentives for manufacturers to remain ignorant
rather than invest in developing information on the long-term safety
of their products. 53 If a manufacturer voluntarily reports research
demonstrating that its product might not be safe 5 4 it is likely to be
rewarded only with a demand by a regulatory agency either to con-
duct additional testing5 5 or to undergo lengthy regulatory proceed-
ings regarding possible market restrictions on its product.56 In
53 See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 42, at 1825-27.
54 This reporting of adverse information in health or safety studies is typically re-
quired by statute. See 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a) (2) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d) (1994) (requiring
collection of toxicity research under TSCA); 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (3) (B) (i) (II) (1994) (sim-
ilar requirements under RCRA); 40 C.FR. § 152.125 (1996) (implementing similar re-
quirements under FIFRA); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1994) (TSCA requirement that
industry report information that "reasonably supports the conclusion that such substance
or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury"); 21 U.S.C. § 350a(e) (1994) (authorizing
the FDCA requirement that manufacturers report any "knowledge which reasonably sup-
ports the conclusion" that its infant formula is adulterated); id. § 355(k) (stating the FDCA
reporting requirements for approval on new drugs); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(b), (d) (2)
(1996) (listing Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA') requirement that employers
report the possible health effects of hazardous chemicals to their employees if there is
significant evidence of a hazard, which is demonstrated by one "statistically significant"
study conducted in accordance with scientifically accepted methods). Perhaps the most
comprehensive disclosure requirement arises under TSCA. chemical manufacturers must
notify the EPA of their new products and submit Premanufacture Notices ("PMNs") that
provide the results of all safety tests, as well as information regarding chemical composition
and other chemical characteristics. Based on the PMN filings, the EPA determines
whether further testing or regulation is necessary. See 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1994). If no test-
ing information is available, the EPA typically considers whether the chemical structure of
a product or its components are sufficiently similar to other known toxins to necessitate
further testing by the manufacturer. See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c) (2) (A)-(B) (1994) (allowing
exemption if equivalent to regulated substance and testing would be duplicative).
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1994). The EPA may require a manufacturer to conduct
further testing on a product if it finds that product "may present an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment," § 2603(a) (1) (A) (i), or if there "may be significant or
substantial human exposure to [the product]," § 2603 (a) (1) (B) (i), and if there is insuffi-
cient data to reasonably determine its effects, § 2603(a)(1)(A)(ii). See also id. § 2607(d)
(stating that for listed chemicals, manufacturers conducting safety tests voluntarily must
notify the EPA of the results of safety tests); id. § 2604(h) (1) (A), (h) (2) (requiring testing
for a new use of a chemical unless it will not present "an unreasonable risk of injury"). See
generally Hayes & Claassen, supra note 50, at 205 (outlining the reporting procedures under
the federal regulations).
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994) (allowing the EPA to issue regulations regarding
distribution or production of products under TSCA if the EPA finds that the chemical "will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment"); see also Lars Noah,
The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know"from the "Need to Know" about Con-
sumer Product Hazards, 11 YALEJ. ON REG. 293, 298-361 (1994) (providing an overview of the
.crazy quilt" of warning requirements governing products that research has revealed pres-
ent some health hazard). Interestingly, only about 10% of substances for which manufac-
turers submit PMNs pursuant to TSCA undergo "some form of restriction." DavidJ. Hayes
& Robert M. Sussman, EPA Activities Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, in HAZARDOUS
WASTES, SUPERFUND, Toxic SUBSTANCEs 299,312 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Oct. 31-Nov. 1,
1994), available in WESTLAW, C667 ALI-ABA 299. For most of this 10%, EPA imposes
some type of "use restrictions, workplace practices, [or] labeling and environmental re-
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contrast, a manufacturer who reports no knowledge of adverse effects
of its product-precisely because it has avoided investigating possible
harms-is likely to be successful in dodging regulatory oversight.5 7
The low proportion of chemical products that are accompanied by
long-term safety research suggests that, at the very least, disclosure re-
quirements do not encourage toxicity research for a large percentage
of potentially toxic products.58
Public testing programs, which are often created as part of a regu-
latory program, also fail to fill the information void. Although govern-
ment testing provides vital information, resource constraints often
limit testing to only a small number of chemicals annually, leaving the
vast majority of products unstudied.59 As of 1987, the government
lease limitations." Id In some cases, manufacturers enter into agreements with the EPA to
conduct further safety testing. See id.
57 Due in part to the TSCA's cumbersome process and the relatively serious findings
the EPA must make before it can require manufacturers to undertake additional safety
testing or otherwise restrict the production or distribution of a product, a manufacturer
who chooses to avoid safety testing is unlikely to be caught by the regulators. See, e.g.,
Applegate, supra note 1, at 319-30 (discussing procedural barriers in TSCA that explain, at
least in part, the EPA's inaction in acquiring toxicity information); see also WILLIAM DRAY-
TON, AMERICA'S Toxic PROTECTION GAP 69, 72 (1984) (noting that through 1983 the EPA
"ha[d] required testing for only 4% of new chemicals" and had obtained voluntary agree-
ments for testing on 84 chemicals); Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic Substances
ControL Cost-Effective Information Development for the Control of Environmental Carcinogens, 27
PUB. POL'Y 333, 336 (1979) (concluding that by focusing on only a few chemicals, govern-
ment testing programs "decrease the chances that others will be controlled"); cf. discussion
supra note 50 and accompanying text (reviewing investigation by the General Accounting
Office).
58 Not surprisingly, only about 17% of the product disclosures required under TSCA
contained any safety information on the long-term effects of the product. See OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PREMANUFAcTURE NOTICES 50-51
(1983). For an insightful discussion of why TSCA appears to have failed in the production
of safety research and suggestions for reform, see Applegate, supra note 1, at 319-32. Simi-
larly, the NRC, in its 1984 study, observed that for "no substance in the... categories of
chemicals in commerce.., is information sufficient to permit a complete health-hazard
assessment. Partial assessments could be made for 10-37% of the substances in the select
universe." Toxicrrv TESTING, supra note 29, at 125.
59 See Applegate, supra note 1, at 306-07 (concluding after careful study that expense
and breadth of the necessary toxicity research prevents the government research programs
from "fill[ingi the existing data gaps on a chemical-by-chemical basis" and recommending
that government instead focus resources on developing better risk assessment methodolo-
gies for using existing limited information). Under 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i), the Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR"), which is funded by responsible parties
and registrants under TSCA and FIFRA, see id. § 9604(i) (5) (D), may provide "consultations
... on health issues relating to exposure to" specific substances. Id. § 9604(i) (4). The
ATSDR may also conduct health assessments at certain EPA Superfund Sites, which typi-
cally requires compiling information on potential exposures at contaminated sites and
keeping records on exposed persons over time. See id. § 9604(i) (6). In litigation, this in-
formation may assist persons in proving exposure or increased health risks associated with
living close to a contaminated site, but it does not address the preliminary issue of whether
scientific research has been done on the potential long-term hazards of individual sub-
stances present at that site. For a list of the government research conducted on specific
substances, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL ToxIcoLoGY PROCRAM:
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had conducted animal carcinogenicity bioassays on only 308 sub-
stances out of 594 that were nominated by various agencies for test-
ing,60 but since that time a gradually shrinking budget has led the
government to test even fewer chemicals. 6'
II
THE COMMON-LAW COURTS' APPROACH TO
SAFETY RESEARCH
Because common-law courts are charged with allocating responsi-
bility between plaintiffs and defendants, one would hope that they
would consider which party is better able to produce scientific infor-
mation when assigning burdens of proof for causation. Yet, in adjudi-
cating toxic tort and related cases, 62 the courts make no such
distinction. 6 3
REVIEW OF CURRENT DHHS, DOE, AND EPA RESEARCH RELATED TO ToxicoLoCY (published
annually).
60 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING CARCINOGENS 160, 174
(1987) [hereinafter REGULATING CARCINOGENS]. In addition, each study of a chemical
takes from approximately six to eight years to complete. See id. at 167 ("Developing proto-
cols, awarding contracts, and performing chemical disposition and prechronic and chronic
tests takes at least 5 years; the evaluation of organs and microscopic sections adds at least
an additional year; and preparation of the report, review, and publication add still more
time.").
61 See, e.g., id. at 161 (noting that "[t]he number of chemicals selected for testing is
consistent with the NTP budget," which was adversely affected by cutbacks in 1986); Lyn-
don, supra note 42, at 1805-06 ("In fiscal year 1987, the federal government allocated $210
million for toxicological research, but in real dollars, the budget for chemical testing was
smaller than the 1980 budget."); cf William J. Broad, Science Research Would Be Hit Hard in
Budget Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at Al (reporting on Republican proposals to cut
government funding of basic science by one-quarter to one-third).
62 For an extended discussion of the types of claims available to plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases, see Wendell B. Alcorn, Jr., Liability Theories for Toxic Torts, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1988, at 3; Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort
Law, 1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. LJ. 1, 26-29 (1993).
63 Many people writing in the toxic tort field take the existence of adequate scientific
information for granted and thus tend to reinforce rather than correct thejudiciary's fail-
ure to recognize the distinction between preventable scientific and trans-scientific uncer-
tainties. See, e.g., Boston, supra note 16, at 366-67 (arguing without support that a rigorous
scientific standard in mass exposure litigation will cause firms to "invest in safety research
and precautionary measures commensurate with the risks potentially posed by the hazard-
ous substances they generate"); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic
Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers' Compensation Systems, 60
FORDHAM L. RE%. 843, 900-04 (1992) (recognizing a lack of research on causation questions
and recommending that plaintiffs' burden be reduced to proving only "general statistical
causation," but assuming that enough scientific information exists to provide evidence for
plaintiffs); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37
UCLA L. REv. 439, 443-51 (1990) (overlooking in analysis of corrective justice that some
uncertainty regarding causation of toxic products is possibly due to negligent failure of
manufacturers to conduct safety testing); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Struc-
ture, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 689,
695-705 (1985) (modelling incentives for long-term safety research, but overlooking the
possibility that because no testing will be done for many chemicals by persons other than
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A. The Causation Rule: Immunity for Ignorance
At present, common-law courts place the entire burden of prov-
ing causation on plaintiffs, a burden that includes responsibility for
resolving both "trans-scientific" and "preventable scientific uncertain-
ties." Causation in tort requires that a plaintiff establish that her harm
was more likely than not caused by a defendant's product.64 Although
the manufacturers, a lack of manufacturer accountability will cause widespread avoidance
of safety testing); Shavell, supra note 15, at 262-68 (arguing that strict liability will lead
defendant to obtain optimal level of information regarding risk based on the mistaken
assumption that plaintiffs have other sources for obtaining information and prevailing on
liability); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1183, 1184-91 (1992) (arguing that strict liability is
appropriate because it is fairer for the manufacturer rather than the victim to bear the risk
from unknowable dangers, but overlooking the possibility that the current burden of proof
on causation could, in theory, lead to less safety testing, less safety, and ultimately more
injured victims); cf. Applegate, supra note 28, at 324 (recognizing numerous remedial data
gaps regarding chemical safety, but suggesting that agencies focus regulation on those sub-
stances for which agencies can readily obtain the most information, even though this pro-
posal would seem to reward scientific ignorance).
Proponents of proportional causation seem to assume both that adequate safety re-
search exists, and that this research will allow for a rough probabilistic estimate of the
contribution of a chemical to a resulting class of harms. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 16, at
1220 (observing that "something of a scholarly consensus exists in favor of making recov-
eries proportional to the probability of causation"). See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond
Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881, 892
(1982) (arguing that tort law should allow "each member of the plaintiff class [to be]
compensated in proportion to the damages sustained by the class as a whole"); Glen 0.
Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713,
759-62 (1982) (contrasting various approaches to probabilistic apportionment of liability);
Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 861-905 (advocating proportionality rule for mass exposure
cases). While the latter assumption has been called under attack by several scholars, see,
e.g., Feldman, supra note 1, at 39-40 (noting that "strong uncertainty about general causa-
tion" causes market-share and proportional-liability schemes to be generally unhelpful); cf.
Farber, supra note 16, at 1251 (arguing that scholars writing in area of proportional liability
only consider one type of case that is not typical of all toxic tort cases), the doubtful availa-
bility of any toxicity testing on a particular carcinogenic substance is consistently over-
looked. See, e.g., id. at 1241 (touting proportional recovery "as a means of compensating
for actual harm given limited information about causation") (emphasis added). Although
the ultimate effect of the proportional reform on firms that have conducted minimal safety
testing will depend on courts' determinations of what constitutes sufficient evidence for
proof of proportional causation, it is possible that the incentive not to test products is
greater under proportional liability because firms with no testing are the only parties as-
sured of avoiding liability.
64 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON E AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAwv OF TORTS § 41, at
269-70 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing that when proving causation, "plaintiff must introduce
evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not
that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result"); Bert Black & David E.
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 782, 749 (1984)
(observing that in toxic tort cases courts generally "have explicitly adopted the preponder-
ance test ... in which the harmfulness of a substance was at issue"); Jean Macchiaroli
Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence after Daubert, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rw,. 889,
895-909 (1994) (discussing causation requirements in toxic tort cases). Sometimes courts
express this test as requiring the plaintiff to establish causation by a "preponderance of the
evidence." See MICHAEL D. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS I4 LAW 66-67 (1978)
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some courts seem content with expert testimony that expresses a prob-
abilistic judgment that the cause-and-effect relationship between
plaintiff and defendant was greater than fifty percent,65 other courts
require "particularistic" evidence that a particular plaintiff's harms
were caused by a particular defendant's product or by-product.66
Despite variations between courts with regard to the sufficiency 67
and the admissibility of various types of scientific causation evidence, 68
all courts require a plaintiff to submit some scientific research demon-
strating that a product is capable of causing latent injuries similar to
her own. 69 As Joseph Sanders observed in his survey of Bendectin
(equating preponderance-of-the-evidence standard with requirement of more than fifty
percent proof of causation); CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 31, at 118 (1935) (same). For a very insightful analysis of how this "more likely than not"
test inappropriately collapses the burden of proof with the standard of persuasion, see
Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statis-
tical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 380-86 (1986).
65 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 857-58 (describing a "weak" standard for cau-
sation which requires only statistical evidence of cause).
66 See generally Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 972 F.2d 304, 306 (10th Cir. 1992)
(discussing medical causation); JASANOFF, supra note 17, at 124-25 (noting that, in cases
with fewer plaintiffs, some courts appear to demand testimony from doctors who examined
the plaintiff to prove causation and concluding that, when presented with such evidence,
courts may be willing to overlook weaknesses in proof of general causation); Rosenberg,
supra note 16, at 857 n.38 (citing courts that use "particularistic" requirement for causa-
tion); cf. Robinson, supra note 63, at 765 (attempting to explain some courts' hesitancy to
accept probabilistic proof without additional, particularistic proof).
67 See, e.g., Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the
Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. LJ. 189, 211 (1992) (describing variation in how courts
rely on statistical evidence of causation). For example, while some courts have held that
epidemiological evidence of a statistically significant relationship between a substance and
injuries is necessary to prevail on a defendant's motion for summary judgment or a di-
rected verdict, see infra note 76 and accompanying text, other courts consider epidemiolog-
ical evidence completely unhelpful in determining causation due to its purely statistical
nature, see Brennan, supra note 28, at 492 & nn.114-15.
68 See Poulter, supra note 67, at 223 (discussing varying rulings on admissibility of
animal studies as proof of causation in toxic tort cases); Brian P. Voke, Sources of Proof of
Causation in Toxic Tort Cases, 61 DEF. CouN s.J. 45, 45 (1994) (observing that "[d)efendants
have had mixed success in excluding expert opinions based on animal and in vitro studies"
and concluding that "[a]n examination of the cases shows that the courts have not estab-
lished any uniform rules concerning the admissibility of animal and in vitro studies,"
although some rough factors can be identified). The most significant split in admissibility
rulings concerns the probative value and relevance of animal studies to the long-term tox-
icity of a chemical on humans. Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d
823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (excluding animal studies as not relevant to human causation
when substantial epidemiological evidence is available), with Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
630 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D. Md. 1986) (admitting animal studies as relevant in resolving
causation issue), aff'd sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.
1987). For an overview of admissibility questions arising in toxic tort cases, see generally
Bert Black, A Unified Theoy of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595 (1988).
69 See, e.g., KEETON Er AL., supra note 64, § 41, at 265-68 (describing generally ac-
cepted "but for" and "substantial factor" tests for cause-in-fact and citing cases that date
back over 100 years); cf. Eggen, supra note 63, at 863 (describing imposition of somewhat
similar burden of proof on plaintiff-workers required in worker compensation claims).
792
1997] CHOOSING IGNORANCE
cases, "In mass tort cases, the importance of the science cannot be
overemphasized. Without in vitro [tests on single cells], in vivo [tests
on animals] and epidemiological findings, and experts prepared to
present them, the plaintiff has no case." 70 Although this burden is not
problematic in a handful of "hot" toxic tort cases in which a wealth of
studies have been produced, 7' such cases are the exception rather
than the rule.
72
When assigning the burdens of proof for causation, then, the
courts presume as a matter of policy that plaintiffs should not only
bear the losses resulting from inherent limitations in scientific knowl-
edge (trans-scientific uncertainties), but they should also be held re-
sponsible for conducting initial safety testing on products and
byproducts when that information does not otherwise exist (preventa-
ble scientific uncertainties).73 Given the resource 74 and time limita-
tions75 of plaintiffs and government testing facilities, chemicals for
which inadequate safety research exists will likely fall outside of the
litigation system due to this causation rule. The additional and more
recent requirement some courts impose, that a plaintiff's burden of
proof also includes the production of one or more epidemiology stud-
This issue is likely to be resolved on a dispositive motion before trial. See, e.g., id. at 899
(concluding that worker-victims of reproductive injuries will likely lose because of insuffi-
cient proof of cause-in-fact).
70 Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43
HASTINGS LJ. 301, 331 (1992).
71 See, e.g.,Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert,
78 MINN. L. REv. 1387, 1415 (1994) (observing with disapproval that, in Bendectin cases,
courts may exclude animal studies and insist on epidemiology studies for proof of causa-
tion "because of the rich epidemiological data available"); id. at 1434 (noting that "Bendec-
tin cases are unique in a number of ways including the existence of an unusually rich body
of epidemiological data"); see also Farber, supra note 16, at 1251-53 (discussing easy cases
where the available research on latent toxicity of a chemical is extensive and the substance
causes a "signature disease").
72 See infra Part IV.A.
73 See, e.g., Blomquist, supra note 62, at 43 (noting as one of a toxic tort plaintiff's
obstacles, "inadequate toxicological information ... and the enormous expense of trying
to gather whatever information or expertise is available"). Thus, not only must the plaintiff
minimize the significance of other potential causes and re-create exposure measurements
that occurred decades before, see, e.g., id. at 42-43 (describing the "serious obstacles" toxic-
tort plaintiffs face in establishing causation); Lyndon, supra note 42, at 1801-02 (describing
evidentiary handicaps plaintiffs face when proving causation), but there is often little scien-
tific research available on most products, even though they may be identified as likely
carcinogens, see supra Part I.B.3.
74 See supra notes 59-61 and infra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing govern-
ment resource allocation and the cost of toxic-tort litigation).
75 Even the more permissive "discovery rule" in statutes of limitations, see generally
Gerald A. McHugh,Jr., The Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule: Variations on a Theme
of Fairness, 64 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 197, 197-98 (1993) (noting rule that the statute of limitations
starts only when the plaintiff has knowledge of the injury and its cause), may not provide
plaintiffs with sufficient time to conduct epidemiology studies in thosejurisdictions where
such studies are required for proof of causation.
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ies, 76 further reduces the likelihood that a manufacturer will be held
accountable for performing a basic level of safety testing. From a
practical standpoint, then, victims are able to challenge the adequacy
of a manufacturer's safety and design decisions only in the small per-
centage of cases where a substantial body of scientific studies exists,
and in some jurisdictions, only once those studies reveal that a statisti-
cally significant number of human injuries or diseases resulted from
exposure to the chemical.
B. Penalty for Knowledge
In addition to offering manufacturers practical immunity for re-
maining ignorant about the latent hazards of their products and by-
products, the courts provide, at best, unreliable rewards for
manufacturers who institute comprehensive safety testing programs.
Some (but not all) courts provide manufacturers who have conducted
"state-of-the-art" research on the safety of their products with a com-
plete defense to liability for hazards that were only later revealed
through unexpected advances in scientific knowledge. 77 State-of-the-
76 See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 17, at 126-28 (discussing cases where courts appeared
heavily influenced by existence and outcome of epidemiological studies); Black &
Lilienfeld, supra note 64, at 769-76 (observing with approval that courts generally accept
and sometimes require toxic-tort plaintiffs to introduce epidemiological evidence that a
particular hazardous substance causes harm); Brennan, supra note 18, at 23 n.107, 56 n.241
(1989) (stating that "[e]ven though animal data involves very different technical issues,
there should be no doubt that they are probative regarding human disease," and arguing
that rulings excluding animal studies "go against all principles of toxicological science");
Green, supra note 21, at 672-74 (observing that courts in both Agent Orange and Bendec-
tin cases generally adopted "an epidemiologic threshold, or more restrictively, a statistically
significant epidemiologic threshold for plaintiffs to establish in order to create a submis-
sive case," but noting that not all Bendectin courts did so); see also infra text accompanying
notes 161-66 (noting the relationship between available epidemiological studies and
litigation).
This requirement is difficult if not impossible to meet in many cases. See Green, supra
note 21, at 680 (noting the lack of epidemiological studies on most chemicals and conclud-
ing that given the time, expense, and experimental difficulties, "[f]or most potentially
toxic substances, there will not be a solid body of epidemiologic evidence on which to
rely"); id. (arguing that "plaintiffs should be required to prove causation by a preponder-
ance of the available evidend); Sanders, supra note 71, at 1415 (arguing that at least for a
"'first plaintiff'" animal studies should be admissible).
77 See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550 (Cal. 1991)
(holding the state of art defense relevant in a product liability case); Fell v. Kewanee Farm
Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1990) (adopting the state of the art as a complete
defense); see also KEETON,E'Er AL., supra note 64, § 99, at 700 (observing that the "state of the
art" defense is "often" asserted against strict liability claims); Wertheimer, supra note 63, at
1184, 1209-40, 1245-69 (lamenting that a majority of courts and legislatures permit some
sort of state-of-the-art defense and citing cases and laws from various states). The state-of-
the-art defense has been endorsed by the drafters of the Restatement. See RESrATEMENr
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (providing that liability for failure to warn in
products liability action is limited by "the present state of human knowledge"); cf. id. cmt.j
(noting that seller's obligation to warn in products liability is limited to when the seller
"has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
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art testing generally consists of "all of the available knowledge of a
subject at a given time, and this includes scientific, medical, engineer-
ing, and any other knowledge that may be available."78 Such immuni-
ties are not always reassuring to manufacturers, however, because
plaintiffs typically control the venue and hence the availability of the
defense. Even if a manufacturer is fortunate enough to land in ajuris-
diction where a state-of-the-art defense is adopted, considerable un-
certainties as to what the "should have known" standard actually
entails reduces the benefits of a predictable immunity.79 If a jury or
judge determines, for example, that a manufacturer's long-term test-
ing program fell slightly short of a jurisdiction's state-of-the-art stan-
should have knowledge, of the presence of ... the danger."); id. § 388 (providing that a
manufacturer by definition, will not be held negligent for information that is beyond the
reach of scientific testing); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUCTS LIABILnY
§ 2(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (providing that a "product is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warn-
ings ... and [their] omission ... renders the product not reasonably safe") (emphasis
added). Some states have also adopted state-of-the-art defenses legislatively. See, e.g., Amiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (West 1992) (providing an affirmative defense to a claim of de-
fect in design if the product "conformed with the state of the art at the time the product
was first sold by the defendant"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (a) (1987) (creating a
rebuttable presumption of no defect if the product "conformed to the state of the art, as
distinguished from industry standards"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Banks-Baldwin
1991) (establishing rebuttable presumption for the defense that a product is not defective
if designed consistent with the state of the art); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1995) (codify-
ing state-of-art defense); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105 (b) (1980) (requiring that the "state
of scientific and technological knowledge available to manufacturer" is relevant to deter-
mining defect of product).
Not all jurisdictions, however, have adopted a state-of-the-art defense. See, e.g., Roach
v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (Or. 1974) (refusing to recognize a "state of the art" de-
fense); Peggv. General Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074, 1075, 1083 n.10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(holding seller responsible for warning buyer of risks associated with product "regardless
of whether the seller knew or had reason to know of the risks and limitations") (citing
Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 794 n.15 (8th Cir. 1977)).
78 Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986); see
alsoMeisner v. Patton Elec. Co., 781 F. Supp. 1432, 1443-44 (D. Neb. 1990). The California
Court of Appeals interpreted state-of-the-art testing to include "long-term animal studies"
in the context of a medical device, see Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 133
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983), and follow-up studies as a result of consumer complaints for toxic
shock syndrome from the use of tampons, see West v.Johnson &Johnson Prods., Inc., 220
Cal. Rptr. 437, 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
79 See, e.g., Michael A. Pope & Michael K. Bartosz, "State of the Art": Is There any Life Left
in the Defense?, 316 PLI/Lit 187 (1986) (outlining the various approaches of courts in
adopting the state-of-the-art defense in products liability action); John W. Wade, On the
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734,
756-60 (outlining variability in "state of the art" immunity with regard to types of knowl-
edge over various time periods); Wertheimer, supra note 63, at 1213-39 (describing differ-
ences between states in adoption of the state-of-the-art defense). There are even variations
within states. For example, the NewJersey Supreme Court refused to apply the state-of-the-
art defense to an asbestos case in Fischer v.Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 471-72 (NJ.
1986), although the defense was allowed in a drug product liability action several years
before, see Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (NJ. 1984).
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dards, the immunity is gone, and any adverse research performed by
the manufacturer may be used against it.
Because a manufacturer that fails to test may be able to escape
liability based on the plaintiff's inability to prove causation, the manu-
facturer may view any testing efforts that carry the dual possibility of
falling short of state-of-the-art standards and producing adverse results
as only encouraging, rather than discouraging, litigation. 80 On bal-
ance, therefore, manufacturers may benefit more from the practical
immunity provided by scientific ignorance than from the state-of-the-
art defense. When the costs and time of conducting a thorough test-
ing program are added to this equation, choosing ignorance seems
even more clearly to be a rational choice for manufacturers of poten-
tially toxic products.81
III
THE COMMON-LAW APPROACH IS WRONG IN THEORY
The common-law requirement that plaintiffs assume the entire
burden of proving causation in toxic tort cases not only creates inap-
propriate incentives for long-term safety research, but also contradicts
well-established theories of tort law and analogous precedents. Refer-
ence to economics, as well as to a variety of legal doctrines,8 2 reveals
80 This is true as long as the manufacturer perceives that long-term safety research is
unlikely to be performed by any party other than the manufacturer. See, e.g., James A.
Henderson,Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REn'. 919, 940-
41 (1981) (observing that knowledge of hazards comes primarily from private enterprise
and thus imposing strict liability on manufacturers may discourage them from safety test-
ing "after distribution to discover whether products are causing harm"). Note that this
liability picture is. likely specific to toxic-tort cases for latent harms. More immediate or
acute effects caused by products are likely to be proven by consumers with greater ease.
81 See, e.g., infra Part 1V.A-
82 Currently, economic and moral theories provide the leading explanations for neg-
ligence and strict liability causes of action in the common law. See, e.g., IZHAK ENGLARD, THE
PHILOSOPHv OF TORT LAW 7 (1993) (describing the theories of moral responsibility and
social utility as at the "foundation" of tort law analysis). Unfortunately, the current state of
the leading moral theory of tort law-corrective justice-offers little insight into specific
details of concern in this Article, such as what behavior is reasonable or when liability
should be imposed for a defendant's actions that serve to increase risk. See, e.g., ErnestJ.
Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 39-40 (1983) (charac-
terizing corrective justice as a matter of structure "not substance"); see alsoJules L. Cole-
man, The Practice of Corrective Justic 37 A~iz. L. REv. 15, 19 (1995) (acknowledging and
categorizing different views of corrective justice among leading scholars); Richard W.
Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14J. LEGAL
STUD. 435, 435-36, 455-56 (1985) (noting the difficulties encountered when using correc-
tive justice in defining principle elements of causation and rights). Consequently, a discus-
sion of corrective justice has been omitted from the instant analysis of how the common-
law approach comports with tort theory and doctrine.
There are of course other theories of tort law. See, e.g., FlemingJames, Jr., Last Clear
Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE LJ. 704, 716 (1938) (arguing that tort law serves in
part as a social insurance program); Jerry L. Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform,
and Guerilla Warfare 73 GEO. LJ. 1393, 1395-96 (1985) (suggesting that tort law provides a
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that society expects a manufacturer to resolve at least a few basic pre-
ventable scientific uncertainties regarding the long-term safety of its
product before releasing the product or byproduct into commerce.
A. Law and Economics
Utilitarian theory provides one of the primary theoretical justifi-
cations for tort law and is central to much of the economic analysis of
torts.8 3 If the potential harm to society is catastrophic and irrevers-
ible, as it is during the manufacture of toxic products that come into
contact either directly or indirectly with humans,84 then utilitarian
theory tells us that some basic investment in determining the approxi-
mate probability of harm is socially optimal.85 Not only is a basic
forum for civilized battle between small and big, namely the individual versus the corpora-
tion); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1987)
(arguing that at least a partial purpose of tort law is to deter harmful behavior). Although
competing theories do not discuss a manufacturer's duty to test, their primary tenets rein-
force the conclusion that a manufacturer should conduct some basic testing on its product
if non-de minimis risks are possible.
83 Utilitarian theory presupposes that the goal of tort law is to make society better off
and that the optimal level of economic activity in society should reflect its social costs. An
optimal level of economic activity or production is the level at which further accident pre-
vention expenditures would exceed the social costs of the prevented accidents. See Richard
A. Posner, A Theoy of Negligence, 1 J. LEcA STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972). See generally Dan W.
Brock, Utilitarianism, in AND JUSTICE FOR ALL 217 (Tom Regan & Donald VanDeVeer eds.,
1982) (discussing utilitarianism as a formal moral theory); Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as
a Tort: A Non-AccidentalPerspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 651 (1971) (describ-
ing Calabresi's position as characterizing optimal deterrence of inefficient risk-taking as
the prime objective of an ideal tort system).
84 See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1040-41 (discussing the catastrophic and
irreversible nature of chemical products and unique problems the management of these
public risks present); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 EcoL-
ocw L.Q. 207, 211-14 (1978) (same). Asbestos provides the most dramatic example of a
product causing catastrophic and irreversible harm. Since the first recovery in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), an estimated 33,000-50,000
cases have been filed against asbestos producers. See THos E. WILLGINc, TRENDS IN ASBES-
TOS LITIGATION 12 (1987). The number of serious irreversible injuries resulting from the
preventable latent hazards caused by the Dalkon Shield have been estimated in the tens of
thousands. See infra note 191. The possibility that further mass catastrophes may lurk in
products currently in use cannot be eliminated, particularly given the vast ignorance sur-
rounding their safety. See infra Part IV.A.
85 Information regarding safety is generally desirable as long as its social value ex-
ceeds the costs of its generation. See Shavell, supra note 15, at 260. The social value of the
information includes not only the lives saved once the latent toxicity of a substance is
determined, but also the socio-psychological benefits that attend greater security regarding
the safety of products and workplaces. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclo-
sure, and the First Amendment 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 653, 655 (1993) (arguing that "[i]f
people are unaware of the consequences of their choices, they are, to that extent, less
free"); Wagner, supra note 28, at 1653 n.138 (citing literature on the public's desire for
freedom from toxic risks); see also Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Contro4 24 EmTl..
L. 887, 894 n.28 (1994) (citing literature in which authors advocate the inclusion of lay
public values in evaluating appropriate risk); infra Part III.B.3. Therefore, some basic test-
ing must be done for all products that pose nonde-minimis risks of exposure because the
research will prove consistently, and in some cases significantly, beneficial to society. Cf
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amount of safety testing required according to utilitarian theory, but
manufacturers should conduct such testing because they are, in the
words of Guido Calabresi, the "least cost avoiders."8 6
1. Access to Information
Manufacturers are best able to conduct research on preventable
uncertainties regarding the long-term safety of their products and by-
products because they generally have superior and often exclusive ac-
cess to the information needed to conduct these tests. Most impor-
tantly, manufacturers frequently enjoy a legally protected right to
information regarding the composition of their products87-informa-
tion that is also essential in determining the toxicity of the products in
a timely and cost-effective way.88 The difficulty third parties face in
Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Lability in the Law of Torts, 9J. LEGAL
STUD. 463, 484-85 (1980) (arguing that the scope of liability should include activities when,
"given the circumstances under which [a type of accident] occurs, there must be a sufficiently high
potential for reducing losses by taking more care," even when the probability of the accident is
low).
86 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 138-52 (1970) (discussing various ap-
proaches to finding the cheapest cost avoiders); see also Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence
and Accidents, 84 YALE LJ. 656, 666-67 (1975) (observing with approval a "strong trend"
toward finding that enterprises engaged in the manufacture of products are in a better
position than consumers to determine a product's social costs and benefits); Guido Cala-
bresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1070
(1972) ("It should come as no surprise that considerations of knowledge, alternatives, and
category levels are implicit in the search for the cheapest cost avoider."); Jeffrey
Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens
on the Chemical Victim, 7 HIARv. EmrL. L. Rrv. 177, 209 (1983) (arguing that "[e]nterprises
dealing in hazardous chemicals can most easily determine whether the social costs of such
activity exceed the potential benefits of that activity"). But see Steven Shavell, Economic
Analysis of Accident Law 282 (1987) (suggesting that when information has public value,
theoretically "a social authority may be in a superior position to obtain information").
87 In a recent article, Mary Lyndon provides an excellent overview of the intersection
of trade secrecy and health and safety demands for information on chemical composition,
exposure, and health effects. Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regu-
lation, 23 N.M. L. RE,. 1 (1993). After outlining the current prominence of trade secrecy
claims under major regulatory statutes such as FTSA, OSHA, and EPCRA, see id. at 22-35,
Lyndon makes the following observations:
Current rules thus effectively give firms a full trade secret exemption.
The agency whose mandate is to foster health protection ends up in the
anomalous position of "sanitizing" and protecting industry documents, edit-
ing chemical identities and health information out of disclosure systems,
and thinking up ways of describing health effects so that no one will figure
out what they are. Health regulators are put in the position of deciding
matters about which they have little expertise-whether a chemical is a
trade secret and what its commercial value is. A regressive circularity is in-
jected into toxics regulation, because if it is not revealed, a chemical will
not be studied and therefore will not be found toxic.
Id. at 35.
88 See id. at 34-35 ("For a worker or neighbor seeking data from a company, trade
secret information is, as a practical matter, simply unavailable. There is no incentive for an
employer to disclose."); see also id. at 33 (reporting that "trade secret claimants persuaded
the EPA [under EPCRA] that.., disclosure of specific health effects data... [could]
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gaining access to this information was highlighted by the NRC's at-
tempt to determine the availability of toxicity testing results for hun-
dreds of chemicals. The composition of a number of these chemicals
proved to be "so undefined" or "so variable" that the NRC was unable
to make even a preliminary assessment of the extent of safety research
available on them.89
Manufacturers also tend to be in the best position to compile the
underlying information needed to evaluate the long-term safety of a
product.90 Physicochemical properties of a chemical, the expected
paths and extent of human exposure, and complaints of injuries
caused by the chemical are relevant to the manufacturer's business.
reveal trade secret identity" because in some cases "so little study has been done on the
health effects of many chemicals that to reveal a known effect will identify the chemical").
In fact, under some statutes such as FIFRA, manufacturers have, at least temporarily, also
enjoyed a property right in the confidentiality of their health and safety data. See Ruckel-
shaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1010-11 (1984) (holding that FIFRA, for the six-year
period before the 1978 amendments, provided manufacturers trade secret protection for
registrations, including health and safety data). Lyndon has even suggested that manufac-
turers may actively seek trade secret protection in order to avoid accountability for con-
ducting safety research. See Lyndon, supra note 87, at 36 ("Indeed, the expectation of a
legal shield from health research may affirmatively guide investments in the direction of
secrecy.").
Confidentiality is a legal construct, of course, but until trade secrecy is at least partially
abandoned, publicly funded research institutions must overcome a number of time-con-
suming and resource-intensive hurdles before they can conduct meaningful safety tests on
many chemical products. Cf. id. at 50 ("[Laws currently create a] technological commons
... with legal protection for secrecy, which bars some uses of data which would help cor-
rect the negative effects of technologies .... Access by those concerned with the impacts of
technologies should be assured by establishing a basic rule of disclosure.") (footnote omit-
ted). See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
89 ToxiciTv TESTING, supra note 29, at 61. NRC's efforts to learn more about the
composition of these products proved generally futile. See id. at 194-95 (detailing the dis-
appointing response of 600 companies to questionnaires and Federal Register notices re-
questing "otherwise unobtainable information on potential occupational exposures,
manufacturing processes, waste disposal practices, and production"). They concluded
based on this portion of their study that the "[r]eluctance or inability of industry to coop-
erate in studies like this was found to be only one factor inhibiting the collection of infor-
mation on industrial practices and occupational exposure. It is very difficult-often
impossible-to locate and contact all the current manufacturers of a given substance." Id.
at 195. Ultimately, the NRC left these substances out of its sample and studied only the
better-defined substances. See id.
90 See Applegate, supra note 1, at 299 (concluding that "industries that produce and
use chemicals ordinarily are in the best position to provide or obtain toxicity and exposure
data most cheaply and accurately"); Trauberman, supra note 86, at 214 (arguing that the
chemical manufacturers' position "makes them better informed, more likely to know of
the potential effects of hazardous substances, and better able to identify those who might
have been exposed to such substances"); id. at 209 & n.167 (concluding that chemical
manufacturers have superior information regarding hazards and identifying, based on
1981 statistics, the billions of dollars spent by the chemical industry on research and devel-
opment). Manufacturers are also often in the best position to keep centralized records (or
contract with pharmacists) regarding the users of their products, or at least of the com-
plaints from consumers. Cf. Robinson, supra note 63, at 734 (discussing the role of defen-
dant drug manufacturers in keeping records of effects on users).
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However, this information is also critical in determining the extent
and types of needed toxicity tests.91 The NRC again found this basic
information missing for many chemicals92 and was unable to identify a
"comprehensive method of gathering the needed information." 93
2. Product Development
Manufacturers are also in a better position than plaintiffs to re-
search preventable uncertainties regarding the safety of their products
because they can channel the results of safety testing back into prod-
uct design before the product is finalized, thus avoiding the social
costs of injuries and the production costs of recalls and product re-
design.94 Research on industrial innovation reveals that for chemical
products, over seventy percent of the total development time (averag-
ing from seventeen months to four to five years) 95 is dedicated to the
final stages of product design-after the product is designed,
91 See Toxicrry TESTING, supra note 29, at 120 (noting that basic characteristics of a
chemical such as "breadth of known exposure, expected trends in exposure, physicochemi-
cal properties and chemical fate of the substances, and strength of evidence of toxicity in
humans" seem to be logically related to "quantity and quality of toxicity testing"). See also
id. at 122-23 (describing the importance of this same basic information to determining the
hazard posed by a chemical); id. app. L at 179-84 (listing the major components of an NRC
dossier, including these same basic characteristics of a chemical).
92 For 36% of the substances studied, the NRC reported that "no data were available
from which the committees could determine the extent of exposure" and for 75% of the
substances "no information was available from which trends in exposure could be esti-
mated." Toxicry TESTING, supra note 29, at 126; see also id. at 122 tbl.21 (listing the availa-
bility of specific basic information on various categories of chemicals). The Interagency
Testing Committee ("ITC"), which is responsible for identifying chemicals in need of test-
ing under TSCA, has been similarly impeded by the general unavailability of production
and exposure data. In 1990, the GAO reported that, despite efforts to "call in" such infor-
mation through regulations and other research channels over a ten-year period, the ITC
"still did not have exposure information for more than 1,700 [out of 2,226 identified]
chemicals." GAO, EPA's CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM, supra note 50, at 15. The report
noted that, "[a]ccording to the ITC chairman, the lack of current production and expo-
sure data has prevented ITC from making more recommendations in recent years. He
believes this continues to be a problem." Id.
93 Toxicrn TES-nNG, supra note 29, at 120 ("[I]n the end, the principal basis for char-
acterizing exposure information was the knowledge and expertise of the committee
members.").
94 See Lyndon, supra note 1, at 152-53 (discussing how the failure to require manufac-
turers to conduct safety testing as part of research and development postpones testing until
after a technology is established and manufacturers can no longer adjust to defects, lead-
ing them to manipulate information regarding health and safety effects); see also Calabresi
& Hirschoff, supra note 86, at 1062-64 (describing circumstances where manufacturers are
relatively better suited than consumers to making the cost-benefit analyses regarding prod-
uct design); cf. Shavell, supra note 85, at 481 (arguing that liability should be imposed on a
defendant when its increased care will lead to a "sufficiently pronounced" reduction in acci-
dent costs).
95 See EADs & REUTER, supra note 44, at 53-54 & n.2.
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but before the product is marketed. 96 Even after marketing,
manufacturers continue to innovate by improving "equipment
technology [and better exploiting] latent economies of scale."9 7
This reality of innovation suggests that the most expedient time
to conduct safety tests and, if necessary, decide not to market
a product or make compositional modifications is during the
early stages of product development. 98 In contrast, by the time
public test results are prepared and disseminated, 99 it will likely
96 Edwin Mansfield has identified five stages of the design of a product, beginning
with applied research and ending with manufacturing start-up. The final four stages con-
sume most of the time of product design, but can begin only after the product itself has
been determined. See EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL., RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN THE MODERN
CORPORATON 116, 118 (1971). In addition, there appears to be a "neighborhood" concept
of innovation where one new type of product is followed by a series of very similar new
products. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF Eco-
NOMIC CHANGE 257 (1982).
97 NELSON & WINTER, supra note 96, at 259-60; see also Nicholas A. Ashford & George
R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 109, 113 (providing a model for the dynamics of product
and process innovation in industry).
98 See Lyndon, supra note 1, at 150 ("At least in the early stages of innovation, innovat-
ing firms are unquestionably in the best position to set the direction of the search for
information. If nothing more, firms know what information they lack and can anticipate
what data should be generated."). Interestingly, Eads and Reuter suggest that in practice
"prime responsibility" for ensuring the safety of a product is with the division producing it,
which means that safety concerns might not emerge until some midpoint in the several-
year production process. EADS & REUTER, supra note 44, at 62.
Although basic safety testing does increase the costs of innovation, it is not clear
whether the costs of basic testing will be substantial enough to adversely impact innovation
in any significant way, particularly if the safety testing is conducted late in the first stage of
product design. See infra note 277 and accompanying text; cf Flores, supra note 46, at 16-
19 (describing Monsanto's extensive safety review process that occurs early in the design
process and presumably does not significantly deter innovation). Additionally, early safety
testing will be far less costly than having to retrofit changes during later stages of product
development or after the product has been marketed-a cost savings that will benefit inno-
vation as well as other production sectors. In fact, those who have examined the effects of
safety testing have focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the extensive regulatory require-
ments imposed on the drug and pharmaceutical industries in which the costs of research
are estimated at over $200 million per product and take approximately 10 to 12 years to
conduct. See Henry, supra note 35, at 617.
99 It takes the National Toxicology Program approximately six to eight years to study
a single substance for toxicity and carcinogenicity. See, e.g., REGULATING CARCINOGENS,
supra note 60, at 167 (explaining the time involved from nomination of a chemical to
publication of the report); cf NELSON & WINTER, supra note 96, at 394-95 (concluding that
with regard to research and development, a "good share" of information "must be guided
by information available in and criteria relevant to the firms who eventually use the tech-
nology," and that government control of technological advances will therefore lead "not to
efficiency but to inefficiency"). In addition, the government's ability to identify the appro-
priate manufacturers and disseminate the testing information may also prove difficult, if
not impossible. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 357, 360 (1984) (arguing that in contrast to private parties, "[flor a regulator
to obtain comparable information would often require virtually continuous observation of
parties' behavior, and thus would be a practical impossibility").
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be too late or too expensive to make significant product
changes. 00
3. Loss Spreading
Manufacturers also tend to be in the best position to absorb the
financial costs of safety testing and to pass the costs of product testing
onto customers, thereby ensuring that product users pay the full cost
of developing and manufacturing the product.' 0' Some scholars have
argued that this loss spreading objective provides at least a partial jus-
tification for holding manufacturers responsible for product safety.'0 2
Various courts have agreed with this reasoning. 103
4. The Hand Formula
The Learned Hand Formula, which is used to gauge whether con-
duct is reasonable, 04 also suggests that when an activity threatens pos-
100 See, e.g., Fred Hoerger et al., The Cumulative Impact of Health, Environmental, and
Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industy During the Seventies, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1983, at 59, 96 (identifying the extraordinary financial impact of product bans that re-
sulted from delayed regulatory actions-from $165 million for plastic beverage bottles to
$612 million for PCBs).
101 John Applegate has argued convincingly that it is both more equitable and more
efficient to require manufacturers and ultimately the users of chemicals to pay for the
generation of safety information:
It is... equitable because the primary beneficiaries of the chemical pay for
one of its externalities; efficient because, to the extent that the regulatory
system internalizes costs (including the cost of detecting externalities), the
price of the chemicals will more accurately reflect their true cost and con-
sumption will adjust accordingly. Indeed, one justification given for data
call-ins is that owners of marginally useful registrations will discontinue the
product rather than pay for expensive research.
Applegate, supra note 1, at 317.
102 See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 86, at 1074-85 (comparing strict liabil-
ity and negligence). Most scholars presume that manufacturers are able to most cheaply
ensure that a reasonable base of knowledge exists regarding the long-term product safety.
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 86, at 245-46 (arguing that "[a]n allocation [of accident
costs through worker's compensation] to non faulty employers could and did lead to
cheaper cost avoidance because it resulted in adequate evaluation of the risk of injury and
in its full retention as an economic factor internal to the employment contract"); cf
Trauberman, supra note 86, at 211 (arguing for the proposition that those who cause harm
are generally best able to avoid the externalities which created harm).
103 See, e.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 36 (5th Cir. 1963)
("The injuries from knowable risks are a cost of production for the industry to bear .... .");
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970) (discussing loss spreading as a tort
objective); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (same); Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (NJ. 1982)
(same).
104 The Learned Hand Formula instructs that a defendant's conduct is "reasonable"
only if he has taken precautions which are equal to or greater than the product of the
magnitude of the harm his activity will cause times the probability that the harm will occur
(B>PL). The Learned Hand formula made its algebraic debut in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand formula has been substantially
refined in its details, see, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMics 326-
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sible catastrophic harm, the actor should make some effort to
determine the probability that the harm will actually occur.10 5 It fol-
lows that, to resolve preventable scientific uncertainties, a reasonable
manufacturer should conduct safety testing as long as the social value
of the testing exceeds its costs. 10 6
B. Public Laws and Values
For those who deny that existing economic theories offer satisfac-
tory positive or normative explanations for tort law, common-law doc-
trines and statutory rules may provide the more reliable indication of
what a manufacturer's responsibility for resolving preventable scien-
tific uncertainties should be.10 7 These doctrines paint the picture of a
legal system that, despite its adherence to an outmoded and regressive
causation rule, generally wishes to require manufacturers to test for
latent hazards in their products. Indeed, the extraordinary legal com-
plexity that surrounds the heavily regulated area of toxic products
may obscure the damaging, yet largely invisible, counter-force the
common-law causation rule exerts on incentives for adequate toxicity
testing. 108
1. Direct Responsibility to Test under the Common Law
The "duty-to-test" requirement is the most conspicuous tort rule
that imposes a responsibility on manufacturers to resolve at least basic
476 (1988); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT
LAW 85-88 (1987), but its basic form remains largely unaltered, see, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
155-56 (1994) (explaining the Hand formula's application to safety decisions). Despite its
popularity as a conceptual tool, the Hand Formula has proven difficult to apply with quan-
titative precision. See McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987)
(admitting that the Hand formula is a conceptual tool that tends to defy reliable quantifi-
cation); see also ENGLARD, supra note 82, at 38-42 (identifying a variety of weaknesses in the
practical use of the Hand formula as a measure of negligence).
105 More specifically, the manufacturer should invest in safety at roughly "the point at
which the marginal costs of the investment equal the marginal costs of accidents thereby
avoided." Henderson, supra note 44, at 768. Unfortunately, in their repeated use of the
Hand formula, Landes and Posner give little insight into how to determine what level of
research is reasonable in predicting the approximate values of the variables (such as the
probability of injury). LANDES & POSNER, supra note 104, at 256-72 (analyzing negligence
in the context of catastrophic injuries). Despite this omission, if the harm (L) is greater
than zero and the probability (P) is unknown, the Hand formula instructs that the cost of
care (B) is also likely to be greater than zero. How much greater seems impossible to
gauge ex ante without the benefit of more refined ranges for the possible probabilities and
magnitudes of harm. Only in situations where virtually no human exposure is possible
would research be unnecessary. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106 See Shavell, supra note 15, at 259-60.
107 Cf. John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419 (1979)
(conceding that, although moral duties direct legal liability rules, at times "legal and moral
judgments [must] diverge").
108 See infra note 135.
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preventable scientific uncertainties prior to marketing a product. 10 9
The Fifth Circuit has perhaps been the most emphatic with regard to
the fundamental importance of this duty in holding asbestos manu-
facturers liable under a- parallel "duty-to-warn" claim: "The manufac-
turer's status as expert means that at a minimum he must keep abreast
of the scientific knowledge, discoveries, and advances and is presumed
to know what is imparted thereby. But even more importantly, a man-
ufacturer has a duty to test and inspect his product."110
Although the parameters of the duty-to-test requirement are not
altogether clear, 1 ' this rule traditionally requires manufacturers to
perform testing that is commensurate with the possible risks associ-
ated with their products."12 Given the potentially catastrophic and
irreversible risks associated with exposure to toxic products, it seems
apparent that, at a minimum, manufacturers must perform a basic
109 See, e.g., RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. e (1965). These responsibili-
ties are doctrinally justified by the manufacturers' superior knowledge and the asymme-
tries of information that would result between seller and buyer if the manufacturers did
not test the products and disclose the hazards. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Note, The Manu-
facturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1087, 1090 (1981)
("The duty to inform... rests on the assumption of an asymmetry ofinformation .... The
producer obtains information about technological advances in the ordinary course of do-
ing business, but the customer.., would have to expend extraordinary amounts of time to
obtain and understand it.").
I10 Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973).
11 See, e.g., Eric B. Bruce, Avoiding Product Liability Claims: How Much Testing Is
Enough?, 62 DEL'. COUNS.J. 391, 392 (1995) (observing that "there remains a good deal of
uncertainty" regarding parameters of the duty-to-test rule).
112 See, e.g., Bore 493 F.2d at 1090; see also George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993). The Eighth Circuit in Nick-
laus v. Hughes Tool Co., 417 F.2d 983, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1969), provides possibly the most
detailed description of manufacturers' testing obligations. One commentator has isolated
five different ways a manufacturer might violate its duty to test under Nicklaus: (1) if the
manufacturer fails to conduct any tests or conducts only de minimis testing; (2) if the
manufacturer fails to conduct additional, alternative tests that are "reasonable" and that
would have disclosed the defect; (3) if the manufacturer uses a sample testing frequency or
other safety factor in its testing that is too permissive in light of the "circumstances" (e.g.,
the manufacturer samples only two percent of the products on its assembly line); (4) if the
manufacturer fails to conduct the tests under "real life" conditions, such as "foreseeable
misuse" by the consumer; and (5) if the manufacturer fails to conduct a reasonable
amount of testing based on the risks posed by the product and the costs of testing. See
Bruce, supra note 111, at 392-95.
Courts have also held that under some circumstances manufacturers have a continu-
ing obligation to conduct research on their products. See, e.g., Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d
864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) ("A manufacturer or retailer may ... incur liability for failing to warn
concerning dangers in the use of a product which come to his attention after manufacture
or sale, through advancements in the state of the art.., or through being made aware of
later accidents involving dangers in the product .. ") (citations omitted); Barson v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836 (Utah 1984) (noting that a "drug manufacturer is
responsible.., for not only 'actual knowledge gained from research and adverse reaction
reports' but also for 'constructive knowledge as measured by scientific literature and other
available means of communication"') (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
528 P.2d 522, 528-29 (Or. 1974).
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screening of possible hazards to satisfy the standard.113 Manufacturers
who have not conducted any safety testing are thus in violation of the
common law duty-to-test requirement.114
Ironically, as the common-law courts have applied the rule, a
manufacturer is still able to escape liability when the plaintiff cannot
prove that the manufacturer's product caused plaintiffs harm, even
though this proof problem is a direct result of the manufacturer's in-
adequate testing.'15 Despite this flawed circularity in its implementa-
tion, however, the well-accepted duty-to-test rule supports a
conclusion that the common-law courts intend responsibility for test-
ing to lie in the first instance with manufacturers. 16
2. Indirect Responsibilities to Test Under the Common Law
A presumption that shifts the burden of proof to defendants
when they are in superior control of information provides a second,
albeit less direct, line of cases that reinforce the common-law responsi-
bility of manufacturers to test the safety of their products."17 Superior
access considerations made their debut in negligence cases and some-
times influence courts' decisions with regard to whether to employ
the res ipsa loquitur presumption-a presumption that the defendant
was negligent'"18-when the defendant is in the best position to pro-
113 See supra Part 111.4.
114 See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52, 54 (10th Cir. 1953)
(holding that because of potential for serious harm if a part should fail, a truck manufac-
turer had a duty to conduct available tests that would have revealed presence of latent
flaw); Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 329-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (holding
that failure of manufacturer to conduct any tests on the uniformity, strength, and thickness
of the walls of tubing used in heart catheterization was unreasonable and violated the duty
to test).
115 See ALL KANNER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT TRIALs § 6.07, at 119 (1991)
("In cases where a company has marketed a product without adequately pre-testing for
safety, it may currently be able to escape responsibility, because plaintiff cannot prove
causation.").
116 Other duty-to-test rules, while less directly relevant, further suggest that the com-
mon-law courts believe that responsibility for safety testing should be placed, in the first
instance, on manufacturers. See, e.g., M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liabil-
ity: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221, 236 (1987) (noting that a manufacturer is
presumed in duty-to-warn claims to have "superior knowledge" regarding safety of its prod-
ucts); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design orDirections for Use of a Product, 71 YALE
LJ. 816, 853-55 (1962) (noting that manufacturers' responsibility in duty to warn claims
includes adequate testing).
117 See generally FlemingJames, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. RE,. 51, 66 (1961) (argu-
ing that "[a]ccess to evidence is often the basis for creating such [a] presumption" on
grounds of convenience, fairness, and public policy); Robinson, supra note 63, at 733-35
(discussing superior access justification for shifting burden of proof).
118 Under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the burden of proving negligence shifts to the
defendant once the plaintiff establishes an inference, either direct or circumstantial, that a
defendant's act was likely to have been negligent. See, e.g., KEETON Er AL., supra note 64,
§ 39, at 244. This burden shifting is justified implicitly, and in some courts explicitly, by
the fact that the plaintiff might otherwise be unjustly denied compensation simply because
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duce exculpatory information." 9 Although this presumption is used
primarily in limited situations in which other conditions also support
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant,120 a defendant's supe-
rior access to critical information regarding its exercise of due care
nonetheless appears to be an important consideration for some courts
in allocating burdens of proof 121
Courts have also shifted the burden of proving causation in cases
involving multiple defendants when the defendants appeared to have
superior access to information regarding the causal link between their
she could not produce evidence that was in the defendant's exclusive possession. See id.
(citing Chief Justice Erie in Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159 Eng. Rep. 665
(1865)). When the defendant is better able to determine the reasonableness of its acts,
then it should be up to the defendant to establish that it was behaving in a socially accepta-
ble way. See id. (observing that in application of res ipsa, "[s]ome courts have at least
suggested... [as a) condition, that evidence as to the true explanation of the event must
be more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff"); see also id. at 254-55
(discussing caselaw regarding superior access factor).
119 Prosser and Wigmore both question the importance of defendants' superior access
to information in applying the res ipsa loquitur presumption. See, e.g., KEETON Er AL, supra
note 64, § 39, at 254-55 (agreeing that defendant's superior access to critical information
could be considered, but arguing that based on analysis of caselaw it is not an indispensa-
ble requirement); 9JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2509, at
507 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1981) (same); William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur
in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183, 204 (1949) (same). A more recent analysis of res ipsa
cases, however, reveals that "[tihe defendant's presumably superior access to relevant in-
formation . . . serves as the foundation for the policy-driven version of res ipsa loquitur"
which the author characterizes as a subset of "enhanced res ipsa loquitu7" cases. Stephen A.
Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstilbestroh The Unidentffiable Tortfeasor in California, 65
IND. L.J. 591, 599 (1990). These enhanced res ipsa loquitur cases occur in two situations;
the first occurs when a special relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant that
justifies the imposition of any uncertainty on defendant; the second is comprised of cases
in which the "doctrine is primarily used to sanction the defendant for the nonavailability of
evidence." Id. In these cases, courts seem to be unconcerned about "whether the defen-
dant actually had relevant information that could have been produced at trial." Id. at 604;
see also Louis L.Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 Burr. L. REv. 1, 6 (1951) ("[T]ypically
... the defendant has greater access to the facts than the plaintiff.... Res ipsa rests on the
notion that it is fair to treat the probability as the fact if the defendant has the power to
rebut the inference."). See generally Spitz, supra, at 599-606 (discussing the development
and application of enhanced res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
120 See Robinson, supra note 63, at 735 (arguing that "[t]he law does not routinely
allocate burdens merely according to who is the best (cheapest) information-producer,"
and that to shift the burden the plaintiff should show additional justification, including
probability and public policy).
121 See, e.g., Kitto v. Gilbert, 570 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that in
medical malpractice action in which patient was injured while unconscious during surgery,
the "absence of voluntary disclosure by the participants [doctors] as to the precise cause
... [and the resulting] evidentiary disadvantage [to plaintiffs]"justified the application of
res ipsa loquitur). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 39, at 254 n.31 (citing cases
where courts "have said, and on rare occasions have held, that res ipsa loquitur cannot be
applied unless evidence of the true explanation of the accident is more accessible to the
defendant than to the plaintiff').
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activities and the resulting injury. 122 Although "superior access to in-
formation" may not be the pivotal factor, both the courts and the Re-
statement pay at least lip service to its import in determining when to
shift the burden of proof to defendants to disprove causation. 123 In
fact, in several multiple-defendant cases in which the courts refused to
shift the burden of causation to defendants, the courts found that de-
fendants were no more prepared than plaintiffs to establish
causation. 24
Finally, some courts shift the burden of proof of both causation
and negligence when a defendant has negligently or intentionally de-
stroyed medical records or other evidence that is central to plaintiff's
case. 125 This "spoilation of evidence" doctrine provides yet another
example of the common law's intolerance of defendants who attempt
to profit from missing evidence that is within their superior control.
3. Statutes
Federal and state statutes also indicate a trend towards imposing
responsibility on manufacturers to keep the public abreast of the long-
term safety of their products. The most compelling evidence of this
trend is the growing popularity of "right-to-know" laws at both the na-
122 See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (shifting burden of proof for
gunshot injuries to two defendant hunters and stating that "[o]rdinarily defendants are in
a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury") (citing
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944)).
123 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. d (1965) ("As between the
proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plaintiff,
any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the harm caused should fall upon
the former."). In situations in which recordkeeping makes good policy sense and can be
done in a cost-effective manner, the presumption of burden-shifting encourages this prac-
tice by manufacturers. See Robinson, supra note 63, at 784 (discussing how the presump-
tion encourages recordkeeping). However, courts do not always find that manufacturers
are in the best position to maintain the records needed in litigation. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 929-30 (Cal. 1980).
124 See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to
shift the burden of proof on causation to defendant DES manufacturers partly because the
"DES defendants are not in any better position than are plaintiffs to identify the manufac-
turer of the DES ingested in any given case"); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 64, § 41, at
271 (observing that with regard to shifting the burden of proof for caugation to multiple
defendants, "where there is no evidence even as to where culpability lies, the hardship may
be equally great upon an innocent defendant; and except in very special cases the courts
have refused to shift the burden of proof.") (citations omitted).
125 See, e.g., Sweetv. Sisters of Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 491-92 (Alaska 1995) (holding
that missing medical records that result from negligence or intentional acts of defendant
and that impair the ability of plaintiff to prove a prima facie case create a rebuttable pre-
sumption shifting the burden of proof for negligence and cause to defendant); see also id.
at 491 (citing cases creating similar presumptions).
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tional126 and state level.127 These statutes generally compel industry
to monitor and disclose the hazardous properties or releases of their
products and by-products.1 28 Although fight-to-know statutes do not
require manufacturers to conduct safety research, they are logically
premised on an assumption that existing safety testing is prevalent, or
at least widespread enough to ensure that the worst hazards have been
identified. 129 Otherwise, the public would have a right-to-know, but
there would be no information to obtain and evaluate, The very exis-
tence of these statutes, then, evinces a public belief that comprehen-
sive safety testing is occurring. As discussed in Part I.B.2, however, this
appears not to be the case.' 30 The legislative history undergirding at
126 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (7) (1994) (requiring under OSHA that employees be
"apprised of all hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate
emergency treatment, and proper conditions and precautions of safe use or exposure"); 42
U.S.C. § 11023 (1995) (mandating under Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-
Know Act ("EPCRA") that a large number of industries submit "toxic chemical release
forms" disclosing the movement of listed chemicals). Right-to-know laws provide the most
comprehensive attempt to force manufacturers to disclose toxic hazards in their products
and by-products. For an argument that a series of other statutes and regulations at both
the federal and state level produce too many warnings, see Noah, supra note 56, at 298-344.
Noah's concern further supports the observation that the public wishes to have the oppor-
tunity to avoid toxic hazards, a desire that can only be fulfilled after some initial testing has
been done.
127 In California, for example, the voters approved Proposition 65, which required in-
dustries to disclose listed chemicals (those chemicals suspected of being carcinogens or
reproductive toxins) if present in products. See Proposition 65, reprinted in CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (1992). As of 1994, several other states had considered similar
legislation, although none of them had passed the legislation. See Noah, supra note 56, at
343.
128 The right-to-know provision of EPCRA, for example, requires covered industries to
annually report the quantity of their releases, off-site transport, on-site treatment, and re-
cycling of hundreds of listed chemicals. See 42 U.S.C. § 13106 (1994). California's Proposi-
tion 65 requires covered persons to provide warnings for over 600 listed chemicals to
individuals likely to be exposed to the chemical. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12201(d)
(1995).
129 Specifically, the statutes seem to erroneously presume either that the worst hazards
have been scientifically identified, see supra Part I.B.3 (discussing NRC's toxicity testing
study), or that the testing will occur without added legal direction. See supra Part II (dis-
cussing the inability of market factors, regulation, and current law to encourage safety
testing). Right-to-know provisions may actually discourage testing because a manufacturer
will find itself forced to monitor and disclose hazards associated with a potentially toxic
product that, if it remained untested, would go unnoticed under the right-to-know law.
13o In fact, the explicit purpose of Proposition 65 was to fill the gap in toxics control
left by regulatory failure.
[One] tradition in American politics is that the burden of proof rests with
the public .... The recent performance by regulatory agencies indicates
that public institutions simply cannot stay apace with industry's production
of chemicals with unknown effects.
Proposition 65 has provided an indication that the American electo-
rate may no longer be willing to adhere to [these] time-honored political
traditions.
BRUCE H. JENNINGS, SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE wITH PROPOSI-
TION 65: IMPLEMENTING THE SAFE DRINKING WATER AND Toxic ENFORCEMENT ACT 31 (1990).
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least some of the right-to-know laws also supports an inference that
the public expects manufacturers to bear responsibility for generating
and providing basic information on potentially toxic products and by-
products.13'
Several statutes that provide regulatory agencies with authority to
require manufacturers to conduct safety testing before or even after a
product has been marketed' 3 2 and to require manufacturers to fi-
nance public testing programs are also instructive with regard to the
public's expectations for safety testing.133 Although regulatory fail-
ures and statutory drafting decrease their effectiveness, 134 the express
purpose of the most comprehensive regulatory statute, TSCA, is clear:
the public expects "adequate [safety] data [to be] .. .developed...
and that the development of such data should be the responsibility of
The chemical industry itself has noticed this missing link in the right-to-know laws. In an
article published in the early 1980's, several officials from Dow Chemical lamented that "so
much has been said recently about the 'right-to-know' issue that one is on the verge of
losing sight of how much information is available." Hoerger et al., supra note 100, at 73.
131 As the sponsor of EPCRA stated, the statute represents the "'heartfelt belief that
people in communities have an absolute, fundamental right to know what goes into the air
their kids breathe, the water they drink and the ground they play on.'" Keith Schneider, For
Communities, Knowledge of Polluters is Power, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1991, § 4, at 5 (quoting
U.S. Rep. Gerry Sikorski). For repeated expressions of a public desire to "know" the risks
confronting them, see Superfund Provisions: Community Right-to-Know and Cleanup of Aban-
doned Hazardous Wastesites Located at Federal Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Transp., and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2-4 (1985)
(statement of Rep. Sikorski); see generally Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evalu-
ating Warnings Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 318-20 (1996) (pro-
viding an overview of the purpose of Proposition 65 and noting that the "statute is clearly
intended to promote informed individual choice"); cf. infra Part IV.C (hypothesizing that
where manufacturers have been negligent in conducting safety tests, juries may excuse
weak or, by some accounts, non-existent evidence of cause-in-fact); supra note 85 (conclud-
ing that information about safety is desirable if its social value exceeds its cost).
132 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (2) (B) (i) (1994) (providing the EPA with authority
under FIFRA to "call-in" additional safety information on previously approved pesticides);
15 U.S.C. § 2605(a), (c) (1994) (providing the EPA with authority under TSCA to impose
follow-up testing controls on chemicals of concern). See generally supra note 49 and accom-
panying text (listing statutes requiring testing). TSCA, however, is seldom used because it
is narrowly drawn, agency resources are limited, and the authority necessitates elaborate
procedures and agency findings that tend to discourage regulatory activity. See, e.g., Apple-
gate, supra note 1, at 313-16; see also Shell Chemical Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.
1987) (remanding EPA test requirement on chemical under Section 4 of TSCA because of
limited evidence of potential human exposure to the chemical). In contrast, much more
extensive safety testing is a pre-condition to marketing a subset of products such as drugs,
food additives, and pesticides that pose the greatest likelihood of significant exposure. See
supra note 34 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i) (2)-(5) (1994) (providing EPA with authority to pro-
mulgate regulations to provide for payment of costs for research on 100 priority toxins
found at hazardous waste sites conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease
Registry).
134 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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those who manufacture and those who process such chemical sub-
stances and mixtures." 135
IV
THE COMMON-LAw APPROACH IS WRONG IN PRACTICE
The common-law approach to establishing liability in toxic tort
cases is not only inconsistent with the key theories and doctrines run-
ning through tort law, but it also can have serious adverse conse-
quences. These adverse effects include an inadequate understanding
of product safety, a lack of deterrence in the development of toxic
products, undercompensation for victims who have been harmed by
such products, and even the tendency of juries and some judges to
nullify the causation rule when a defendant has been negligent in
testing.
A. Inadequate Understanding of Product Safety
Although a manufacturer's decision to choose ignorance may be
attributed in part to market or regulatory failures, 136 the existing lia-
bility system does little to counteract this choice. Indeed, as we have
seen, the existing liability system makes choosing ignorance a rational
choice for manufacturers of most chemical products. 137 As a result,
135 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1994). The counter-argument is that the public has per-
fect knowledge of the content of the statutes and their implementation problems and has
intentionally limited testing requirements to only the most egregious, known hazards.
Rather than supporting an inference that the public generally expects manufacturers to
remain accountable, then, these statutes might suggest exactly the opposite. This counter-
explanation seems unlikely to be the better interpretation of the public's will for a number
of reasons. The most persuasive reason is that this explanation not only requires the pub-
lic to understand the subtleties of legislative drafting, cf. Applegate, supra note 1, at 319-30
(detailing problems with statutory wording of TSCA that explains why it fails to ensure
adequate safety testing), and the prevalence of regulatory failure in the area of toxics con-
trol, see Wagner, supra note 28, at 1677-85 (outlining extended failure of agencies in sci-
ence-based regulations), but it also requires that the public appreciate the prevalence of
parallel failures in the market and the common law to promote safety testing. The latter
understanding (of the common-law failure) is particularly counter-intuitive in light of the
well-established duty to test rule. Thus, the possibility that the failure of TSCA to en-
courage testing is a result of careful public design seems to expect more of the public than
even the most savvy lawyers, versed in the complexities of toxic product regulation, have
achieved. Cf Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
Duca L.J. 1, 26-31 (describing how legal complexity reduces public understanding or can
even be used to escape public accountability).
136 See supra Part I.B.3.
137 "Indeed, what would be surprising would be to discover that, notwithstanding these
factors, [scientific ignorance was] ... other than commonplace." Henderson, supra note
44, at 782; see also Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the
Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 892, 899 (1983) (hypothesizing that, in wake
of recent case law, manufacturers may be deterred from making safety improvements
rather than encouraged to do so). Interestingly, although Henderson insightfully identi-
fies and analyzes the effect of liability rules in decreasing a firm's incentives to make a
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socially optimal "managerial behavior [may in fact be] ... constrained
by the law, rather than the other way around."' 38
Steven Shavell has concluded that a negligence rule similar to the
current causation rule that bases the determination of reasonable con-
duct on the level of safety information a defendant actually possesses
(rather than the level of information a defendant should possess) will
produce, at best, suboptimal levels of information. 3 9 In some cases,
such a rule may lead a party to "decide not to obtain [any] informa-
tion no matter how cheaply it can be done" since the "private value of
information may be negative."' 40 Alan Schwartz's economic model
similarly predicts that a firm will sell a product without safety research
if it perceives the possible benefits of research to be small' 41 or the
costs of research to be high.142 Choosing ignorance, Schwartz argues,
becomes even more sensible when years are likely to pass before the
harm materializes.' 43
That manufacturers have a strong incentive to choose to be igno-
rant about even the most basic preventable scientific uncertainties re-
garding the safety of their products is supported by empirical
evidence-the present knowledge of latent chemical toxicity is
product design safer over time-below what might be socially desirable-he overlooks the
parallel phenomenon occurring in safety research. This error leads him to understate the
importance of his observations, suggesting that the cases affected are only "at the margin."
Henderson, supra note 44, at 774.
138 Henderson, supra note 44, at 788.
139 Shavell, supra note 15, at 26668.
140 Id. at 266.
141 Consumers are unlikely to discriminate between most chemical products based on
the extent of safety research performed because consumers are not generally aware of such
risks in the first place. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
142 Schwartz states that his economic model shows that:
the amount of research a profit-maximizing firm will do to discover how
dangerous a product is depends on three variables: the mean of the profit
distribution if the firm were to sell without doing further research; the vari-
ance of this distribution-the amount of uncertainty about dangerousness;
and research costs.
Schwartz, supra note 63, at 700-01.
143 See id. at 710 (predicting that a firm will not insure against accidents if accident
costs are not likely to be incurred for six or more years because the "entrepreneur...
would operate if he could earn enough in the accident-free period to recover start-up costs
and make a profit"); see also EADS & REtTER, supra note 44, at 22 (suggesting that to the
extent injuries (and claims) occur "only far in the future, and to the extent that these costs
can be reduced by firm actions other than increased design efforts related to safety, the
incentive to design safer products is undercut"); Felstiner & Siegelman, supra note 43, at
810 (discussing considerable body of literature documenting the short-term focus of Amer-
ican corporations); Henderson, supra note 44, at 775-76 (noting that without pre-judgment
interest and in light of discount rates, "to have deferred a liability for six or seven years
beyond the time when it otherwise would have incurred was to avoid a substantial part of
that liability"); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk,
14J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 784 (1985) (discussing how "[hlong-lagged effects also [tend to]
escape deterrence").
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poor.144 As discussed earlier, the National Research Council found an
alarming scarcity of information regarding the toxicity of most chemi-
cal products. 145 In addition, the NRC reported that the availability of
toxicity information was unrelated to the potential hazard a substance
posed. A chemical that potentially posed a significant risk of harm
was often subjected to less toxicity testing than a chemical that was
more likely to be benign. 46 Not surprisingly, when some testing was
done, the completed tests were typically the least expensive and least
time-consuming and, as a result, provided the least amount of infor-
mation about the long-term hazards the chemical posed-a plethora
of preventable scientific uncertainties were thus left unresolved. 147
A recent investigation into the extent of safety research and inno-
vation activity1 48 on forty-three of the least-studied chemicals consid-
144 See Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 854 n.19 (listing reports of considerable scientific
ignorance regarding latent chemical toxicity); infra notes 170-181 and accompanying text
(providing examples); but see infra note 154 (discussing possibility that some manufacturers
are conducting safety tests but not releasing the data). Two separate reports published in
the 1980's suggest that the Monsanto Corporation may provide an exception to this appar-
ent trend toward choosing ignorance. Albert Flores's in-depth investigation of Monsanto
in 1982 and an extensive interview of Monsanto officials in 1981 both indicate that Mon-
santo is very concerned about ensuring the long-term safety of its products and processes.
Although Monsanto does screen for long-term product and process safety by reviewing the
scientific literature, it is not clear whether Monsanto also conducts in-house testing on
potential chemical hazards that appear understudied in the literature. See Flores, supra
note 46, at 16-20; see also David W. Ewing & Millicent R. Kindle, Monsanto's 'Early Warning'
System, HARv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 107, 108-10 (interviewingJohn W. Hanley, CEO,
Monsanto). Monsanto's recent objection to EPA regulations requiring it to conduct two
screening tests on several chemicals that it produces or discharges (tests which the EPA
estimated will cost from $200,000 to $328,000 per chemical), however, suggests that it may
not be conducting even these more basic safety tests in the absence of regulatory require-
ments. Compare Office of Water Chemicals; Final Test Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,667, 59,675
(1993) (reporting that both Monsanto and the Chemical Manufacturers Association esti-
mated the costs of basic screening tests for four chemicals would be "burdensome" on the
industry), with Ewing & Kindle, supra, at 115 (quoting the Chairman and CEO of Monsanto
as saying that Monsanto "take[s] the lead in testing," and that "federal and state regulatory
agencies have no relevance at all to the need for our testing programs"). If this is the case,
then the benefits of Monsanto's safety program could be quite limited; the company may
simply be replacing products with known adverse effects with products that are not neces-
sarily known to be safe, but instead are simply unstudied.
145 See supra Part I.B.2.
146 See ToxciT TESTING, supra note 29, at 121 (reporting that "[t]he amount of testing
that had been performed was not related to the committee's judgment that the chemicals
warranted additional concern on the basis of physicochemical information").
147 See Toxicrrv TEsTING, supra note 29, at 95 (observing that toxicity "[t] ests that were
more complex ... were frequently absent" for most chemicals in the study).
148 The databases used to gather this information were as follows: (1) Patents and Pat-
ent Abstracts-Search of U.S. Patent Text File, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (July-Au-
gust 1995) (search of all patents and/or abstracts with chemical name in text); (2)
Chemical Releases-U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1994 Toxics RELEASE IN-
VENTORY. PUBLIC DATA RELEASE 78-89 tbl.1-45 (1996) (organized by chemical name); (3)
Short-term and long-term studies conducted in laboratories (primarily on animals)-
Search of the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances ("RTECS"), Nat'l Inst. of
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ered for the right-to-know provisions of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA")1 49 underscores the NRC's
1984 findings. Safety research on these forty-three chemicals is inade-
quate: a number of preventable scientific uncertainties, such as repro-
ductive effects, have not been assessed satisfactorily, or, in some cases,
at all.150 Yet investments in innovation on these same chemicals, evi-
Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") (July-August 1995) (search using chemical
name; long term and short term studies were sorted manually using NIOSH's general cate-
gories (i.e., mutagenicity as the basis for delineation) (for most chemicals, estimates of the
numbers of employees exposed to the chemical in 1974 and 1983 were also available from
RTECS-these numbers are reported infra Appendix A)); (4) Human studies-Search of
MEDLINE, National Library of Medicine (July 1996) (search of abstracts of published stud-
ies in biomedical journals (English only) using chemical name and "adverse effect" sub-
heading to narrow the search; results were screened manually for "epidemiology studies"
(defined as involving more than 100 subjects) and "clinical studies" (defined as involving
less than 100 subjects)); (5) "Active" litigation-Search of WESTLAW, All Cases File (May-
June 1996) (using common chemical name as the only search term; results were screened
manually and include each case that involves a claim of harm resulting from exposure to
the named chemical; occupational cases are those brought against employers and toxic
tort cases are the remainder). For raw data, see Appendix A.
149 Chemicals listed under EPCRA were selected because some safety information was
available (an implicit prerequisite to listing), but in some cases this information was not
extensive. EPCRA chemicals were also attractive because information is readily available
for recent discharge quantities. See supra note 128. Initially, a subset of 109 EPCRA chemi-
cals was chosen based on the apparent scarcity of information for all 109 chemicals suffi-
cient to permit the EPA to conduct an estimate of toxicological potency for various human
health and ecological effects. See 2 U.S. EPA, Toxic CHEMICAL RELEASE INVENTORY RISK
INVENroRY SCREENING GUIDE (VERSION 1.0) appA at A-9 to A-37 (1989) (listing chemicals
and toxicology potency for five categories of adverse effects; the 109 selected chemicals
were those that had no potency identifications for any of the 5 categories of adverse ef-
fects). Through the process of the study, the list was ultimately pared down to 43 chemi-
cals for reasons having nothing to do with the extent of study or innovation. Specifically, a
chemical was eliminated from the study either because: (1) There was substantial variabil-
ity in the common names used to refer to a single chemical. Although dozens of synonyms
typically exist for a single chemical, in this study, chemicals were excluded only when the
chemical name used in the EPCRA database (compiled by the EPA) differed from the
name used for the identical chemical in the RTECS database (compiled by NIOSH). See
supra note 148. Although the chemical identification number ("CAS") would have en-
sured a common chemical identity, several of the databases (MEDLINE, WESTLAW, PAT-
ENT DATABASE) do not use CAS numbers consistently or at all; (2) Primitive search
techniques required for some of the databases prevented a common ingredient of a chemi-
cal (e.g., ethylene) from being identified separate from its more notorious derivatives (e.g.,
diethylene dibromide; ethylene glycol). While search difficulties could have been remedied
with manual screening, this would have added several hundred hours to this study with
limited benefits. Even after paring the list to the 43 chemicals with very dependable chem-
ical names, some minor variability in chemical names and chemical derivatives remained,
although it is possible that these false negatives and false positives in database "hits" largely
canceled each other out.
150 See infra note 151. In fact, the testing that has been conducted on these chemicals
appears to have been conducted predominantly by third parties in academic institutions,
rather than by manufacturers. The affiliation of the authors conducting long-term studies
were not available on the computer databases, and manual searches were not possible due
to resource constraints. However, author addresses were available for epidemiology and
clinical studies dating back to the mid 1980s, and a tally of these addresses reveals that the
authors for 95% of the 195 studies were affiliated with universities or research institutions.
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denced by the number of times the chemical is referenced in a patent,
is generally quite high. Although the data is highly variable depend-
ing on the chemical, the number of times a chemical is cited in a
patent typically exceeds by ten to one-thousand times the number of
reported toxicity studies done on that chemical.15 ' Moreover, the ex-
tent of innovation (e.g., patent activity) bears no relationship to the
extent of long-term safety testing on animals:' 52 for some chemicals
patent activity is high and safety testing is low, while for other chemi-
cals safety testing is high and patent activity is low.'5 3 This preliminary
data suggests that manufacturers are making significant investments
in product innovations that use these forty-three chemicals and far
less in needed safety research.' 54
Search of MEDLINE, supra note 148. (Studies meeting the criteria described supra note
148 were then manually screened and tallied for author affiliation.) This does not pre-
clude the possibility that manufacturers are financing a portion or all of this third-party
research. It does suggest, however, that manufacturers are not doing much of the pub-
lished safety research in-house.
151 Of course, at some point the number of long-term studies that are needed to assess
the risks a chemical posed are "capped." Additional safety research has diminishing re-
turns after sufficient data exists to conduct a full health assessment. Based on the NRC
criteria, however, existing research appeared to be sufficient, at best, for only a few of these
43 chemicals to conduct such an assessment. For example, reproductive effects were rarely
investigated in the sample of 43 chemicals, even though these effects constitute one-fifth of
the basic hazards the NRC recommends for testing. See supra note 30.
152 Although caution must be exercised in applying statistical tests in a group of chemi-
cals that does not represent a "random" population, correlation coefficients may provide
the reader with at least a sense of the weakness of the correlation (a strong positive correla-
tion is +1, no correlation is 0, and a strong negative correlation is -1). The correlation
between long-term animal studies on a chemical and the frequency the chemical was refer-
enced in the abstract or text of a patent was essentially nonexistent (.09).
153 See Figure 2. Discharge quantities also appeared to bear no relationship to either
patent activity or the number of long-term safety studies. (The correlation coefficients
ranged from -.24 to -.07 in comparing discharge quantities with various types or totals of
safety studies). However, a moderate correlation may exist between innovation and
human studies that might warrant further study with an expanded random data set. (The
correlation between patent activities and the number of epidemiological studies was .6 and
for total patents versus all studies (clinical, epidemiological, long-term laboratory and
short-term animal combined) the correlation coefficient was .48.) In addition to investi-
gating a correlation between these variables, it would be interesting to learn more about
their interaction over time. For example, do human studies tend to follow rather than
precede bursts in innovation activity? Does greater innovation mean greater exposure,
which in turn means more opportunities for studying the effects on humans?
154 It is also possible that manufacturers and their consultant laboratories are con-
ducting a good deal of long-term safety testing, but are not reporting the results of this
testing. In such a case, manufacturers may decide privately whether, based on the results of
the toxicity testing, a product should be modified or discontinued. Cf Toxicrrv TESTING,
supra note 29, at 194 (observing that "[m] anufacturers and trade associations are reposito-
ries of otherwise unobtainable information" on various chemical characteristics).
Although this possibility certainly cannot be eliminated, the lessons learned from the dev-
astating liability imposed on firms caught with in-house research that suggested their prod-
uct was hazardous, see infra notes 176-86 and accompanying text, makes the presence of
widespread secret safety research unlikely. See also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
text (discussing characteristics of manufacturing process that tend to minimize the role of
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B. Underdeterrence and Undercompensation
A causation rule that provides a negligent manufacturer who de-
liberately fails to conduct toxicity tests higher odds of escaping liability
than a manufacturer who does conduct safety testing underdeters
harmful activity and likely undercompensates victims. 55 Considera-
ble evidence suggests that both are occurring in the manufacture of
potentially toxic products.
safety research in product development). In any case, if testing is not disclosed to the
government or public, it is essentially the same as not having testing information at all-
absent an in-house "whistleblower," the manufacturer completely escapes accountability
for its internal cost-benefit decision regarding the optimal safety of the product. Short
record retention policies implemented in at least some manufacturing firms may further
ensure that companies succeed in escaping accountability for their decisions. Cf.John M.
Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 56 NoTRE DAME LAw. 5 (1980) (surveying federal and state law and
ethical codes governing the retention and destruction of corporate documents); Michael
Allen, Cleaning House: U.S. Companies Pay Increasing Attention to Destroying Files, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 2, 1987, at 1 (reporting that "[a]s important as teaching companies which documents
to destroy ... is teaching them which ones never to create in the first place").
155 Several scholars have argued that the liability rules underdeter and undercompen-
sate because of the great scientific uncertainty that plaintiffs face. See, e.g., Trauberman,
supra note 86, at 187-88 n.48 (citing literature). Although the undercompensation and
underdeterrence caused by inadequate safety testing is somewhat different than that ad-
dressed by the majority of scholars, see sources cited supra note 63, it is a preventable handi-
cap that plaintiffs are currently forced to bear.
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1. Underdeterrence
The traditional common-law approach to assigning responsibility
for proving causation in toxic tort cases creates, at least in theory, a
"recurring miss";156 manufacturers can act negligently, but avoid lia-
bility precisely because of that misconduct.157 Debate currently sur-
rounds the question of whether and how much tort rules actually
156 See Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 19 J.
LErAL STUD. 691, 692 (1990) (defining a "recurring miss" as the class of cases that "involves
wrongful conduct that is not likely to be linked under a preponderance-of-the-evidence
rule with the injury that it sometimes causes"). In his analysis of "recurring miss," Levmore
focuses on the related, but still different, set of cases where adequate scientific research
exists, but the resulting probabilistic causation cannot reach the "substantial cause" or
.more likely than not" sufficiency threshold. See, e.g., id. at 706 ("The identifying feature of
these [recurring miss] cases is, once again, that there is a wrongful party who is more than
0 percent but possibly never more than 50 percent likely to have caused an injury.").
157 James Henderson similarly observes that prevailing tort rules may actively discour-
age manufacturers from making safety improvements after their products are marketed.
See Henderson, supra note 44, at 774 (arguing that "[t]o the extent that increases in expo-
sure to liability are likely to flow from reasonable efforts by manufacturers to make their
products safer, they discourage manufacturers from engaging at the margin in precisely
the sorts of activities that tort law purports to encourage"); see also Arlen, supra note 15, at
1121 (arguing that "imposing [additional] liability on manufacturers may be necessary to
provide them with the requisite incentives to test products properly and to reveal to con-
sumers information about the risks of products currently on the market as that informa-
tion becomes available"); Eggen, supra note 63, at 896-97 (observing that in the workers'
compensation context, employers are not held fully accountable for reproductive injuries
caused by exposure to toxic substances because of workers' inability to prove causation);
Feldman, supra note 1, at 41 (arguing that underdeterrence will occur under current toxic
tort liability rules because placing the burden on plaintiff "creates a perverse incentive for
actors to foster strong uncertainty about general causation").
In jurisdictions where medical monitoring claims are allowed and causation burdens
are slightly lower, some manufacturers may face an increased likelihood of liability for at
least medical surveillance costs deemed necessary as a result of plaintiffs' exposure to de-
fendants' hazard. These claims are allowed in some jurisdictions even when the research
on long-term product safety is incomplete. See, e.g., Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Dam-
ages: Using Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental
Hazards, 12 HARv. ETL. L. REa,. 265, 265-67 (1988) (providing overview of nature of med-
ical monitoring claims). However, these claims do not begin to offset the problems with
proving general causation for latent harms because: (1) the proof of causation required in
most jurisdictions for a medical monitoring claim cannot be provided when basic safety
research has not been conducted, see, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting medical monitoring claim, but
still requiring the plaintiff to introduce "competent medical testimony" or other evidence
of need for diagnostic testing); (2) medical monitoring claims are filed less often due to
the availability of primary insurance for most victims, see, e.g., Gara, supra, at 269 (observing
that "[t] hose financially able to afford medical care will heed scientific and medical advice
and undergo precautionary testing regardless of ajudicial remedy"); (3) some courts may
require present physical harm associated with exposure before allowing a monitoring
claim, a requirement that substantially limits its availability to plaintiffs, see, e.g., Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (requiring pres-
ent physical injury for medical surveillance claim), rev'd, 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993)
(holding that physical harm is not required for medical surveillance claim).
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affect behavior. 58 Although there is presently no way to prove that
the tort rules cause manufacturers to avoid learning of their products'
latent hazards, 59 the striking absence of even a weak correlation be-
tween patent activity and long-term safety testing suggests that the tort
system is at least not encouraging safety testing.' 60
A direct relationship between epidemiological research on a
product's latent effects and litigation provides even more compelling
evidence that liability rules currently penalize rather than reward
safety testing. In case studies of Bendectin161 and benzene, 62 a single
158 Compare Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73
CAL. L. REV. 677, 682-93 (1985) (noting absence of proof regarding deterrent effect of
liability rules); Mashaw, supra note 82, at 1394 (same); and Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87, 405-
13 (1994) (providing overview of debate concerning whether tort doctrines deter and
more focused discussion of literature on deterrence in products liability), with Neil L
Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. R . 23,
51 (1990) (using institutional analysis to argue against assertions about the lack of deter-
rence in tort system); Richard.A. Posner, Can Lauyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73
CAL. L. REv. 747, 749-50 (1985) (arguing that liability insurance premiums affect decisions
to drive); and Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 862-63 (suggesting that firms with potential for
mass exposure torts should be increasingly sensitive to liability rules). Some commentators
have gone so far as to argue that toxic tort rules overdeter manufacturers, see, e.g., Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 291-93, 314-16 (1985), although these analyses seem to focus exclu-
sively on a small subset of heavily regulated products, such as new drugs and vaccines, for
which safety testing is extensive, see Toxicrrv TESTING, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that, in
1984, unregulated chemical products in commerce included over 40,000 chemicals in con-
trast to less than 2000 drug products).
Interestingly, inadequacies in existing liability rules may impair empirical efforts to
determine whether existing tort doctrines actually deter manufacturers. For example, a
survey of 250 companies with regard to how the product liability system affects their manu-
facturing decisions revealed that only nineteen percent had "[i]mproved safety of prod-
ucts" and only thirteen percent had "[riedesigned product[s]" in anticipation of liability.
E. PATRICK McGunE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 20 (1988). This may suggest that
the effect of product liability on manufacturers' decisions is slight or it might suggest that
gaps in tort rules provide many manufacturers with relatively reliable ways to avoid liability.
159 One can argue, in the abstract, that many of the factors that tend to mute tort law's
signals are absent or less significant in litigation involving latent toxic harms. For over a
century, courts in every state have imposed the burden of proof for producing some scien-
tific information supporting a cause-and-effect relationship on plaintiffs. See supra note 69
and accompanying text. Thus, the temporal and jurisdictional variations that are often
blamed for suppressing tort law's messages to manufacturers are not present with the cau-
sation rule. Cf JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AuTo SAFETY 241
(1990) (concluding that products liability law does not significantly influence automobile
design because its messages are "weak and full of static").
160 See Figure 2; see also supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
161 The filing information was based on data published by Sanders, supra note 70, at
396 tbl.5 (including state and federal filings). For a "suggestive epidemiology" study that
provided a scientific turning point in the Bendectin litigation, see KennethJ. Rothman et
al., Exogenous Hormones and Other Drug Exposures of Children with Congenital Heart Disease, 109
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 433 (1979), described in Sanders, supra note 70, at 342.
162 The benzene "case hits" were collected from a search of WESTLAW, Allcases file
(June 1996) ("benzene" as the search term), see supra note 148 (describing WESTLAW
search in greater detail), and include opinions from both toxic tort and workers' compen-
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positive or inconclusive epidemiology study appeared to lead to plain-
tiffs' verdicts and increased filings.' 63
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sation suits that involve claims for harms resulting from benzene exposure. The suggestive
epidemiology studies of benzene are Robert A. Rinsky et al., Benzene and Leukemia, 316 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1044 (1987); Robert A. Rinsky et al., Leukemia in Benzene Workers, 2 Am. J.
INDUS. MED. 217 (1981). These studies are discussed in Brennan, supra note 18, at 33, as
"large and complete epidemiological studies" that demonstrate higher incidences of leuke-
mia after exposure to benzene, as well as dose-response effects.
163 See FIGURES 3 & 4; see also Sanders, supra note 70, at 342 (discussing scientific and
legal watershed resulting from highly regarded 1979 epidemiological study that suggested
an association between Bendectin and birth defects); cf. id. at 321 ("Science is... a leading
indicator of what was to happen in the Bendectin trials. To know the science was, to some
extent, to be able to predict what would come."). Sanders also observed that mass filings
generated, in turn, greater scientific research, because questions regarding latent effects of
the chemical became "hot." Id. at 346. Media attention tends to stimulate the interest of
prestigious journals and funding sources, which in turn encourage scientists to propose
research in the particular area. See id. Research on Bendectin dropped only after scientists
began to reach a consensus that Bendectin was at best a weak teratogen, the number of
exposed persons declined because Bendectin was removed from the market in 1983, and
other "hot" topics began to take funding priority. See id. at 347.
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This case-specific trend is repeated in the broader study of forty-
three EPCRA chemicals. 164 The number of "case hits" for a chemical
is strongly correlated with the number of epidemiological studies pub-
licly available on that chemical:165 the number of epidemiology stud-
ies increases at the same rate as the litigation (using published
opinions as a measure). This relationship is not repeated for any
other data pairs. 166
164 Recall also that the target chemicals used in this study are regulated under the
right-to-know provisions of EPCRA, see supra note 149 and accompanying text, and, hence,
will have considerably more safety information than the average unregulated chemical.
Three or four long-term studies is a low number for chemicals listed under EPCRA; it is a
good deal for an average unregulated chemical. See supra Part I.B.2.
165 Despite the coarse nature of the case-hit data collected from WESTLAW computer
database, which does not provide the total number of case filings, case settlements, or
settlements prior to filing on a chemical-by-chemical basis, and despite other sources of
error stemming from the study more generally, see supra note 149, the correlation between
case-hits and epidemiology studies was a surprising 0.94 (with a perfect correlation being 1
and no correlation being 0).
166 SeeFigure 5. The strongest "second" correlation was between the combined total of
epidemiological and clinical studies and case-hits. Surprisingly, there appears to be no
correlation between long-term laboratory studies and case-hits, and only a weak to moder-
ate correlation between innovation activity and case-hits.
The absence of a similar correlation between case-hits and long-term animal studies is
puzzling. Absent more detailed information (such as filing information) these results can
be interpreted in several very different ways. The first interpretation is that most heavily
litigated toxic tort claims are going to be those supported by relatively well-developed sci-
entific proof due to selection factors. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text. A
second interpretation is that the data in this study are too rough and, therefore, the ab-
sence of a correlation is inconclusive rather than meaningful.
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Perhaps even more importantly, the manufacturing community
appears to believe that safety research regarding latent harms invites,
rather than wards off, litigation.1 67 Defense lawyers tout the effective-
ness of ignorance of long-term product effects as a defense to litiga-
tion,168 and this advice appears to be followed, in some cases
167 Cf Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Liti-
gation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BRooL L. REv. 961, 1017 (1993) ("The history of mass torts
has shown that manufacturers may doubt or at times even suppress information about
potential product-related dangers, allowing products to remain on the market until their
dangers are obvious and many people have been placed at risk.").
168 See, e.g., Voke, supra note 68, at 48 (identifying as successful defense strategy in
toxic tort cases "[e]licit[ing] a concession [from an expert witness] that a positive response
from either an epidemiological, in vitro or in vivo study is generally required in the scien-
tific community before an expert can offer an opinion that the product in question caused
the plaintiff's disease"); see also Blomquist, supra note 62, at 30 (observing based on a survey
of caselaw that defendants in toxic tort disputes rely on "causation-based arguments" and
that inadequate evidence exists on causation for their defense); cf. Henderson, supra note
44, at 779 (observing that in terms of making safety improvements in an existing product,
frequently "the safest course in the short run ... is to admit nothing, alter course as little as
possible, and offer to settle with no one"); Allan Kanner, Continuity and Change in Toxic Tort
Litigation, in 2 ENVTL. LrrIG. 539, 564-65, 594-95 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 20-24,
1994), available in WESTLAW, C921 ALI-ABA 539 (observing strategic litigation tactics
manufacturer-defendants use "to keep incriminating information out of the public market-
place of ideas," which include staying discovery until all dispositive motions have been
ruled on, entering into confidential settlements to keep information from other victims,
and attacking plaintiffs' causation experts and evidence).
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successfully.169 Case studies show that a manufacturer's decision to re-
frain from conducting even the most basic tests to resolve pre-
ventable scientific uncertainties regarding the safety of their
product is often made even after the company becomes aware
of a potential problem. For example, in the manufacture
of the Dalkon Shield,170  Ultra-Absorbent Tampons, 171  Ben-
169 In a case brought by parents for the death of their child from aplastic anemia
allegedly resulting from exposure to Pratt 505K, which was sprayed in the city for mosquito
control purposes, defense attorneys "persistently demanded [from plaintiffs] studies show-
ing an increased risk of aplastic anemia in humans from exposure to Pratt 505K, evidence
which the plaintiffs in this case, or any similar case, could not realistically present." Bren-
nan, supra note 18, at 44, 46-47 (citing testimony in trial record of Vann v. City of Woodha-
yen, No. 84425 092 NI (Wayne County Cir. Ct. Mich., June 12, 1988) and noting the
paucity of epidemiological studies available on most chemicals) (footnotes omitted). De-
fendants won a jury verdict in the case. See id. at 47.
170 The A.H. Robins Company manufactured the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth
control device ("IUD"). Dr. Robert Murphy, the director of scientific development and
international research for the company, stated in a memorandum "'we possess[ed] inade-
quate support data from animal studies as to long-term safety of the current Dalkon
Shield.'" MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD 123 (1985) (quoting memo) see also id. at 133 (quoting memo of Dr. Oscar Klioze,
Director of Pharmaceutical Research and Analytical Services, warning that the string on
Dalkon Shield "'has not been subjected to any formal stability testing' "); id. at 134 (quot-
ing memo by Kenneth Moore, Dalkon Shield Project Coordinator, warning that
"'[c]onsidering that we have been marketing the device for going on three years .... it is
about time that data are collected on the effect of the uterine environment' "). See generally
SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD'SJUSTICE: ONEJUDGE'S BATTLE TO EXPOSE
THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD 28, 36-38 (1985) (describing inadequate safety testing of
Dalkon Shield); MINTz, supra, at 132-47 (describing the considerable amount of informa-
tion that Robins ignored when it delayed and avoided safety testing of the string on the
Dalkon Shield). Robins also apparently failed to disclose that the shield contained copper
and copper sulfate in order to avoid having the FDA classify and ultimately regulate the
Shield as a drug. See MiNTz, supra, at 123-27; see also Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal.
Rptr. 117, 132 n.21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (observing that "plaintiff presented substantial
evidence of a conscious decision by defendant Robins not to test the IUD device prior to or
during marketing").
171 In 1980, when the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") became aware of a virtual
epidemic of Toxic Shock Syndrome ("TSS") among women, it conducted an epidemiology
study that correlated the disease with the recent use of tampons. See West v. Johnson &
Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 442-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). The CDC then re-
quested safety research from tampon manufacturers but received almost no information.
See id. at 443. As a result of the considerable scientific uncertainty, CDC conducted a sec-
ond study and within three to four weeks had isolated the cause of TSS as a bacteria pres-
ent in a small percentage of women that thrived as a result of tampon use. See id.
Estimates in 1980 reported that approximately ten percent of the women suffering from
TSS died. See id. at 442 (quoting an expert witness)
Evidence later adduced by plaintiffs revealed that between 1975 and 1980 one of the
tampon manufacturers (Johnson &Johnson) had received 150 complaints "of a more seri-
ous nature" resulting from tampon use. Id. at 445. When the complainant would cooper-
ate, Johnson & Johnson would test remaining tampons in the box owned by the
complainant to ensure that they met manufacturing specifications, but did no additional
testing. See id. In fact, the court found that "[u]p to the time of trial, (Johnson &Johnson]
had conducted no studies to ascertain whether use of a tampon was in any way related to
vaginal infection." Id. Plaintiffs told a similar story against Playtex, another manufacturer
of ultra-absorbent tampons. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446
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dectin,172 D.E.S.,17 3 and breast implants,1 74 well-established corpora-
tions repeatedly resisted conducting relatively straightforward studies
on the long-term safety of their products. Not surprisingly, some of
these companies defended their products in litigation by arguing that
the existing scientific research was insufficient to prove that the prod-
ucts actually caused harm. 75
(10th Cir. 1987) (finding that Playtex disregarded studies demonstrating a connection be-
tween highly absorbent tampons and TSS).
172 See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 1982) (reporting that
"It] he jury determined that Lilly and other DES manufacturers wrongfully marketed the
drug for use in preventing miscarriage without first performing laboratory tests upon preg-
nant mice," and that these tests would have alerted the companies that "DES was capable of
causing cancer"); id. at 189 (discussing Lilly's partial admissions regarding foreseeability of
cancer resulting from DES).
174 Breast implants were not subject to FDA regulation until 1988, 24 years after they
had been on the market (a delay attributed in part to successful lobbying by breast implant
manufacturers and surgeons). See Z6e Panarites, Note, Breast Implants: Chowices Women
Thought They Made, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 163, 192-93 (1993). The research finally
filed with the FDA in 1991 was sorely inadequate. The Leader of the FDA's Breast Implant
Task Force reported that Dow's clinical studies were:
"so weak that they cannot provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of these devices[,]" because they provide "no assurance that
the full range of complications are included, no dependable measure of
the incidence of complications, no reliable measure of the revision rate and
no quantitative measure of patient benefit."
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 102d CONG., REPORT ON THE FDA's REGULA-
TION OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 22 (Comm. Print 1993). Because of remaining scien-
tific and trans-scientific uncertainties regarding the safety of breast implants, the FDA has
substantially restricted their availability. See, e.g., id. at 43-45 (observing FDA's 1992 morato-
rium on implants, but criticizing FDA for inadequate monitoring of "'urgent need'"
exception).
175 Michael Ciresi, a plaintiffs' lawyer in the Dalkon Shield litigation, reported that
"'[t]he defense strategy has been to insulate Robins's officials from the information gath-
ered by the defense [legal] team, so as to enable them to testify that they have no medical
or technical evidence that the Dalkon Shield causes injury to a degree different [from that
caused by] other IUDs.'" MiNTz, supra note 170, at 203 (alteration in the original); see also
id. at 17-19, 203-06 (reporting on scientific ignorance as defense in the Dalkon Shield
litigation). Defending claims that their untested o.b. tampons caused TSS, Johnson &
Johnson's experts consistently maintained that "no study had proved a cause-and-effect
relationship between the use of tampons and the occurrence of TSS. They also main-
tained... that tampons by themselves did not cause TSS .... " West, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
Despite its extensive in-house knowledge of the health hazards of cigarettes, see infra note
180, even the tobacco industry has attempted to claini that existing research does not es-
tablish a scientifically established cause-and-effect link between tobacco and cancer. See,
e.g., PHiuP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP
18 (1996) (reporting the tobacco industry's argument that existing research did not prove
tobacco causes cancer and that for sufficient proof, the victim would need to scientifically
establish "every individual biochemical step as a disease is created" and then establish that
each of these steps led to her particular cancer); id. at 41 ("'The position of the tobacco
companies ... is dominated by legal considerations.... It has retreated behind impossible,
perhaps ridiculous, demands for what in PR terms is called scientific proof... usually the
first reaction of the guilty.'") (quoting former British American Tobacco Company vice
president for research, SidneyJames Green) (alterations in original).
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More attenuated, but also more disturbing, are isolated examples
of corporate decisions to continue marketing products after confiden-
tial in-house research revealed latent hazards, but publicly available
studies demonstrating adverse effects were scarce or non-
existent.176 Corporate concealment of adverse testing results occur-
red in the marketing of asbestos, 77 the Dalkon Shield, 78 and
breast implants, 17 9 and may be occurring in the marketing of tobac-
176 See generaly Kanner, supra note 168, at 587-88 & n.220 (charging that manufacturer
defendants engage in deliberate efforts to suppress damaging scientific data).
177 The record of asbestos manufacturers' attempt to conceal or downplay the hazards
of asbestos is well-documented. See generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCr:
THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TirAL (1985) (chronicling asbestos litigation throughout the
industry). More dramatic examples include: animal studies on asbestosis in the 1930's, the
findings of which, by agreement, belonged to the investors until they agreed to disclose it
to the public, see id. at 118-19; notes detailingJohns-Manville Co.'s health review committee
meeting during which executives "developed a corporate policy of not informing sick em-
ployees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen's-compensation
claims and lawsuits," see id. at 145; and successful company efforts to persuade the editor of
a trade magazine that growing scientific studies on "'asbestos . .. [should] receive the
minimum of publicity.'" Id. at 116-17.
178 For example, A.H. Robins's primary strategy was to avoid safety research on the
Dalkon Shield, but it selectively disclosed the limited safety testing it did conduct when the
results were positive. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987)
(awarding punitive damages based on corporate misconduct, including evidence that A.H.
Robins "commissioned studies on the Dalkon Shield which it dropped or concealed when
the results were unfavorable" and "consigned hundreds of documents to the furnace"). Cf
MiNTz, supra note 170, at 122 (referencing memo by Kenneth Moore, Project Coordinator
of Robins's Dalkon Shield, reporting that Robins's main purpose in engaging in studies
was "'to make available for publication extremely good Dalkon Shield results' "). Robins
initiated a two-year study on the effects of the Dalkon Shield on baboons eight months
after it started selling the Dalkon Shield that was never made available to the medical
profession. "Among eight [of the baboons tested], one 'perished,' and among ten, three
suffered perforation of the uterus .... " Id. at 123 (quoting testimony of Dr.John W. Ward,
director of toxicology and assistant director of scientific development). Following an esca-
lation of concern by company employees over the potential of the string of the Dalkon
Shield to carry bacteria from the vagina to the uterus, Robins retrieved 303 used strings for
examination by a staff scientist, Thomas C. Yu. Dr. Yu found defects in all but 35 of the
strings. Yu's boss swore that Robins maintained "no written records of the exams or the
results." Id. at 134-35. There is also some suggestion that Robins destroyed sensitive
Dalkon Shield documents in order to better defend against litigation. See Francine
Schwadel, Robins and Plaintiffs Face Uncertain Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1985, at Al.
179 See Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1994) (af-
firming punitive damage award based in part on evidence that company concealed adverse
results of clinical studies and knew that long-term studies were needed). In Hopkins, the
court stated:
Dow obtained results of a study in which four dogs received silicone gel
implants that resembled the implants that Dow was then marketing. The
results demonstrated that after six months, the implants appeared to be
functioning properly, but that after two years, inflammation surrounding
the implants demonstrated the existence of an immune reaction. Dow did
not publicly release the results of this research for several years, and when it
did ultimately release the results, Dow omitted the negative findings and
implied that the implants were safe.
Id. at 1119. See also Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination
of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 973, 987 n.122 (1993)
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co products as well.' 8 0 Although limited, these examples provide
dramatic evidence that at least some corporations perceive liabil-
ity for certain types of latent harms as either unlikely or a risk
that should be significantly discounted as long as their own
in-house research is concealed.' 8'
The well-publicized demise of these same corporations who en-
gaged in in-house research and were later "caught" with their adverse
results may also have the untoward effect of deterring firms from con-
ducting such research in the future, particularly for products already
on the market.'8 2 Experience in other mass tort cases has revealed
that in-house research is helpful only if it is used to determine when to
remove or recall a product from the market so that the manufacturer
can "deplete" the pool of future plaintiffs183 and reduce liability judg-
ments to a payable size.18 4 Beyond this function, additional in-house
safety research has been relatively ineffective in supporting a firm's
defense, because a manufacturer's research conducted after litigation
(quoting Dow Coming discovery documents and summary of scientific studies). Dow
Coming also conducted a study in 1974 that revealed that silicone could "trigger strong
reactions of the immune system," but Dow Coming denied such a reaction at an FDA
hearing in 1991. Id. at 988 n.123 (citing Boyce Rensberger, Reaction to Silicones was Denied;
Despite 1974 Study, Dow Scientist Told FDA No Risk Seen, WASH. PosT, Jan. 18, 1992, at Al).
Finally, in 1987 Dow Coming was aware that some of its employees had falsified documents
regarding silicone breast implants, but Dow Coming did not alert the FDA to these mis-
statements until 1992. See Weisman, supra, at 988 n.123 (citing Thomas M. Burton, Dow
Corning Employees Falsified Data on Breast Implants, Counsel Concludes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
1992, at A3).
180 See HILTS, supra note 175, at 6-7 ("[The tobacco industry's] plan was to spend large
amounts of money every year indefinitely into the future to prevent, not swom adversaries,
but scientists and public health officers, from warning people of a potential hazard .... There
is no case like it in the annals of business or health."); see also id. at 10-11, 20-22, 23-41, 129
(describing concealment of adverse health studies conducted by tobacco industry).
181 Gross negligence by manufacturers in marketing products is of course not limited
to safety testing. In his article on tort deterrence, Gary Schwartz highlights several other
disturbing examples of manufacturers who marketed drugs and medical devices with the
knowledge that they were defective and could cause serious injuries or death. Schwartz,
supra note 158, at 406-07.
182 Henderson has similarly observed the tendency of liability rules to deter safety im-
provements for marketed products "at the margin." Henderson, supra note 44, at 774; see
also id. at 772 (discussing "'confession by implication'" occurring when manufacturer in-
troduces safety changes in product which later comes back as evidence against safety of
original design).
183 See Sanders, supra note 70, at 347 (noting that Merrell, a manufacturer of Bendec-
tin, produced a "case depletion effect" and an "epidemiological depletion effect" by remov-
ing product from market).
184 According to plaintiffs attorneys, if A.H. Robins had recalled the Dalkon Shield in
1974, when it became aware of the dangers, it "would have cost about $50 million" as
opposed to the nearly $500 million it expended in settling cases and legal bills because of
its "decision to defend the product." See Schwadel, supra note 178, at Al. Clearly, Robins
failed to properly estimate either the potential hazard of its product or the number of
victims who would ultimately file claims.
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has commenced is generally viewed as biased.'8 5 By contrast, addi-
tional in-house research that demonstrates some latent product risks
can reinforce a conclusion that the product is harmful. In fact, a man-
ufacturer's adverse research may provide a basis for a punitive damage
claim-a plaintiff is virtually certain to argue that the manufacturer
behaved recklessly when it continued to market a product that its own
research revealed was hazardous.18 6
2. Undercompensation
Underdeterrence leads to undercompensation; the relationship
is logical. If manufacturers are not adequately deterred from wrong-
ful conduct, they must be underpaying their collective debt to the vic-
tims of these undetected wrongs.' 8 7 Unfortunately, whether and to
what extent the current causation rule may undercompensate victims
is impossible to determine precisely because the long-term toxicity of
most chemical products is unknown and unstudied. Those who have
185 See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 70, at 337 (describing Merrell's research conducted
after litigation began as a "lose-lose proposition" because "[i]f they showed an effect, the
studies would be used against the company" and if they did not "[amny slight technical flaw
in the design or execution of the experiment would be exploited by plaintiffs to under-
mine Merrell's findings"). In at least the Bendectin litigation, this appeared to happen
with some studies Merrell conducted or funded. See id. at 337-38 nn.169-70 & 172. In fact,
one letter between a Merrell employee and Professor Richard Smithells, who conducted
research for Merrell, suggested that the researcher hoped for greater financial generosity
from Merrell if his findings supported Merrell's case. See id. at 337 n.170 (quoting letter
from Richard W. Smithells, Professor of Pediatrics, to Mark T. Hoekenga, M.D. (Jan. 26,
1977)). Sanders notes that in the only trial in which the court excluded this letter, the
Multi-District Litigation ("MDL"), the jury verdict was entered for defendant Merrell Dow.
Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46
STAN. L. REv. 1, 54 (1993) [hereinafter Sanders, Bendectin Cases) (discussing In re Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), affd,
857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988)).
186 Punitive damages have been awarded when a manufacturer had internal informa-
tion indicating that their product posed latent harms, but they failed to act on that infor-
mation. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice
in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 39-46 (1995) (providing survey of punitive damage awards
in Dalkon Shield, Copper-7 Intrauterine Device, super-absorbent tampons, and silicone
and saline breast implants, based in part on the fact that manufacturers concealed adverse
information or avoided testing product in face of mounting evidence of hazard).
187 One response to this argument is that undercompensation is insignificant in com-
parison with the number of undeserving plaintiff verdicts, even in mass toxic tort cases. Cf
MARCIA ANcELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE 193-99 (1996) (suggesting that based on existing scientific evidence
the number of claims filed against bankrupt breast implant manufacturer exceeded the
number of actual harms); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 4 (1991) (commenting on the unprecedented and rapid rise in "junk science
verdicts" for plaintiffs). Absent better toxic tort data, however, no method exists to deter-
mine whether, in general, the tort system is overcompensating or undercompensating
plaintiffs. The argument presented here is not meant to deal with the aggregate impact of
the tort system, but to address whether undercompensation may occur for specific victims
in specific circumstances.
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examined the question closely, however, argue that victims are proba-
bly undercompensated in most toxic tort cases.' 88
Even for those products that have been causally linked to specific
types of harms, undercompensation of victims is evident. In the cases
of asbestos, 189 DES,'90 and the Dalkon Shield, 191 for example,
thousands of serious injuries (including death) are estimated to be
linked causally to each of the inadequately tested products. Some of
these victims nevertheless remain uncompensated or undercompen-
sated because of the limited financial viability of various manufactur-
ers; 192 because of the inherent evidentiary handicaps toxic tort
188 See SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 97th CONG., SIX CaSE STUDIES OF
COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: Alabama, California, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New Jersey, and Texas 520-21 (Comm. Print 1980) (concluding that legal mecha-
nisms for compensating harms caused by toxic substances are generally inadequate); 2 Am.
LAW INST., APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 355-56 (1991) (reporting
that, despite estimates that 10,000 environmentally-related cancer deaths occur annually,
surprisingly little litigation occurs and few plaintiffs obtain awards ($50 million from 1983
to 1986)); Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation
of Cancer and OtherEnvironmental Disease in Individuals, 10J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 33, 59
(1985) (arguing that workers' compensation for occupational diseases such as cancer is
"appallingly inadequate" because "[olnly a tiny percentage of victims" file claims and even
if successful, workers are often rewarded with compensation that is "astonishingly low");
Eggen, supra note 63, at 897-98 (concluding that undercompensation for reproductive in-
juries is likely due to difficulties workers confront in proving cause-in-fact); Rosenberg,
supra note 16, at 858 (arguing that the "more probable than not" rule for liability is not a
"just means of resolving the systematic causal indeterminacy presented by mass exposure
cases involving defendants whose tortious conduct has caused or will cause a statistically
ascertainable increase in the incidence of a particular disease").
189 Brodeur reports that the number of persons exposed to asbestos included
"[in] illions of unsuspecting workers-four and a half million men and women in the war-
time shipyards alone-[who] were left to undergo exposure to dangerously high levels of
asbestos dust as they applied insulation products." BRODEUR, supra note 177, at 120. In
1992, over 200,000 personal injury claims had been filed or were pending against asbestos
manufacturers. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 167, at 1004.
190 See, e.g., Hensler & Peterson, supra note 167, at 981-83 (reporting that from 4 to 6
million women were exposed to DES and identifying over 6000 named plaintiffs in 600
DES suits by 1985 and 1000 cases pending against DES manufacturers in 1991).
191 Tens of thousands of women fitted with Dalkon Shields had suffered serious inju-
ries and that nearly all had suffered pelvic inflammatory disease (PID) that adversely af-
fected their ability to bear children. SeeMiN'z, supra note 170, at 3. The Shield was also an
ineffective birth control device (5% of the wearers became pregnant). See id. Of these
pregnancies, there was a high incidence of "spontaneous abortions" during the first or
second trimester and a rare form of "septic spontaneous abortions" during the fourth to
sixth months. Id. at 4. "By the count of the Food and Drug Administration, 248 women
just in this country endured this dangerous, Shield-related complication; for 15 of them,
these septic abortions were fatal." Id.
192 See, e.g., FrankJ. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injuy Settlement Trust: Lessons for
the Future, 17 CAPtozo L. REv. 583, 584 (1996) (describing Manville Trust (established as a
result ofJohns-Manville Corporation's bankruptcy, which was caused by asbestos liability)
and observing that early plaintiffs recover a far greater percentage of their loss than later
plaintiffs); Schwadel, supra note 178, at Al (reporting that Robins filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy because of plaintiffs' claims). For an insightful discussion of the intersection of
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plaintiffs generally confront in trying their cases;' 93 and because some
plaintiffs may not have availed themselves of the court system despite
the fact that they had meritorious claims for compensation. 9 4 Even
those victims who do "win" their cases through favorable verdicts or
settlements typically remain undercompensated due to the costs of
legal counsel. 95
C. Jury Nullification
More recently, commentators have expressed concern over jury
verdicts for toxic tort plaintiffs that appear to contradict the weight of
the scientific evidence.' 96 These "mistaken" jury verdicts have led at
least a few authors to conclude that lay juries may not be competent to
handle trials involving complex scientific evidence without further
changes to the legal system.' 97
mass torts and bankruptcy, see MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tor4 84 COLUM. L. REV.
846 (1984).
193 See, e.g., Poulter, supra note 67, at 199-200
194 See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURY IN THE
UNITED STATES 122 (1991) (reporting from empirical study that 19% of victims actually
considered the possibility of obtaining compensation for accidental injuries, but only 10%
made any effort to do so, and 2% of the total number of victims actually filed a lawsuit);
Hensler & Peterson, supra note 167, at 1019-26 (discussing factors that affect victim aware-
ness and access to legal system); cf. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything about the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not , 140 U. PA. L. RE,. 1147, 1183-89 (1992)
(reporting low filing rates (10% or less) by victims in a variety of other types of legal dis-
putes). There is also growing evidence that manufacturers sometimes include an agree-
ment that the plaintiffs attorney will not bring further suits against the manufacturer or
assist others in doing so as a condition for settlement. See, e.g., Felstiner & Siegelman, supra
note 43, at 315 (citing literature). Although it is difficult to imagine that the demand for
lawyers can outstrip supply, it is possible that the removal of the more successful plaintiff
attorneys in certain types of cases could further exacerbate the failure of many victims to
pursue meritorious claims.
195 See, e.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION
AND EXPENSES xii-xix (1984) (noting that litigation expenses in asbestos cases constitute
approximately 63% of recovery, leaving only 37% for victim compensation).
196 See Poulter, supra note 67, at 193 (arguing that "[s] ubmission of a case to the jury
may result in a plaintiffs verdict where even the most cursory examination of the evidence
reveals its deficiencies"); Sanders, Bendectin Cases, sujira note 185, at 85 ("[I]n such mass
exposure cases, our current litigation practices inevitably lead to situations in which juries
are unable to appropriately weigh the complex scientific evidence they are presented at
trial. As a result, trial verdicts and damage awards bear little relation to the weight of
scientific opinion.").
197 See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 187, at 204 (discussing "problematic" nature ofjuries in
cases involving complex scientific evidence and suggesting that some consideration should
be given to eliminating juries for civil trials); HUBER, supra note 187, at 4 (arguing that
juries are not capable of sorting good science from bad and that " [j ]unk science verdicts,
once rare, are now common"); Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological
Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact; 7 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 429, 437-38 (1983) (question-
ing whether juries are able to comprehend and accurately consider epidemiological evi-
dence); Sanders, Bendectin Cases, supra note 185, at 84 ("[I]n mass exposure cases, judges
are superior to juries in legal competence and decisionmaking accuracy and sometimes in
factfinding competence as well."); id. at 60-67 (outlining differences between jurors and
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Although misplaced jury sympathies that go unchecked when the
bulk of the critical evidence lies beyond ajury's comprehension can
explain a plaintiff-bias,19 8 juries may also excuse weak evidence of cau-
sation, "commingle" elements of liability, 99 or even "nullify"200 the
causation rule in a pro-plaintiff direction when manufacturers fail to
conduct basic safety testing and this failure disadvantages the plain-
tiff.2 01 It would seem more than coincidental that in those cases in
experts in evaluating how different types of scientific studies demonstrate causation and
identifying refinements to the trial process that might improve jury competence.); cf. Ken-
neth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural
Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22, 27 (1989) (reporting results of empirical re-
search that demonstrate that juries are very inconsistent and tentatively observing that ju-
ries have "a great deal of difficulty comprehending complex trial evidence").
198 See, e.g., Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL, Nov.
1985, at 65-74 (outlining factors affecting jurors' decisions); James K. Hammitt et al., Tort
Standards andJury Decisions, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 753-56 (1985) (analyzing effect of "deep
pockets" theory on juries' verdicts); cf Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 197, at 24 (report-
ing on empirical study that revealed strong positive correlation between presence of plain-
tiff with severe injuries and higher damage awards).
199 Joseph Sanders and Michael Green have both suggested that juries in Bendectin
cases may have "commingled" the evidence of causation (which was weak) with evidence of
negligence (which was strong) in order to find Merrell Dow liable. See MICHAEL D. GREEN,
BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION
263, 289 (1996); Sanders, Bendectin Cases, supra note 185, at 53-54; see also infranotes 203-08
and accompanying text (discussing Bendectin verdicts in greater detail).
200 Although "jury nullification" is associated most frequently with criminal trials, par-
ticularly those involving race, nullification also occurs in civil trials. See, e.g., Noel Fidel,
Preeminently a Political Institution: The Right of Arizona Juries to Nullify the Law of Contributory
Negligence, 23 ARIz. ST. LJ. 1 (1991). See generally MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KAD-
ISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY- A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 45-66
(1973) (discussing prevalence of juries that disobey applicable legal doctrine); Alan W.
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972) (providing
historical perspective on jury nullification). For a discussion of the possibility that jury
nullification might lead to the "correct" result in some cases, see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL
VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 156-60 (1986).
201 Elliott has similarly suggested that verdicts in toxic tort cases may reflect "our soci-
ety's prevailing sense of justice in cases where innocent people have been involuntarily
exposed to substances that are potentially dangerous to their health," rather than ajury's
misunderstanding of the scientific mechanisms of underlying cause-in-fact. E. Donald Elli-
ott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobi, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compen-
sation Systems, 25 HOUSTON L. REv. 781, 787 (1988). Elliott, however, does not discuss the
potentially pivotal role that a manufacturer's negligence or even recklessness may play in
this dispensation of public morality. For more general suggestions that some of the "scien-
tific errors" injury and judicial opinions "are not all scientific," see Poulter, supra note 67,
at 266 ("policy concerns, sometimes unspoken but often implied, seem to underlie courts'
willingness to entertain unfounded and poorly reasoned evidence"). Thus some of the
more dismal views ofjury decisionmaking may be overstated, although the chaos that ap-
pears to result from jury nullification might not be. Professor Mashaw's characterization is
perhaps the most dramatic:
I am tempted to suggest that in the toxic torts context we should describe
the tort system as primarily a system of guerrilla warfare.... [with] a lot of
potential revolutionaries (plaintiffs and jurors) who are throwing bombs
(litigation) and who aren't too interested in what shape the rubble (the
civil liability system) takes after the litigation is over.
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which juries have awarded damages in spite of weak causation evi-
dence, the defendant manufacturers' negligence in testing often rose
to the level of gross negligence or recklessness sufficient to support
the simultaneous award of punitive damages.20 2
In the Bendectin litigation, for example, the plaintiffs high-
lighted Merrell Dow's failure to test the drug's long-term safety in a
prompt or adequate way203 and its prior failures to test effectively the
Mashaw, supra note 82, at 1395.
202 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (af-
firming jury award of punitive damages in case alleging harms resulting from silicone
breast implants where evidence of causation was generally weak but evidence of manufac-
turer's egregious conduct was strong). General empirical research on jury decisionmaking
also lends support to ajury nullification hypothesis. Research suggests that in bifurcated
trials during which juries hear causation evidence without evidence of a manufacturer's
negligence, they are less likely to find for the plaintiff than when negligence and causation
are tried in a unitary trial or when evidence of negligence is presented first in a trial sepa-
rate from a subsequent trial on causation. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 197, at 25-
27. The authors attribute these results in part to juries' ability to decide cases based on
stories, an ability that is thwarted to some extent by separate trials. Id. at 27; see also Invin
A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Com-
plex Tort Trials, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 277-78 (1990) (providing more detailed ac-
count of study); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 242, 242-43 (1986) (examining how cognitive
representation of evidence influences juror decisionmaking process and concluding that
jurors tend to use the story model, incorporating evidence presented at trial with individ-
ual experience). When a defendant's fault (or a plaintiffs damages) assists in understand-
ing causal uncertainties, they may be able to formulate a more coherent story than when
causation is tried first, in isolation from the rest of the case. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra
note 197, at 27 (explaining empirical results and noting that the juries in their study used
"less sophisticated[ ] heuristics" such as "corporate-capitalist versus the little guy" to decide
cases when causation was tried first and separately).
203 Although Merrell Dow did not appear to violate laws in its marketing of Bendectin,
its actions to ensure the safety of Bendectin were far from exemplary. Merrell conducted
only a minimal amount of safety studies on Bendectin, all of which were done after market-
ing the product. See Sanders, supra note 70, at 321 (citing Record at 20-21, Mekdeci v.
Merrell Nat'l Lab., 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983)). Even the minimal safety research
Merrell conducted appeared biased to demonstrate Bendectin's safety. Sanders notes that
in 1967-68 Merrell conducted the first research on the teratogenicity of Bendectin in re-
sponse to the Thalidomide disaster, but it was "inherently suspect." Id. at 334. First, "the
[Merrell] authors interpreted the results as indicating no effect, although there does ap-
pear to be both a higher incidence" of adverse affects in animals receiving higher doses of
Bendectin. Id. at 334 n.158. Second, Merrell did not present any statistical analysis of the
studies. See id. Thus, both the quantity and the quality of Merrell's long-term safety tests
appeared to be quite low.
At trial, plaintiffs' attorneys used Merrell's apparent negligent safety testing as an of-
fensive strategy to prove causation by attempting to "commingle elements, thereby bolster-
ing weak evidence on causation with stronger proof of breach of duty and damages."
Sanders, Bendectin Cases, supra note 185, at 53. In presenting the results of animal studies,
for example, plaintiffs' counsel concentrated much of one of their expert's time and atten-
tion in pointing out the numerous errors in scientific research done by Merrell, while
simultaneously highlighting that other animal studies revealed the long-term hazards of
Bendectin. See id. at 53 (discussing testimony of Dr. Adrian Gross, the plaintiffs' primary
animal studies expert in various Bendectin cases).
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safety of Thalidomide and MER/29.20 4 This evidence went largely un-
rebutted by defendants. 20 5 A subsequent survey of several Bendectin
jurors in the Havnercase206 (a case in which the plaintiff enjoyed large
compensatory and punitive damage awards despite weak causation evi-
dence) 20 7 in fact revealed that the 'Jury deliberations did commingle
the issues of negligence and causation."208 The jurors spent more
time on evidence of Merrell's scientific misconduct than on any other
evidence. 209 This same jury nullification dynamic may also explain
more recentjury verdicts entered for plaintiffs in breast implant cases,
in which the causation evidence is again limited due, in part, to the
manufacturers' failure to conduct adequate pre- and post-market test-
ing.210 In fact, the manufacturers' conduct with regard to ignoring
204 See Sanders, supra note 70, at 313-15. Merrell, the manufacturer of Bendectin, was
already associated with the manufacture of two notorious drugs, Thalidomide and MER/
29. In its manufacture of both of these drugs, allegations of corporate misconduct in safety
research had strong support. See, e.g., id. at 313-15 (discussing Merrell's history with
Thalidomide and noting that Merrell "did not come away with completely clean hands");
id. at 315-16 (discussing Merrell's history with MER/29, including fact that Merrell, its
parent company, and three Merrell scientists "were indicted under the federal False Writ-
ing Statute for withholding data from the FDA") (footnote omitted).
205 Sanders reports that defendants did not attempt to counter this "story" of negli-
gence, but instead focused much of their case on the argument that existing scientific
evidence did not support a finding of general causation. See Sanders, Bendectin Cases, supra
note 185, at 55 (observing that Merrell "increasingly based its entire case on general causa-
tion, despite the fact that its most direct and complete counterpart to the plaintiffs' story-
that Merrell was careful in the testing and marketing of Bendectin ... makes due care a
central issue").
206 Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., No. 88-3915-F (D. Tex. 1991) (decided with-
out opinion), reported in 19 PROD. SAFwv & LiAB. REP. (BNA) 1134 (Oct. 11, 1991).
207 The Havnerjury awarded $3.75 million in compensatory damages and $30 million
in punitive damages. SeeJoseph Sanders, Juy Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Just. Sys. J., 1993 (Special Issue), at 45, 55-56 (citing unpub-
lished district court opinion). Sanders goes on to report that "[b]ecause punitive damages
are limited to four times compensatory damages in Texas, the judge later reduced the
punitive award to $15 million." Id. at 56 n.27.
208 Id. at 58. Sanders suggests that this commingling may be in part a result of the jury
instructions. Id.
209 See id.
210 Many of the hazards of breast implants were not investigated prior to or even after
marketing. See Lois Ember, Breast Implants: Silicone Effects in Body to Be Probed, CHEM. &
ENG'G NEWS, Mar. 2, 1992, at 4 ("After 30 years of silicone gel breast implant use, the
biological, physiological, physical, and chemical reactions of silicones in the human body
are likely, finally, to be systematically studied."); see also supra notes 174, 179 and accompa-
nying text (providing additional background on breast implant litigation). It appears that
manufacturers' failure to test implants has influenced the jury. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow
Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirmingjury award of $840,000 com-
pensatory and $6.5 million punitive damages to silicone breast implant recipient based in
part on evidence that Dow Coming rushed development of the implants, failed to ade-
quately test them, and ignored knowledge of adverse health consequences associated with
the implants). For a lively analysis of the breast implant litigation and how the legal system
misinterpreted the science, see ANGELL, supra note 187, at 69-89, 111-32. Although Angell
does discuss the breast implant manufacturers' negligence in some detail, id. at 38-44, 58-
60, she does not consider how this conduct might explain resultant jury awards.
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potential hazards and avoiding safety testing was so egregious that two-
thirds of the verdicts for breast-implant plaintiffs also included puni-
tive damages awards,21' and the "median punitive damages award in
[these cases] ... is the largest in the history of mass torts. 212
Some of the more hotly criticized toxic tort bench opinions may
also reflect "judge nullification" or efforts by the judiciary to deter a
defendant's choice of ignorance when it simultaneously deprives a
plaintiff of evidence on causation.2 13 Although these cases are often
used as prime examples of the judiciary's inadequate understanding
of scientific information, they may actually represent the judges' so-
phisticated ability to distinguish between trans-scientific and preventa-
ble scientific uncertainties214 and to consider whether the plaintiff or
the defendant should be responsible for conducting some preliminary
211 See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 186, at 44. This is a much higher rate than the
punitive damages awarded in Dalkon Shield, see id.; see also supra note 178 and accompany-
ing text, for which the company's negligence easily "shocks the conscience."
212 See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 186, at 44.
213 See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1044 n.52 (hypothesizing that public risk
cases criticized for being pro-plaintiff instead "might simply reflect an awareness that tradi-
tional doctrine (regarding the burden of proof in particular) demands too much of the
victims of many technological risks, and that correctives are therefore necessary"); Poulter,
supra note 67, at 257-60 (speculating that the court in Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984), made admissibility and sufficiency decisions that were
driven in part by an effort to "correct the imbalance [in tort rules] that disfavors toxic torts
plaintiffs").
Judge nullification may also explain other decisions where, for other reasons, the sci-
entific grounding of ajudge's decision is questionable but the result may comport with a
larger sense of justice. The most obvious example is Judge Weinstein's impatience with
veterans who opted out of the large class settlement in the Agent Orange case. See In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255-56, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). His
controversial ruling on causation was based on a highly questionable exclusion of all toxi-
cology evidence. See supra note 76 (discussing trend by courts to impose epidemiological
threshold on plaintiffs in causation and associated evidentiary rulings and resulting
problems such a threshold creates). Some observers use this case as an example of the
general inability of common-law courts to competently handle scientific evidence. See, e.g.,
Brennan, supra note 18, at 56, 71 (using mistaken rulings in the Agent Orange litigation as
partial support for concluding that "the traditional common-law approach is not function-
ing well" in dealing with complex scientific evidence on causation). It is more likely, how-
ever, that Weinstein's controversial ruling was result-oriented. Cf PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DisAsrERs IN THE COURTS 111-12 (1986) (observing creativ-
ity and high natural intelligence ofJudge Weinstein). As Michael Green observes: "[O]ne
is left with the nagging feeling thatJudge Weinstein's treatment of plaintiffs' experts and
causation evidence was driven more by concerns about upholding the fairness of a settle-
ment that was essential to making the Agent Orange class action manageable than a de-
tached assessment of the causation record." Green, supranote 21, at 677. Sanders has also
suggested that these scientifically wrong admissibility rulings are the result of result-ori-
ented objectives. Sanders, supra note 71, at 1430-31. He argues that admissibility rulings in
Bendectin cases provided judges with "one of the few devices available to achieve the goal
of non-suiting these plaintiffs" because judges "became increasingly certain that plaintiffs
did not have valid claims and sought to prevent separate trials." Id. at 1431. They thus
served the purpose of "an ad hoc method ofjury control." Id. at 1433.
214 See supra Part IAL-B.
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safety testing. For example, commentators have criticized Elam v. Alco-
lac, Inc.,215 a Missouri Court of Appeals' opinion, for "abjur[ing] any
rational analysis"216 because it excused the absence of critical inforrma-
tion on causation between the plaintiffs' various injuries and the de-
fendant manufacturing plant's releases of toxic chemicals into the
environment over an eight-year period.21 7 Yet, in this case, the defen-
dant's flagrant disregard of applicable environmental regulations re-
quiring monitoring and reporting of toxic releases218 prevented the
plaintiffs from learning the nature and extent of their exposures-
information critical to proving causation. 219 By ruling in favor of
plaintiffs, despite significant deficiencies in the proof of causation, the
court repeatedly justified its decision on the grounds that "the but for
proof [defendant] insists upon the toxic tort plaintiffs... was made
impossible by the very conduct of the defendant."220 Thisjudge nulli-
fication dynamic may also explain other problematic judicial decisions
in scientifically complex cases. 221
215 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
216 Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U.
BALT.J. ENvrL. L. 1, 9 (1993).
217 Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 179 (causation consisted of circumstantial proof of some haz-
ardous chemicals at the plant and the fact that some of the chemicals were occasionally
discharged or emitted).
218 The misconduct by defendant was reiterated by the court at several points in the
lengthy opinion and was indeed shocking-
[Defendant's negligence which prevented plaintiffs from learning of their
exposure consisted of] evidence of a state of the art system of toxic waste
control and disposal mismanaged by untrained personnel and by operating
procedures left undefined. It was evidence of recurrent toxic spills vented
into the atmosphere, but unrecorded so that the quantity, identity and
dates of those exposures cannot be known. It was evidence of toxic waste
from the monomer process diverted from the decontamination procedure
and expelled, still toxic, into the bioponds for evaporation into the air-
without record or other note of these recurrent events. It was evidence of a
liquid incinerator, designed to consume particulate toxic wastes, but which
so malfunctioned as to be declared a "hundred percent failure" by the Alco-
lac [defendant] management-but continued in use for more than two
years so that countless, unidentified, unmeasured and unrecorded emis-
sions of toxic compounds were released into the atmosphere. It was evi-
dence of an agreement by Alcolac with DNR [May 30, 1980], but never
honored, to install monitors on the monomer stacks to identify and mea-
sure the emissions for each product-so that the record intended by the
regulatory agency never took form.
Id. at 176.
219 The court noted that because of defendant's misconduct there was no information
on the identity of "the particular chemical at a particular exposure, the particular concen-
tration of the chemical, the particular dosage of the chemical taken in bodily, or the partic-
ular duration of the exposures." Id. at 178.
220 Id. at 177; see also id. at 178-80, 182 (same).
221 For example, in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-38 (D.C. Cir.
1984), the court did not discuss directly the defendant's failure to test long-term hazards of
paraquat (a herbicide distributed in the United States solely by the defendant). However,
the court was intolerant of the defendant's defense of scientific ignorance and concluded
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Requiring plaintiffs to prove causation in toxic tort cases clearly
has a significant adverse effect on both the legal system and on safety
research. The extent to which these adverse consequences are also
unnecessary, however, depends on whether alternative approaches are
available that, on balance, represent an improvement over the status
quo. This final section proposes a reform of the common-law causa-
tion rule that reduces the incentives for manufacturers to remain ig-
norant about the long-term safety of their products and does so
realistically, without imposing unreasonable requirements on industry
or on the common-law courts.
A. The Essential Features of the Reform
The proposed reform seeks to accomplish two things. First, it pe-
nalizes manufacturers who fail to conduct minimal safety testing on
their products.2 22 Second, it provides immunity from suit for manu-
facturers who have conducted a comprehensive battery of tests and
found their product to be safe. Common-law courts could adopt this
reform incrementally, or legislatures could do so unilaterally.2 23 To
that, based on other incidents, the defendant "should have known" of possible latent
hazards of paraquat. See id. at 1538. This discussion provides at least a partial explanation
for why the court affirmed the jury finding on causation despite limited scientific proof.
See id.; see also Brennan, supra note 28, at 497 (hypothesizing that liberal attitude by the
court in Ferebee may have been in part the result of the "unfairness of penalizing the earliest
victims of any hazardous substance"). Although not involving latent hazards, Haft v. Lone
Palm Hote 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970), may best represent this category of cases. The defen-
dant-hotel violated safety codes by failing to have a lifeguard at their pool after being noti-
fied of their violations on three occasions by the county inspector. See id. at 468 & n.5.
Despite the absence of any evidence of why father and son drowned in the pool, the court
found for plaintiffs. See id. at 467, 472. Thejudge's inclination to find liability in spite of
the plaintiffs' inability to prove causation was likely based on the defendant's flagrant viola-
tion of the statute, which prevented the cause from being known. See Daniel A. Farber,
Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 731 (1990) (proposing that the presence of a "fla-
grantly negligent defendant who could not be deterred through the application of the
normal evidentiary rules" influenced the court's judgment for plaintiff); cf. Rosenberg,
supra note 16, at 863-64 (suggesting that in "sporadic accident cases," courts abandon the
causal connection requirement when defendants do not take optimal care).
222 The jurisdictional reach of the proposed reform is flexible. At one end of the
spectrum, it could apply to all products, wastes, and workplace hazards occurring through
the manufacturing process. At the other end of the spectrum, it could apply only to prod-
ucts coming under the jurisdictional reach of the TSCA. See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (1994)
(defining "chemical substance~s]" that are subject to TSCAjurisdiction). Because of the
additional financial burden the reform places on industry, it may be most prudent to begin
with only a piece of the testing problem and work in stages toward a more comprehensive
solution.
223 Although there are several possible impediments to adoption of the reform
through the common law, see infra note 252 and Part V.B.1, these may be modest in com-
parison to the obstacles inherent in a legislative reform. Even if the public, or at least the
legislators, appreciated the current error in the common-law approach to causation, the
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protect manufacturers from potentially catastrophic liability, ideally,
the reform should include a five-to-ten year grace period,224 during
which manufacturers would be put on notice that they must comply
with the new rules.22 5
The mechanics of the reform are simple. In toxic tort cases,
rather than requiring plaintiffs to resolve both trans-scientific and pre-
ventable scientific uncertainties, a revised causation rule would place
the initial burden for resolving basic, preventable scientific uncertain-
ties on manufacturers. If, prior to marketing its product or prior to
the grace period a manufacturer is not able to publicize the "minimal"
safety research on its product where some potential for exposure
exists ("minimal testing"),226 the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption
that the insufficiently tested product caused her harm. The plaintiff
thus establishes a prima facie case with proof of the following: (1)
inadequate minimal testing on a product,227 (2) normal or foresee-
public may simply have insufficient political resources to prevail against the well-organized
manufacturers at a legislative level. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 104, at 167-68, 192 (not-
ing that in product safety where potential for injuries is small, but harm to individuals is
serious, "[t]he skewed distribution can lead and, in this context, appears to have led to
overrepresentation of the position of the potential injurer group" in the political process).
224 Exposures would also have to occur after the grace period for plaintiffs to benefit
from the reformed causation rule. Common-law courts would obviously be unable to es-
tablish such a grace period as precedent, although they could recommend in dicta that
common-law courts adopt such a reform in the future, after defendants have notice of the
proposed change.
225 This reform has the potential to encourage a large number of plaintiffs to file
claims. Cf Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. R~v. 899,
913 (1996) (discussing how plaintiff attorneys are inclined to file marginal claims in mass
toxic tort cases after claim is well established because these claims are not costly to try but
"amount, in aggregate, to a significant vehicle for cost spreading by a plaintiffs' firm laden
with fixed costs"). In select cases, the proposed reform may penalize negligent manufac-
turers to the point of bankruptcy, despite the five-to-ten year grace period. Thus, damages
may need a cap at some point, such as ten-thousand times the unjust enrichment to
defendant.
226 See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text. Under the proposal, the manufac-
turer can conduct the minimal toxicity research itself, purchase the research from another
manufacturer or research laboratory, or "pool" with other firms to produce the informa-
tion. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2603(c) (2)-(4) (1994) (providing an exemption and reimburse-
ment plan under the TSCA for manufacturers whose required research has already been
completed by another manufacturer); 40 C.F.R. pt. 791 (same); Hoerger et al., supra note
100, at 73 (discussing how the chemical industry pools together to conduct toxicology tests
on a limited number of high priority chemicals through the Chemical Industry Institute of
Toxicology, Chemical Manufacturers Association, and other "ad hoc industry groups").
The manufacturer cannot, however, merely provide citations to studies conducted by other
manufacturers. See infra Part V.B.2.
227 Ideally, a scientific panel should determine minimal testing, see infra Part V.B.1, but
in the interim minimal testing would likely consist of one or two short-term laboratory
studies. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. Note that this reform would require
courts that currently refuse to admit laboratory animal studies as proof of causation to
admit those studies as evidence of manufacturers' satisfaction of their duty to test. See supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
1997] CHOOSING IGNORANCE 835
able 228 exposure to the product,229 and (3) serious harm that might
be causally linked to exposure to the product.230 The plaintiff could
satisfy the harm element, depending on jurisdiction, by demonstrat-
ing the existence of latent physical harms (e.g., cancer, reproductive
ailments), emotional harms, medical monitoring costs, or an in-
creased risk of latent physical harm.231 The defendant then bears the
228 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (1965) ("A product is not
in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the injury
results from abnormal [use] ... the seller is not liable."); RFSrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIAnILrrv § 2 cmt. I (foreseeability of use and risks) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1995).
229 The courts will need to define what constitutes an "exposure" to a particular prod-
ucL One approach would require plaintiffs to demonstrate sufficient "exposure" contact
(either in time or concentration) to pose a risk of latent harm of greater than 1 in 10,000
or 1 in I million. See infra note 241. This approach, of course, assumes that some informa-
tion exists from which to make this determination. If no information exists to allow calcu-
lation of risk thresholds for the substance, then courts could hold any non-de-minimis
concentration sufficient to constitute an exposure.
Statutes of limitations would continue to run from discovery of the harm, from the
date of exposure, or from other points in time as defined by the jurisdiction. See generally
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1458, 1605-09 (1986)
(describing prevailing approaches to statute of limitations in toxic tort cases).
230 The plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant violated its duty to test and
that, based on existing information which presumably would include at least the chemical
structure of the product, it is not biologically implausible that exposure to the product
caused plaintiff's harm. A defendant could raise affirmative defenses of comparative fault
(e.g., smoking) to rebut the presumption of causation as well as to reduce damages, but
the defendant will bear the burden of proof.
231 Some courts permit causes of action by victims who do not yet have cancer or some
other latent, debilitating physical injury through the recognition of medical monitoring,
increased risk, and cancerphobia claims. See, e.g., Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d
257 (N.J. 1989) (recognizing medical monitoring, emotional distress, and enhanced risk
claims for the future onset of cancer, but limiting availability of claims to specified circum-
stances). The medical monitoring claim typically provides a plaintiff with necessary medi-
cal surveillance costs if there is a relative increase in the chance of disease resulting from
exposure to defendant's product or waste. This claim takes a variety of forms and requires
varying levels of proof, depending on thejurisdiction. For a brief overview of the different
tests courts use, see Allan Kanner, Review of Toxic Tort Litigation, in 2 ENVTL LITIG. 621, 676-
83 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 20-24, 1994), available in WESTLAW, C921 ALI-ABA
621; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing causation burden in medical
monitoring claims). Although less widely accepted, "increased risk" claims provide a cause
of action prior to the onset of a disease. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788
F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that claim for increased risk of cancer is allowed
when plaintiff "can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to can-
cer"); Eggen, supra note 63, at 906-07 (observing some judicial resistance to increased risk
claims due to their speculative nature and the possibility of overcompensation or un-
dercompensation). Some common-law courts also hold that emotional distress for fear of
future harm is compensable in select circumstances following exposure to toxic chemicals.
See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205-07 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming
availability under Tennessee law of damages for fear of increased risk of contracting cancer
and other diseases, but reducing amount of plaintiffs' awards based on each plaintiffis
exposure to defendant's wastes); cf. JASANOFF, supra note 17, at 130-31 (arguing that
cancerphobia may constitute a legitimate "loss of trust and social anomie that many see as a
condition of life in technologically advanced societies"). But see Schweitzer v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff generally has no cause of action
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burden of rebutting this presumption of causation. In cases where
the manufacturer can convince the jury that its product is benign,
either by post-complaint testing or by other means (e.g., chemical
family analogy), it will succeed in avoiding liability even without con-
ducting this minimal pre-litigation testing. Otherwise, the defendant
manufacturer will have the difficult task of resolving in its favor not
only the preventable gaps in scientific knowledge, 232 but also the vari-
ous trans-scientific uncertainties that currently lie beyond the reach of
scientific experimentation. 233
If the manufacturer has conducted minimal testing and success-
fully rebuts the showing of inadequate testing, the burden of proving
causation returns to the plaintiff, and traditional tort rules determine
recovery.234 The possibility of false positives in laboratory and animal
testing, however, may present some manufacturers with the quandary
of whether, when faced with adverse preliminary test results, to con-
tinue to test beyond the floor prescribed by the common-law re-
form.23 5 If manufacturers take their cues from the caselaw, they will
absent an "identifiable, compensable injury"); Eggen, supra note 63, at 906-07 (observing
that some courts refuse to grant increased risk or medical monitoring claims, even when
some physical harm is present).
232 Proposals recently offered by two other commentators are more general than the
reform presented here, but both suggest a burden-shifting based to some extent on inade-
quate safety testing. See Feldman, supra note 1, at 46 (suggesting that courts should hold
manufacturers liable for injuries to exposed populations if they are unable to "eliminate
strong uncertainty about the causal powers of their products"); Kanner, supra note 168, at
582-83 (asserting that a "solution ... to [the underdeterrence of testing in toxic tort cases]
... will be a greater call on the duty to test prior to marketing, and greater accountability
for those companies that fail this test," and that courts can accomplish this by shifting the
burden on causation or instructing the jury to "draw an adverse inference from this failure
to test") (footnote omitted).
233 See FIGURE 6. One could argue that this proposal in fact imposes a punitive charge
on manufacturers that have failed to conduct minimal safety testing on their products.
Under the circumstances, however, such a charge isjustified. First, according to economic
models, punitive charges are appropriate when the costs of compliance are low and the
probability that a noncomplying manufacturer could escape notice is high. See, e.g.,
SHAVELL, supra note 86, at 284 (justifying imposition of criminal sanctions in certain cases
because "[t]he greater the chance that injurers would escape the notice of a social author-
ity, the higher is the monetary sanction necessary to control their behavior"). Second, the
potentially punitive aspect of the reform may be temporary (provided the testing require-
ments are clearly defined, see infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text) -future manufac-
turers would soon know what is required and comply. As Daniel Farber argued in his
insightful commentary on the Lone Palm case: "By awarding supercompensatory damages
against this one [flagrantly negligent] defendant, we can, it is hoped, prevent any signifi-
cant number of similar accidents." Farber, supra note 221, at 732. Third, this punitive
element may be exactly how juries currently apply liability rules. See supra Part IV.C.
234 See supra Part II.A.
235 See, e.g., Fanny K Ennever et al., The Predictivity of Animal Bioassays and Short-term
Genotoxicity Tests for Carcinogenicity and Non-carcinogenicity to Humans, 2 MUTAGENESis 73, 76-
77 (1987) (reporting on general lack of specificity of fifteen short-term tests used to deter-
mine carcinogenicity, but also noting that four of these tests are relatively sensitive (cor-
rectly predict carcinogens) and specific (correctly predict noncarcinogens)). The single
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conclude that even with some preliminary adverse data, the possibility
of liability is essentially zero: the current trend of courts to require
extensive scientific evidence for proof of causation, generally includ-
ing epidemiological evidence, leaves plaintiffs unable to prove their
case.236 Thus, if a manufacturer does decide to conduct follow-up
testing, it will likely be due to market or related pressures, 237 rather
than to the threat of tort liability.238
laboratory screening test recommended here as an interim standard for minimal testing,
see infra note 257, however, has a very low false-positive rate. See, e.g., Errol Zeiger et al.,
Evaluation of Four In Vitro Genetic Toxicity Tests for Predicting Rodent Carcinogenicity: Confirma-
tion of Earlier Results with 41 Additional Chemicals, 16 ENv-rL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 1,
11-12 (Supp. 18, 1990) (reporting that high predictivity of Salmonella assay of.89 "suggests
that few false-positive responses will be produced"). In any case, there is no question that
even with the possibility of false positives, preliminary screening tests will be consistently
valuable. This preliminary information provides a vital first step to regulatory decisions
regarding, for example, priorities for future testing.
236 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part II.A (discussing
plaintiffs burden of proving causation in toxic-tort cases).
237 Additional testing beyond what minimal standards require might provide manufac-
turers with a competitive advantage in some circumstances. For example, if a minimally
tested chemical is "suspect" based on preliminary testing results, there may be market pres-
sures to conduct additional tests and/or identify substitutes.
238 Failure of the reform to require additional testing on initial, adverse results is likely
to be considered more of a deficiency than an asset. Problems with a more refined ap-
proach to testing requirements are significant, particularly the seemingly insuperable diffi-
culties associated with ensuring that more refined testing requirements are also clear and
unambiguous. See infra note 253; see also Weisburger & Williams, supra note 33, at 405-06
(discussing how animal tests for carcinogenicity must be done "selectively" and hence test-
ing regimes involve considerable scientific discretion). The instant proposal is thus likely
to be the "least imperfect" of the alternatives. Given the large penalties associated with a
failure to conduct minimal testing, see supra note 233, and the enormous transaction costs
associated with an unclear rule, see infra note 289 and accompanying text, clarity of the
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The reform also rewards socially responsible manufacturers by
providing a much more uniform and predictable immunity once they
have conducted comprehensive safety testing.2 9 Successful comple-
tion of a battery of tests sufficient to fully assess the health hazards a
chemical poses would provide the manufacturer with a state-of-the-art
defense.2 40 Plaintiffs can, of course, scrutinize the manufacturer's
conduct based on the results of the testing, but if the testing revealed
a low potential for risk,24' the reform would provide a blanket immu-
nity even if later tests reveal that the product is harmful. The results
of the manufacturer's safety research would also need to be publicly
testing requirements must be the first priority for a reform. Nevertheless, if a dependable
decision tree for testing became available, it would obviously be a substantial improvement
to the more rudimentary approach proposed here.
239 Providing manufacturers with immunity for unknowable risks also comports with
research by Alan Schwartz that suggests that imposing liability for remote risks is not only
unfair, but also "frustrate[s] the law's compensation and efficiency goals." Schwartz, supra
note 63, at 706; see also Schwartz, supra note 137, at 902-05 & n.49 (discussing inadequate
justifications for imposition of strict liability on manufacturers). In contrast, in the context
of toxic torts, it appears that the primary advantages to imposing strict liability on manufac-
turers for all risks causally linked to their products or wastes, including those that were
unforeseeable at the time of manufacture, are simplification of the litigation process, loss
spreading, and fairness and consistency. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 79, at 754-56 (discuss-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of the hindsight standard, which uses the time of
trial to determine what knowledge was available to a manufacturer). If practice bears out
the theoretical prediction that a state-of-the-art immunity will actually lead to greater re-
search, and ultimately to fewer injuries and safer products, than occurs under strict liabil-
ity, then these advantages to strict liability seem illusive at best, at least with regard to the
manufacture of potentially toxic products. For a comprehensive analysis of the doubtful
benefits and adverse consequences resulting from the imposition of strict liability on man-
ufacturers for post-distribution knowledge of product hazards, see Henderson, supra note
80, at 939-52.
A state-of-the-art defense also allays concerns that liability rules may overdeter and
dampen innovation of socially useful products like drugs and vaccines. See, e.g., Boston,
supra note 16, at 368 (citing cases in which courts expressed "the apprehension that an
expansion of liability rules would retard the development and availability (i.e., increase the
price of) new drugs and vaccines"); Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on
New Drug Development, in THE LiABlLITY MAZE 334, 341-45 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E.
Litan eds., 1991) (discussing how liability currently deters development and research of
new vaccines).
240 See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text (specifying interim recommendation
for state-of-the-art testing). Many states have already adopted this defense or something
similar. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. In other jurisdictions, some courts
tend to admit evidence of a manufacturer's compliance with regulations as probative on
the adequacy of a product design. See, e.g., Garey B. Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REav. 343, 367 (1982).
241 Common-law courts could consider regulatory standards for determining when a
risk becomes significant. Typically, Congress and regulatory agencies consider risks
greater than one in one million to be publicly unacceptable, although risks of one in ten
thousand have been considered acceptable under certain circumstances. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(e) (2) (i) (A) (2) (1996) (requiring for purposes of Superfund cleanup that a per-
son should encounter no more than a one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-one million risk of
cancer).
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available, and the manufacturer would bear the burden of proving
that its testing met state-of-the-art standards.242
This reform, at least in theory, goes a long way towards correcting
the failure of the common law to encourage research on the long-
term safety of potentially toxic products.243 Rather than an incentive
system that penalizes research with litigation and leads manufacturers
to choose ignorance, the reform presents manufacturers with reduced
liability as their long-term safety research progresses.
This added testing will enhance our knowledge of the toxicity of
products we use, increase consumer participation in product safety,
and initiate a database from which we can develop more complex test-
ing regimes for such pressing concerns as adverse synergistic reactions
among products and chemicals. The reform also begins to address
the nullification tendency that may undercut litigants' sense of "jus-
tice" in a number of important toxic tort suits.2 44
This reform also has the advantage of providing a workable and
immediate fix for the problems the traditional causation rule creates
without constituting a radical departure from tort law's current evolu-
242 See, e.g., Wade, supra note 79, at 760-61 (recommending negligence rule for deter-
mining safety, but arguing that "if the defendant contends that the knowledge available at
the time of trial was not available at the time of distribution, he should bear the burden of
proof on this issue"). In a sense, this defense is not dissimilar to the "process defense"
presented by Twerski et al. These authors argue that courts should not impose liability
when "a manufacturer defends an action by revealing a well-documented safety review pro-
cess," and that "[ijf the process leading to a [product] design decision has a high degree of
integrity the court should restrict its review of the design itself to instances in which the
industry has clearly erred." Aaron D. Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability:
From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 347, 358 (1980). The immunity pro-
posed here differs from the Twerski proposal, however, because it entails very specific test-
ing requirements so that the process requirements are unambiguous and even the quality
of testing cannot deviate from pre-determined protocol. See infra Part V.B.1.
243 If the manufacturer has conducted the requisite minimal amount of testing, the
reform leaves the current toxic tort landscape unaltered, which may not be desirable. See,
e.g., Brennan, supra note 2, at 65 (observing that "[o]nly after society incurs mass injuries
and scientists study exposed populations for a long period of time does it become clear
that a certain fraction of diseases was caused by the exposure"). To the extent that further
modifications are necessary to address the proportionality problem, there is an extensive
body of literature on that subject. See generally Farber, supra note 16, at 1243-51 (proposing
compensation scheme in toxic tort cases that places the "most likely victims" first in line for
full compensation); John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion
Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. RE,. 1063 (1989) (proposing a proportional
approach to adjudicating causation); Robinson, supra note 63 (same); Rosenberg, supra
note 16, at 861-905 (same). For other reforms that may improve the common-law courts'
adjudication of toxic tort cases, see Brennan, supra note 18, at 62-71 (suggesting that courts
use science panels and scientific experts to improve scientific grounding ofjudicial deter-
minations on admissibility and sufficiency of complex scientific evidence); Roe, supra note
192, at 917-20 (proposing amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to address the problems
mass torts create); Schwartz, supra note 63, at 716-17 (recommending that corporate lim-
ited liability be abolished in certain situations when a "firm's assets.., are insufficient to
satisfy tort claims").
244 See supra Part IV.C.
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tion in response to the unique problems toxic substances pose.245
Although proposals for expanded regulatory and government testing
programs may also be necessary to effect a comprehensive reform, 246
there is little hope of immediate implementation. Even if government
improves the regulatory scheme, regulation may fail to ensure that
manufacturers will actually undertake even a minimal amount of
safety research for a number of products.247 Absent assurance that
regulatory or government testing programs will produce needed in-
245 Market-share liability and medical monitoring claims both reduce the plaintiffs'
burden of proving causation. See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 63, at 899-900 (citing market
share and risk-contribution theories as examples of how tort law has adapted to causation
problems introduced in toxic tort cases).
246 SeeApplegate, supra note 1, at 318-32 (proposing modifications to TSCA to improve
the EPA's ability to call on industry for the production of information); Lyndon, supra note
42, at 1835-41 (recommending private funding of a government "super study program" for
toxicity testing of products).
247 Regulatory reform may ultimately prove inferior to liability rules at encouraging
minimal safety testing. Komesar persuasively argues that, as a political matter, when the
probability of harm from a product is low, but the costs to those individuals they impact are
high, common-law liability rules are more likely to approximate the public will than legisla-
tive resolutions. See KoMESAR, supra note 104, at 170; see also Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An
Institutional Evolutionist Perspective 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941, 974-76 (1995) (discussing a
variety of advantages common-law adjudication has over legislative or regulatory resolution
of mass toxic torts, including a decentralized and hence de-politicized process of decision-
making). Specifically, Komesar suggests that the liability rules are more likely to reflect
society's values because of the minoritarian bias likely to prevail in the political process due
to the diffuseness of society's ex ante interest in product safety. See KOMESAR, supra note
104, at 173 (concluding that "[t]he same high per capita stakes that make potential injur-
ers deterrable targets for tort liability also make them politically active and quite probably
overrepresented in the political processes of tort reform relative to low per capita stakes
potential victims"). In addition, Komesar argues that victims of low probability, high cost
harms are more likely to serve as superior plaintiffs than government bureaucrats who face
the possibility of agency capture, lack of resources, and other politically-linked constraints.
Id. at 171-73; see also SHAVELL, supra note 86, at 281, 283, 285 (arguing that economic analy-
sis suggests that liability rules are superior to regulation in controlling behavior when injur-
ers have superior information regarding the nature of risk and costs of reducing it and
when victims are aware of their harm).
Additionally, a good deal of the current regulatory failure, particularly in the regula-
tion of toxic products, appears systemic and potentially permanent, which raises doubts as
to whether system modifications, even major ones, will really effect a noticeable improve-
ment. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 Due L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) ("[M]any observers from across the political spectrum
agree with [Professor E. Don Elliott] that [ossification of the regulatory process] is one of
the most serious problems currently facing regulatory agencies."); Wagner, supra note 28,
at 1677-85 (outlining pervasive regulatory dysfunction resulting from regulatory "science
charade").
Finally, focusing efforts exclusively on reform of the regulatory system still leaves a
counter-productive liability rule in place that continues to undercut the effectiveness of
regulatory requirements. Thus, even if the regulatory system made parallel administrative
improvements-improvements that several authors have suggested in careful detail-re-
form of liability rules may still remain a priority in order to ensure that the choice of
ignorance is never, or almost never, one that the legal system encourages.
840
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formation on the long-term safety of potentially toxic products,248
then, a workable reform of existing toxic tort rules seems the obvious,
and perhaps the only, practical alternative.2 49 In fact, in their study of
product safety, Eads and Reuter concluded that even though products
liability law generates at best an "indistinct signal," it may cause manu-
facturers to take safety considerations into account in design decisions
to a much greater extent than market forces or the prospect of
regulation.2 50
B. Further Refinements
Despite its practicality and the relative ease with which it can be
implemented, the proposed reform is not perfect. This final subsec-
tion presents possible criticisms of the reform and some potential re-
finements that address those criticisms.
1. Competency of the Courts
Perhaps the most worrisome criticism of the reform is that courts
will not be competent to implement it. This concern is certainly not
without foundation given the courts' historic inattention to the impor-
tance of separating trans-scientific from preventable scientific uncer-
tainties in assigning burdens of proof.2 5 ' Assuming that a significant
248 See Farber, supra note 16, at 1243 (arguing that the regulatory system of toxic prod-
ucts "is fraught with problems of its own" and thus "lilt would seem foolhardy to jettison
the tort system on the basis of current knowledge").
249 See, e.g., JAsANOF, supra note 17, at 205 (observing that many cases involve "in-
stances in which courts almost by default were required to take the lead in constructing
new social and political orderings around science and technology"); Brennan, supra note
2, at 72 (concluding that common-law liability rules are necessary because "an analysis of
regulatory approaches to environmental toxins suggests that the administrative state has
developed inadequate deterrence mechanisms"); cf Brennan, supra note 28, at 531-32
(calling for a Science Panel to resolve toxic tort disputes because of common-law courts'
inability to effectively adjudicate cases, but concluding that tort litigation should still exist
alongside regulation and Science Panel); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Tort Law
as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 434 (1984)
(concluding that it is premature "to give up on tort law as a method of regulating safety in
cases of catastrophic accident"); Lyndon, supra note 1, at 138-41, 154-70 (arguing that tort
law continues to serve vital function in concert with regulation); Rosenberg, supra note 16,
at 927-28 (listing several advantages the tort system has over the administrative system in
responding to and resolving mass exposure dangers).
250 EADS & REUTER, supra note 44, at vii-viii. But see Schwartz, supra note 158, at 408
(criticizing the Eads & Reuter study as failing to support this observation adequately be-
cause the study revealed that products liability appeared to influence significantly only one
of the nine companies interviewed).
251 A number of scholars have questioned the judiciary's competence to adjudicate
cases involving disputes over complex scientific facts. SeeJAsANoFv, supra note 17, at 1-2
(recounting criticism of courts for not deferring to scientists in adjudicating scientific and
technical disputes); Brennan, supra note 28, at 498-99 (arguing thatjudicial incompetence
"create[s] a great deal of uncertainty in the minds of litigants regarding liability because
they cannot predict which mode of causation theory a court will use" and "raises funda-
mental questions regarding their ability to adjudicate hazardous-substance injury cases");
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cause of the common-law courts' inattention to this problem stems
from a lack of familiarity with science and its limitations,252 a national-
ized checklist of minimal and state-of-the-art testing requirements
should be developed to provide both consistency and guidance to
case-by-case adjudications. 253 It is not readily apparent which institu-
Devra Lee Davis, The "Shotgun Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment and Judicial Re-
view, 10 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 67, 85-86, 90-92, 98 (1985) (discussing disappointing record of
judicial review of agency risk assessments); Green, supra note 21, at 680-82, 695-98 (ques-
tioning competence of "generalist judges" to master scientific and statistical issues under-
girding toxic tort cases). See generally Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know about the
Sociology of Science 32 JURIMETRICS J. 345 (1992) (discussing dangers of judicial activism
based on insights in sociology of science). Some scholars have gone beyond criticizing the
judiciary and have recommended replacing it or buttressing it with scientific experts in cer-
tain circumstances. See, e.g., Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 17JuiuMETrcs
J. 332, 332 (1977) (proposing a "Science Court" to resolve disputed questions of fact);Joel
Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional Designs for Environmen-
tal Decisionmaking, 92 YALE LJ. 1300, 1330 (1983) (proposing science advisory board to
assist judiciary).
Judges themselves have echoed these concerns, even in their own opinions. Judge
Bazelon has made perhaps the best statement ofjudicial reluctance to engage in the review
(or adjudication) of disputed scientific facts:
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does not
know. I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I do not
know enough about dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor ad-
justments, and the like to decide whether or not the government's ap-
proach to these matters was statistically valid.
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, CJ., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Litigation and
Statistics, 3 STAT. Sci. 286, 286 (1988) ("'We judges] are no more statisticians than we are
physicians, and counsel who expect of us informed and consistent treatment of such proofs
are well advised to proceed as do those who advance knotty medical problems for resolu-
tion.'") (quoting Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981)).
252 It is also possible that the courts are avoiding reform of the causation rule in order
to maintain some control over their continually growing dockets. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra
note 225, at 915-16 (observing that courts, in order "to guard against a flood of claims,"
have recently "restricted increased risk and fear of cancer claims to situations in which the
plaintiff can demonstrate a likelihood of future impairment"); cf. Robert M. Emerson, Ho-
listic Effects in Social Control Decision-Making, 17 L. & Soc'y REv. 425 (1983) (arguing that
social decisionmakers are significandy affected by macro-considerations such as the "seri-
ousness" of a case in relation to rest of caseload, the resources it demands in relation to
other cases in the caseload, and its possible precedential value). By making pro-defendant
rulings in toxic tort cases that threaten mass filings, courts can limit the number of future
claims. Commentators have also raised concerns that fairness in mass toxic tort cases is
taking a backseat to efficiency in the resolution of these cases. See, e.g., Roger H. Trang-
srud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69, 80 (criticizing the
trifurcation of issues in mass tort cases because "it robs the jury of its traditional flexibility
in tort cases to balance uncertainties in the plaintiff's case on liability against strengths in
the plaintiff's case on damages").
253 Theoretically, the ideal solution to inadequate testing would be to merge the mini-
mal and state-of-the-art standards and require testing to the point that the tests reveal the
product poses no significant risk of latent hazards. If a manufacturer has not conducted
this level of testing, courts will presume causation; if it has been conducting this testing,
the manufacturer will be immune from suit. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. If
the testing is inconclusive, then the manufacturer would be expected to conduct continu-
ous epidemiological studies to monitor the chemical's effect on exposed populations. The
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tion is best able to develop this checklist,254 although specific congres-
sional action would provide the most definitive statement of what
constitutes adequate testing. Before the appropriate institution for-
mally develops some standards, individual courts may be able to de-
velop a rough checklist on their own by relying on existing agency
regulations255 and various toxicity testing reports produced by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and other entities.2 56 Such an interim
checklist, for example, might consist of a single in vitro test, like the
widely accepted Salmonella assay, for minimal testing;257 and either
practical problems with such a theoretically ideal solution are significant, however. First, it
will be difficult (to put it modestly) to reach consensus on a single testing regime that
would provide both a reliable and cost-effective decision-tree for adequate safety testing.
See, e.g., John Ashby et al., The Challenge Posed by Endocrine-disrupting Chemicals, 105 ENvrL.
HEALTH PERSP. 164, 165 (observing considerable confusion among scientists in defining an
"endocrine disrupter," a definition that is obviously an essential first step to identifying
appropriate testing strategies). The alternate proposal this Article presents avoids this dif-
ficulty by adopting a much more rudimentary two-tiered incentive system, which virtually
ensures a very low level of testing, but provides some encouragement for a comprehensive
investigation into latent product hazards. See FIGURE 6. Second, even if a perfect decision-
tree for safety testing could be identified, it would likely lack the clarity and hence the
predictability of my proposal since some scientific judgment would almost inevitably be
required to determine an appropriate stopping point. When liability rules impose such
potentially large penalties, see supra note 233, it is essential that the requirements are spe-
cific and unambiguous. Cf Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 864-65 (noting that excessive lia-
bility and overinvestments in safety could likely result if courts do not "accurately discern
the true level of optimal care").
254 Each branch of government carries its own unique limitations. See, e.g., supra notes
223, 241 (discussing the problems with legislative and regulatory action). Each branch also
has its own cadre of expert advisors. Both Congress and the Executive Branch periodically
call upon several respected nonprofit institutions, such as the National Academy of Sci-
ences or the Carnegie Commission to provide consulting advice to the government on
science-policy problems, while judges often rely on the Federal Judicial Center to provide
detailed, nationalized guidelines or related assistance for adjudications involving complex
science policy issues. Cf Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on
Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 181-208 (1994) (providing a sum-
mary of the scientific issues that often arise in toxic tort cases).
255 See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing federal regulations). But
see Pesticides: Status of Administration's Response to NAS Recommendations Released to NACA,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-8 (Nov. 1, 1993) (reporting that National Academy of
Science committee found EPA's toxicity testing guidelines for pesticides inadequate in
some areas, particularly with regard to assessing effects of pesticides on neonate and ado-
lescent animals).
256 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See generally Toxicrry TESTINc, supra note
29 (presenting a framework for the testing of substances that pose a potential adverse risk
to the public health); SCIENCE ANDJUDOMENT, supra note 22 (reporting the importance of
risk assessments in improving the evaluation of chemical testing).
257 Currently, the Salmonella assay provides a reliable, low cost, short-term test that is
"central to any scheme that is intended to screen for carcinogens." Raymond W. Tennant
et al., Prediction of Chemical Carcinogenicity in Rodents From In Vitro Genetic Toxicity Assays, 236
SCIENCE 933, 934 (1987); see also S. Stanley Young, Do Short-Term Tests Predict Rodent Carcino-
genicity?, 241 SCIENCE 1232, 1232 (1988) (identifying "great interest" in short-term labora-
tory tests as initial screening alternative to expensive ($1 to $2 million) and time-
consuming (3 to 4 year) rodent studies). It also appears to offer reliable results without
the need for additional short-term in vitro tests. See Tennant et al., supra, at 938; see also
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the EPA's protocol for safety testing of new pesticides, or if direct in-
gestion of the product is within its "normal" uses,258 the FDA's drug
safety testing requirements for state-of-the-art testing.259 Although
rigid testing requirements in checklist form may lead to some ineffi-
ciencies-overtesting in some cases and undertesting in others-a
clear outline of testing requirements, at least for the minimal level of
safety research, is essential to avoid extended litigation over the na-
ture and extent of the testing requirements. 260
An equally vexing problem is how to ensure that the judiciary
effectively oversees the quality of a manufacturer's testing.2 61 If a
Errol Zeiger, Strategies for the Use of Genetic Toxicity Tests, 22 DRuG METABOLISM RmEWS 765,
773 (1990) (concluding that combinations of various short-term tests "do not improve
upon the effectiveness of the individual tests, and none of these tests are complementary").
This test is quite specific: over eighty percent of the time, the positive Salmonella assay
results accurately predict cancer in rodents. See Zeiger et al., supra note 235, at 11-12. It
does have a high false-negative rate, however, and current estimates are that over 50% of
possible rodent carcinogens may be missed by the Salmonella assay. See id. at 12. The
actual false-negative rate may ultimately be determined to be lower, pending future scien-
tific findings regarding the human effects of nongenotoxic rodent carcinogens. See, e.g.,
id. at 13; see also M.D. Shelby & Errol Zeiger, Activity of Human Carcinogens in the Salmonella
and Rodent Bone-Marrow Cytogenetics Tests, 234 MUTATION RES. 257, 260 (1990) (observing
the considerable uncertainty regarding whether nongenotoxic chemicals (as opposed to
genotoxic) ultimately cause cancer in humans). For guidelines for conducting the Salmo-
nella assay, see generally D. Gatehouse et al., Recommendationsfor the Performance of Bacterial
Mutation Assays, 312 MUTATION RES. 217 (1994) (providing consensus document on guide-
lines); Errol Zeiger et al., Salmonella Mutagenicity Tests: V. Results from the Testing of 311 Chem-
icals, 19 ENvTL. & MOLECULAR MUTACENESiS 2 (Supp. 21, 1992) (describing test used by
scientists in the National Toxicology Program).
Other latent harms such as reproductive and neurotoxic effects should ideally also be
screened using one or more minimal tests. Unfortunately, scientists have not yet devel-
oped comparable low-cost, quick screening tests for these endpoints in part because of
their more diverse mechanisms of toxicity. See Telephone Interview with Dr. Mike Shelby,
Laboratory of Toxicology, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Research
Triangle Park, N.C. (March 25, 1997). If scientists do ultimately develop these low-cost
screening tests, they of course should be included in the minimal testing requirements. In
fact, even in the interim it might be appropriate to expand minimal testing to require
more extended testing for reproductive harms (e.g., a short-term animal test lasting 5
weeks) if a particular chemical structure falls within a "suspect" chemical family. Such fine-
tuning, however, must be extraordinarily clear and would require the attention of a panel
of scientists. See supra note 253 (discussing import of clear minimal testing requirement).
258 See supra note 228.
259 See, e.g 21 C.F.R. Part 312 (1996) (listing testing requirements imposed for drugs
under Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)); 40 C.F.R. Part 158 (1996) (identifying test-
ing requirements imposed under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) for registration).
260 See infra Part V.B.3.
261 It is possible that some required testing will be of questionable quality, ranging
from outright scientific fraud to systematic biases in scientific judgment. This problem is
potentially a serious one, but it is not fatal. In a worst case scenario, where some or even
many manufacturers are actively engaged in deceptive or biased research that remains un-
detected, the overall level of knowledge, deterrence, compensation, and consistency en-
couraged by a modified causation rule will almost certainly continue to improve the
current state of safety research.
844
1997] CHOOSING IGNORANCE
manufacturer conducts tests based on improper methodologies or
fraudulently developed data, it is possible that the judiciary may not
catch the errors. 262 Indeed, scientific misconduct has plagued some
research in the past,263 including safety testing.264 A liability system
that encourages manufacturers to undertake safety testing without ad-
equately policing the accuracy of those tests265 could lead to more
scientific cheating.26 6 Thus, the creation of federal or state statutes
that increase the government and public oversight of scientific mis-
conduct, including added criminal sanctions, may prove essential to
the reform.267
262 Cf Robert M. Andersen, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Misconduct in
Scientific and Technological Research, 3J.L. & TECH. 121, 133-35 (1988) (discussing why insti-
tutions might not actively or adequately police scientific misconduct of its researchers). If
manufacturers are allowed to purchase safety research from one another, see infra Part
V.B.2, however, the market might encourage internal policing because only the most rigor-
ous testing, which will provide the best protection from liability, will be purchased. It is
also possible that manufacturers are in fact anxious for a legal system that counteracts the
variety of incentives that cause producers to market potentially hazardous products and to
emit wastes in relative ignorance of their long-term effects on human health. Reformed
rules may not only ease the ethical dilemmas presented by the current laws, but may also
ultimately impose higher relative burdens on competitors who have benefitted the most
from inadequate safety research. Cf Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE
POLrICS OF REGULATION 191, 193 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (reporting some members
of the pharmaceutical industry welcomed creation of FDA because it drove out small
producers).
263 See William Broad & Nicholas Wade, Fraud and the Structure of Science, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN SCIENm'Ic RESEARCH: AN ANTHOLOGY 69 app. (Edward Erwin et al. eds., 1994)
(providing a "list of cases of known or strongly suspected fraud in science, from ancient
Greece to the present day").
264 See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 1, at 148-49 (discussing why companies distort and
conceal information regarding the safety of their products); Jon Nordheimer, Johnson &
Johnson Sued OverDismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 50 (describing a formerJohnson &
Johnson researcher's claim that he was pressured to produce misleading test data).
265 Currently, federal sanctions fall only on researchers who engage in scientific mis-
conduct in projects that are federally funded. See Andersen, supra note 262, at 124; Dan L.
Burk, Research Misconduct: Deviance, Due Process, and the Disestablishment of Science, 3 GEo.
MASON INDEP. L. REv. 305, 320 (1995). Penalties for such misconduct range from a mild
reprimand to debarment from receiving grants in the future. See 45 G.F.R. § 689.2 (1996).
In rare cases, this scientific misconduct can be prosecuted criminally under various federal
statutory authorities. See Burk, supra at 322-23 (describing authorities).
266 Allowing manufacturers a grace period of several years before the reform takes
effect may actually provide manufacturers with a window during which they can remove
particularly dangerous products from the market. This period would reduce some of the
manufacturers' incentive to produce distorted studies that incorrectly suggest that a prod-
uct is safe. Cf Lyndon, supra note 1, at 152 & n.52 (discussing how initial decisions regard-
ing technology become established and later lead to manipulation of information on
"detrimental side effects").
267 For a detailed discussion of the limitations of the current federal statutory frame-
work for policing scientific misconduct and a proposed statute that would provide added
criminal sanctions, see Susan M. Kuzma, Ciminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Re-
search, 25 U. MICH.J.L. REFoRM 357, 399-420 (1992); see also Portney, supra note 41, at 138
(recommending stiff penalties for falsifying data in order to ensure high quality private
testing); cf Andersen, supra note 262, at 147-48 (recommending development and enforce-
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Research tainted by a manufacturer's bias that plausibly can be
represented as a matter of "scientific judgment" poses another obsta-
cle to effective reform. Although the extent and nature of industrial
bias in testing has not been determined, it is well-established that such
a bias exists. 268 The objectivity of research is, of course, much more
difficult for courts to ensure than asking them to compare the
number and types of tests a manufacturer conducts against a checklist.
If testing bias is a significant problem, additional refinements to the
reform, such as detailed testing protocols 269 and government certifica-
tion programs for more complicated studies,270 may be necessary to
assist courts in overseeing research quality.27 '
ment of more rigorous ethical standards for scientific misconduct). Although Congress
has not prohibited scientific misconduct that occurs during research that is not federally
funded, it has a "federal interest" in such misconduct because poor research can adversely
affect the public welfare. See, e.g., id. at 124 (noting that scientific misconduct may be a
federal concern if it reaches "the general public in the form of defective products"). A
federal statute that penalizes scientific misconduct, regardless of its funding source, must
be drafted carefully, however, because the line between scientific judgment and fraud is
not always clear. For an insightful discussion of the difficulties in policing scientific mis-
conduct, see Ullica Segerstrale, The Murky Borderland Between Scientific Intuition and Fraud, in
ETHICAL IssuEs IN SCIENTIFIc RESFARCH: AN ANTHOLOGY 91, 91-109 (Edward Erwin et al.
eds., 1994).
268 See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 168, at 587-94 (citing examples of scientific deception
and bias in industry); Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research:
A Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DuKE LJ. 155, 161-
68 (providing evidence of lower quality testing conducted by manufacturers). The possi-
bility of such a testing bias, in fact, has led more than one commentator to suggest that
industry safety tests have little public value. See Lyndon, supra note 42, at 1816 (suggesting
that various factors that adversely affect the quality of industry tests "limit the usefulness of
toxicity data generated by private chemical producers"); Richard Peto, Distorting the Epide-
miology of Cancer. The Need for a More Balanced Overview, 284 NATURE 297 (1980) (lamenting
bias in research by private institutions and asserting that private data is generally
distrusted).
269 For animal and other non-human studies, existing protocols may be sufficiently
detailed to leave little room for wide fluctuations in scientific judgment. See Portney, supra
note 41, at 138 (recommending well-defined testing procedures to protect against bias in
privately conducted research). The EPA has established relatively specific laboratory prac-
tice and testing standards under both FIFRA and TSCA that may provide sufficient gui-
dance in this regard. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 160, 792, 795-98 (1996) (providing detailed
"good testing" guidelines).
270 For those studies (most likely epidemiology studies) for which "cookie-cutter" pro-
tocols do not or cannot exist, the government might certify various national consulting
firms as "objective testing centers" or approve individual testing methodologies before or
after the study is conducted. See, e.g., Portney, supra note 41, at 138 (recommending gov-
ernment verification as another option to protect against bias in privately conducted re-
search). Courts would presume that manufacturers who use these "gold-star" programs
have undertaken quality tests. Plaintiffs could possibly be allowed to challenge the wisdom
of individual certifications, but they would bear the burden of proving that the testing was
not conducted properly or the requirements were inadequate. This refinement has the
obvious disadvantage of requiring the expenditure of agency resources-a demand that
may prove unrealistic.
271 It is also possible that once testing and disclosure is mandated by law, the efforts of
"better" manufacturers to comply will exert competitive market pressures on others who
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2. The "Public Good" Problem Posed by Safety Research
Although the proposed reform goes a long way towards curing
the market failure that plagues safety testing of potentially toxic prod-
ucts, it could create a "free rider" problem: some manufacturers
might attempt to rely on the results of other manufacturers' safety
research in order to satisfy the requirements of this reform. Obvi-
ously, if such behavior is allowed, those who are first to invest in safety
research will be put at a competitive disadvantage.272 To protect
against this practice, manufacturers can claim copyright privileges on
their studies.2 73 These privileges allow them to collect licensing fees
from other manufacturers who disseminate the studies or otherwise
do not conduct the testing through negative advertising or other media campaigns. It is
also possible that the emergence of a market for testing data, see infra Part V.B.2, will make
only high quality (and thus court-friendly) testing profitable. This latter possibility, how-
ever, will likely depend on the scrutiny the courts give to privately conducted research.
272 Because the reform requires manufacturers to make research publicly available,
other manufacturers will benefit from the information at no cost. See, e.g., Shavell, supra
note 99, at 360 (identifying inability of party generating information "to capture its full
value [when] others can learn of the information without paying for it," which may result
in either "wasteful, duplicative expenditures" on testing or a free-rider problem, both of
which deter cooperation between parties).
A similar problem that occurs in the development of innovative drugs is due in part to
delays in FDA approval. These delays may cut the effective life of a patent in half, which in
turn, suppresses economic incentives for innovation by making it less likely that a firm can
recoup its expenditures through long-term sales. See, e.g.,JamesJ. Wheaton, Generic Compe-
tition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: TheDrugPrie Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 433, 451-54 (1986) (describing potential adverse effects on
new drug innovation of FDA approval process which shortens the effective life of a patent).
A patent may expire before the costs of innovation have been fully recouped, due in part
to the delays resulting from FDA approval. In recognition of this problem, Congress
passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1994), which provides pharmaceutical companies with up to a five-year extension of
their patents on innovative drugs as long as they meet several conditions. See id. At the
same time, the Act benefits generic drug manufacturers by expediting the FDA approval
process for generic drugs. See, e.g., THE LEGISLATIVE HISrORY OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETI-
TION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984, at v (Allan M. Fox & Alan R. Bennett
eds., 1987) (discussing compromise between brand-name and generic drug manufactur-
ers). Despite this legislative effort to extend the property right for certain socially benefi-
cial products in order to spur further research and development, the Patent Term
Restoration Act appears to have only partially succeeded. See, e.g., Suzan Kucukarslan &
Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 522 (1994) (criticizing law as providing insufficient
patent extensions (averaging 2.39 years) to compensate for lengthy regulatory review (aver-
aging 5.36 years)).
273 Copyright protection attaches to published studies and to unpublished studies pro-
vided certain requirements have been met. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (copyright
protection extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed"); see generally MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTAND-
ING COPmIGHT LAw §§ 2-4 (2d ed. 1995) (providing comprehensive overview of copyright
law protection).
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make them publicly available as the reform requires.274 Ultimately,
once safety research is treated as a property right and is required as a
matter of law, it could actually stimulate a profitable market in toxicity
testing, which in turn could lead to more and higher quality
research. 275
3. Costs
A final criticism of the reform is cost. The type of cost-benefit
analysis needed to evaluate this criticism is difficult to conduct be-
cause the benefits of testing remain unknown until after testing is com-
plete. Costs of the proposal, however, can be estimated in rough
form.
The most obvious expense associated with the reform is the cost
of testing. Testing expenses will depend on the final study or "check-
list" of studies required for minimal safety research.276 Assuming that
this checklist is no more demanding than one laboratory screening
study, such as the Salmonella assay, the cost per chemical would run
from $2000-$4000.277 The resulting aggregate costs to the chemical
274 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-107 (1994) (granting author of copyrighted material "ex-
clusive rights to do and to authorize" reproduction and public display of material unless
very specific "fair use" exceptions are met). In fact, courts have prohibited commercial
researchers from making unauthorized copies of publicly available research. SeeAmerican
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918-25 (2d Cir.) (finding copyright viola-
tion as a result of a single Texaco scientist's photocopying of several published scientific
studies in journals that scientist intended to use only as a reference in future research),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995). See also supra note 226 (discussing reform requirements
regarding a manufacturers' dissemination of safety research).
275 Manufacturers conducting long-term safety research might actually stand to profit
under this reform proposal. A shrewd manufacturer, with a reputation for high-quality
safety research, might theoretically be able to earn more from sharing the research with
two or more other manufacturers than it expended in conducting the research in the first
place. The price of "sharing" a study with the manufacturer-author will ultimately hinge
on many factors, including the nature of the competition in safety research, the resources
of the buyer to conduct the test itself, the quality of the research, and the ease of con-
ducting transactions. If manufacturers can charge fees for safety testing, they may become
more willing to disclose the contents of their products to encourage other producers man-
ufacturing similar products to purchase partial rights to their published safety tests. The
creation of a market in long-term safety research, in fact, might drive testing to much
higher levels than prescribed by either the common-law claim for minimal testing or ex-
isting regulatory authorities.
276 See supra Part V.B.1. When determining the appropriate level of testing certainly
one must consider both the minimal and the state-of-the-art level.
277 See Telephone Interview with Dr. Errol Zeiger, Environmental Toxicology Program,
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, Research Triangle Park, N.C. (March
18, 1997); see also Young, supra note 257, at 1232 (suggesting that battery of short-term
genetic toxicology tests that include Salmonella assay "costs approximately $10,000"). See
generally supra note 257 (discussing interim solution of Salmonella assay as meeting mini-
mum testing requirement). Although this initial basic test should lead to further testing if
it indicates a hazard, in the reform proposed here, a manufacturer discharges their duty to
test for purposes of burden-shifting if they conduct only the minimal screening test or
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industry for conducting this minimal testing for the tens of thousands
of untested chemicals in commerce could theoretically be over one-
hundred million dollars.278 For a variety of reasons, however, the
more flexible common-law incentives are likely to make total testing
costs less. In some cases, manufacturers may already be routinely con-
ducting minimal toxicity tests on their products. The only added cost
introduced by the reform in such cases, then, is the requirement that
the results of this testing be made publicly available. In other cases, a
manufacturer may still find it more cost-effective to forgo testing. For
example, if exposure potential is de minimis, 279 if the manufacturer is
confident that it can disprove causation without testing,28 0 or if a man-
ufacturer believes potential liability and transaction costs are less than
the costs (tangible and intangible) of testing, common-law liability will
not produce incentives for testing.
Even if the "worst case" prediction of millions of dollars of testing
costs materialized, the economic realities of chemical manufacture
should allow such costs to be assimilated rather easily.28 ' First, testing
for a single new drug averages $231 million,28 2 a figure that may be
roughly equivalent to the costs of "minimally testing" all products in
commerce. Second, in most cases chemical manufacturers appear
large enough to absorb the costs of testing and to pass them on to
consumers.28 3 Third, prudent manufacturers, both small and large,
tests. See supra Part VA and note 253 (explaining why a more refined system may be
inferior).
278 If there are at least 36,000 chemicals in commerce for which no safety testing has
been conducted, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, and if testing costs $3,000
per chemical, then the total costs would be over $100 million.
279 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 232-33.
281 Indeed, a strong normative argument exists that regardless of the minimal testing
costs, they should be internalized by the manufacturer. See supra Part III.
282 See supra note 35.
283 In requiring manufacturers to conduct a subacute and a subchronic test on animals
for several chemicals, EPA determined that manufacturers' concerns about overburden-
some costs were not supported. Specifically, EPA calculated that the
annualized test costs, using a 7 percent cost of capital over 15 years, range
from $24,000 to $36,000. Given that these costs are less than one-tenth of
one percent of the annual revenues from sales for each of these four sub-
stances, EPA believes that the potential for adverse economic impact result-
ing from the costs of testing is low.
See 58 Fed. Reg. at 59,679.
Notably, the manufacture of chemicals (ranging from feedstock chemicals to final
consumer or industrial products) is quite a diverse business and often escapes generaliza-
tions. J. Clarence Davies, The Effects of Federal Regulation on Chemical Industry Innovation, LAw
& CoNrviEP. PRoBs., Summer 1983, at 41, 43 (citing statistics on a number of manufactur-
ing entities at various stages of product development). Despite wide variation from chemi-
cal to chemical, large firms appear to dominate most phases of the market, and these firms
appear capable of absorbing the modest costs of minimal testing without difficulty. See,
e.g., id. at 47 & n.32 ("[I]n the early 1980s, seventy-one percent of the new chemical notifi-
cations under TSCA were submitted by companies with sales over $500 million. Only 2%
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can share testing costs among themselves as is currently done under
TSCA.284 Thus, even a total testing bill that falls in the hundreds of
millions .of dollars range would appear not to interrupt the manufac-
ture of most chemicals.2 85
The costs of compliance with state-of-the-art standards will be
considerably greater-as much as five orders of magnitude higher
than minimal testing costs.2 8 6 This much more substantial investment
will only be beneficial in those instances where the manufacturer is
already required to conduct testing pursuant to regulatory require-
ments, or where the cost of testing is justified by the probability and
extent of liability. Thus, although it will provide heavily regulated in-
dustries with an opportunity for common-law immunity,287 the state-
of-the-art testing requirements may necessitate testing that is simply
too expensive for all but the highest risk industries. Future experi-
ence with a reform such as this one may reveal that lower expectations
for state-of-the-art testing will provide a better incentive for firms to
conduct optimal testing on their products.
More difficult to measure, and of greater concern for some crit-
ics, is the possible increase in transaction costs that may result from
lightening the burden of proof on plaintiffs in a subset of cases where
a manufacturer fails to complete minimal safety testing.2 88 The clarity
of the notifications were submitted by companies with sales under $10 million."); Hoerger
et al., supra note 100, at 71 (listing eleven major companies with extensive toxicological
research facilities in 1983). It is possible, however, that the increased costs of testing may
adversely affect smaller specialty chemical companies, even if they share some of the basic
testing costs with other firms. See, e.g., Ashford & Heaton, supra note 97, at 153 (suggesting
that "small companies and specialty chemicals have suffered a decline relative to the situa-
tion of large companies, particularly those whose products are targeted to large markets"
as a result of federal health and safety regulation); Davies, supra, at 52 (noting the possible
adverse impact of even modest regulatory costs on a firm producing small-volumes). An
additional refinement to the reform could thus include the provision of hardship grants to
finance minimal safety testing by these firms. Such a refinement obviously introduces the
need for larger administrative and legislative costs and therefore warrants further
investigation.
284 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
285 As discussed in note 283, supra, however, hardship grants to finance minimal safety
testing by smaller companies may be a desirable refinement to the proposed reform.
286 This at least would be the case if standards prescribed by FIFRA or the FDCA are
followed to determine what constitutes state-of-the-art testing. See supra notes 34-35, 259
and accompanying text.
287 This is indeed a new benefit that many have suggested is essential. See, e.g., Huber,
supra note 158, at 291-93, 314-16.
288 The high transaction costs associated with tort adjudications seems to be conceded
by most involved in close empirical analysis of the legal system. See, e.g., TILLINGHAST, TORT
COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECrvE 3 (1992) (reporting the inefficiency of the
U.S. tort system, which returns "less than 50 cents on the dollar to the people it is designed
to help-and less than 25 cents on the dollar to compensate for actual economic losses");
Saks, supra note 194, at 1281-83 (stating that transaction costs are the most expensive part
of litigation and reporting that in the middle 1980's "it cost society $1.92 to deliver $1 of
compensation to a victim of negligent injury").
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and reasonableness of the minimal testing requirement and the
length of the grandfather period before the reformed rule takes effect
will determine whether the reform will cause a precipitous rise in
litigation. Both factors will significantly affect the number of valid
claims that actually materialize.28 9 If the minimal testing require-
ments are unambiguous, the relative ease of compliance should
prevent the filing of an excessive number of claims, particularly
with a lead time of five to ten years.2 90 If the testing require-
ments for the state-of-the-art defense are also clear, litigation
after implementation of the reform could actually decrease be-
cause of the increased availability of a predictable defense.2 91
In addition, the high cost of toxic tort litigation,292
289 But see Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 L. & Soc'y Rav. 371,
384 (1990) (cautioning that it is "impossible to know a priori what the net effect [of litiga-
tion] will be").
290 It is possible that if too many valid and potentially lucrative claims remain, they
could pose a danger of overwhelming the courts. In mass torts generally, plaintiffs' net-
works have formed around major class action litigation in toxic torts. See Galanter, supra
note 289, at 387 (discussing lawyer networks "for information sharing and strategic coordi-
nation"); Nagareda, supra note 225, at 937 (describing role of plaintiffs' lawyers in pioneer-
ing toxic tort litigation); Paul D. Rheingold, The Development of Litigation Groups, 6 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 1 app. (1982) (describing networks in swine flu, Dalkon Shield, Agent Or-
ange, MER/29, birth control pills, asbestos, DES, and Ford transmission). It is thus also
possible that they could form around testing claims. Recommending probabilistic causa-
tion as a reform in toxic tort cases, Glen Robinson similarly discusses the potentially over-
whelming increase in litigation resulting from his proposed reform. See Robinson, supra
note 143, at 796-98. His suggestions on how this litigation might be controlled, id. (noting
the possibility of narrowing the class of claims entitled to probabilistic causations and using
class consolidation to control costs), to some extent parallel some of the possibilities dis-
cussed in the remainder of the Article, infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
291 Cf Bruce, supra note 111, at 398 (noting that although there are "significant costs
involved" with state-of-the-art testing in product liability claims, it is "well worth the price"
because the defense, even with existing ambiguities, "currently represents the best option
for manufacturers can [sic] pursue"); Landes & Posner, supra note 249, at 421 (suggesting
based on economic models that "a negligence standard may give the injurer a greater
incentive to use due care than strict liability" because by using due care "the injurer avoids
all liability ... whereas under strict liability expected damages fall as care rises but the
injurer still pays something").
292 Sanders reports that the "first plaintiff" case against Merrell, the manufacturer of
Bendectin, had a severe shortage of funds so that "much of the second trial [on remand]
was tried on the record of the first trial, without the benefit of live expert witnesses. Only a
last minute infusion of $25,000 from Mr. Belli [one of the more prominent plaintiffs' law-
yers involved in the litigation] kept the second trial going." Sanders, supra note 70, at 351-
52. A shortage of funds also occurred in the Agent Orange litigation and led to a new
plaintiffs' counsel team, each of whom were required to invest $250,000 in the litigation.
See id. at 352 n.212 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
BalancingFairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHi. L. RFxv. 877, 901 (1987).
Both Coffee and Rosenberg have suggested that the expense often associated with mass
toxic tort litigation may cause plaintiffs' attorneys to prefer more lucrative sporadic acci-
dent alternatives where the payoff is high and the investment small. SeeJohn C. Coffee,Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement
of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 676 (1986); Rosenberg,
supra note 16, at 889-92.
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the impediments to discovering untested products, 293 and a prerequi-
site of some harm and exposure294 may act together to ensure that
even in the worst cases of manufacturer neglect, litigation will rarely
be overwhelming.2 95 If it is, the claims may at least be capable of be-
ing consolidated for greater judicial efficiency.296
CONCLUSION
The common-law approach to assigning responsibility for proving
causation is outmoded and ultimately socially damaging for the im-
portant and growing subset of "toxic tort" cases. Within a market and
regulatory environment that already discourages safety testing, causa-
tion rules that provide additional incentives for manufacturers to re-
main ignorant about the long-term safety of their products cannot be
tolerated. This Article highlights the failure of the current liability
rules, the consequences of that failure, and how these rules might be
reformed without radically changing existing claims, rules, and doc-
trines. By adopting the proposed reform, choosing ignorance-the
rational choice for manufacturers today-will become an irrational
choice tomorrow, and needed scientific research on the long-term
293 Although claims established through litigation might be filed in the thousands, see
supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text, "new cases" would likely be tried only when
plaintiffs' attorneys believe they are likely to pay off. "In the parlance of sports fishermen,
the goal is to keep the big fish for frying and to throw the little ones back." Nagareda,
supra note 225, at 912.
294 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
295 Both Saks and Hensler estimate that a small percentage of victims actually file a
lawsuit to seek compensation. See supra note 194. Gillette and Krier hypothesize that there
is an even lower incentive to sue in public risk cases as compared with other types of torts,
see Gillette & Krier, supra note 42, at 1047 (arguing that "[incentives to sue and disincen-
tives to free ride usually diminish as risk moves from the private toward the public end of
the spectrum"), even if coalition building is possible, see id. at 1048 (admitting that coali-
tions can exist but arguing that risk victims may still be too diffuse for effective coalition
building); cf Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 893-900 (providing a detailed series of argu-
ments explaining why proportional liability would not result in unmanageable mass fil-
ings). In fact, it is possible that these impediments working together may cause this reform
to provide too little litigation relative to the prevalence of misconduct in safety testing. In
such a case, the common-law liability system may simply be too awkward to provide ade-
quate enforcement of safety testing responsibilities, and the reform might be accomplished
better through a statutory reform, enforced by civil and criminal penalties, and reinforced
by citizen suits in which plaintiffs can recover expert expenses and attorney fees. For a
somewhat similar "public" approach to ensuring that manufacturers comply with the dis-
closure obligations under EPCRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (1994); see also Robert W.
Shavelson, EPCRA, Citizen Suits and the Sixth Circuit's Assault on the Public's Right-to-Know,
ALB. L. ENmrL. OUTLOOK, Fall 1995, at 29. However, such reform is unlikely. See supra note
223 and accompanying text.
296 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 855 (arguing that "uniformity of conditions
[common in toxic tort cases] enables courts not only to adjudicate a multitude of mass
exposure claims efficiently [in comparison to a case-by-case basis with sporadic accident
cases], but also to increase the net compensation that each claimant receives").
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safety of products will be produced in abundance, not irrespective of
the law, but because of it.
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APPENDIX A: DATA TOTALS FOR EACH OF 43 EPCRA CHEMICALS
Chemical Name PatT PatA RtxL RtxS Emp74 Emp83 RtxT Dis94 (lbs)
Acetamide* 12851 299 9 11 4668 2074 20 466028
Aluminum Oxide 25606 1656 5 3 513250 1559336 8 121489
AminoAnthraquinone* 119 5 13 3 16
Ammonium Nitrate
(solution) 607 16 3 4 22884 57833 7 60545892
Ammonium Sulfate
(solution) 1043 28 3 7 55229 159582 10 4554466
o-Anisidine* 430 1 11 6 17 1064
p-Anisidine* 912 4 11 8 19 15
o-Anisidine
Hydrochloride 3 0 14 3 1108 17
Anthracene* 6809 200 14 4 18 86808
Benzamide 3873 188 10 4 14 0
m-Xylene* 2733 45 7 13 4621 39864 20 966287
o-Xylene* 2820 98 7 9 5778 25994 16 1395879
p-Xylene* 4702 150 8 9 1912 20366 17 3431609
Butadiene 49748 2689 22 13 66326 51971 35 2711287
sec-Butyl Alcohol 1159 7 4 15 42853 126196 19 1144287
tert-Butyl Alcohol 1601 24 7 8 3121 171420 15 1879266
Butyraldehyde 3373 45 8 14 1258 5392 22 367790
Carbonyl Sulfide 884 78 3 6 9 17146171
Chloroacetophenone 731 10 4 25 2294 29
Diaminoanisole* 282 4 8 4 12 0
Dibenzofuran 700 52 3 3 3292 6 26116
Hexachloronaphthalene 6 0 3 3 520 6
Hydrazine Sulfate* 338 9 39 13 945 52 230002
Isobutyraldehyde 1670 66 3 9 705 4114 12 448132
Isopropyl Alcohol* 22646 242 11 30 3183554 4665524 41 995673
Melamine 19678 1201 6 12 31892 43104 18
Methyl tert-Butyl Ether
(MTBE) 27654 59 3 9 5996 12 3223885
Methylene Dianiline* 1736 36 6 9 9163 15170 15 36531
Molybdenum Trioxide 1203 88 3 7 5269 48418 10 471568
N,N-Dimethylaniline 9890 48 9 15 2456 7448 24 22676
N-Nitrosomorpholine* 12 0 57 10 67
Nitrilotriacetic Acid 4068 102 4 5 13454 25216 9 3261
Nitro-o-Anisidine* 91 0 10 5 15 10
p-Nitrobiphenyl* 265 0 18 5 23
Nitroglycerin 715 34 6 23 4331 38471 29 47619
Nitrosodiphenylamine* 273 13 12 2 24 24
Octachloronaphthalene 13 0 3 3 6
p-Phenylenediamine* 12612 359 7 31 14983 49939 38 8827
Picric Acid 1502 26 6 10 21627 37003 16 43966
Sodium Sulfate
(solution) 846 12 3 5 866411 1332131 8
Terephthalic Acid 16734 899 3 5 22732 6456 8
Thiodianiline* 176 0 15 5 20
Chromium* 61002 6440 5 3 16576 43025 8 1804627
LEGEND: PatT: number of times chemical appeared in total patent
PatA: number of times chemical appeared in patent abstract
RtxL: number of long-term laboratory studies on chemical
RtxS: number of short-term laboratory studies on chemical
Emp74: number of employees potentially exposed to chemical in 1974
Emp83: number of employees potentially, exposed to chemical in 1983
RtxT: total of long- and short-term studies on chemical
Dis94: pounds of chemical discharged into environment in 1994
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED.
Chemical Name CasIT CasWC CasT EPI Clinical HumTot SciTot
Acetamide* 0 0 0 1 0 1 21
Aluminum Oxide 0 2 2 10 17 27 35
AminoAnthraquinone* 0 0 0 0 1 1 17
Ammonium Nitrate (solution) 0 1 1 0 1 1 8
Ammonium Sulfate (solution) 0 0 0 0 18 18 28
o-Anisidine* 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
p-Anisidine* 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
o-Anisidine
Hydrochloride 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
Anthracene* 0 0 0 0 5 5 23
Benzamide 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
m-Xylene* 4 10 14 16 28 44 64
o-Xylene* 4 10 14 16 27 43 59
p-Xylene* 4 10 14 16 27 43 60
Butadiene 3 3 6 12 5 17 52
sec-Butyl Alcohol 0 4 4 0 1 1 20
tert-Butyl Alcohol 0 4 4 0 2 2 17
Butyraldehyde 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Carbonyl Sulfide 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Chloroacetophenone 1 0 1 0 14 14 43
Diaminoanisole* 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Dibenzofuran 2 0 2 0 1 1 7
Hexachloronaphthalene 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Hydrazine Sulfate* 0 0 0 0 9 9 61
Isobutyraldehyde 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Isopropyl Alcohol* 0 3 3 4 17 21 62
Melamine 0 2 2 0 3 3 21
Methyl tert-Butyl Ether (MTBE) 0 0 0 0 9 9 21
Methylene Dianiline* 0 0 0 2 10 11
Molybdenum Trioxide 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
N,N-Dimethylaniline 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
N-Nitrosomorpholine* 0 0 0 0 0 0 67
Nitrilotriacetic Acid 0 1 1 0 0 0 9
Nitro-o-Anisidine* 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
p-Nitrobiphenyl* 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Nitroglycerin 0 1 1 1 1131 114 143
Nitrosodiphenylamine* 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Octachloronaphthalene 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
p-Phenylenediamine* 0 0 0 4 22 26 64
Picric Acid 0 0 0 0 2 2 18
Sodium Sulfate (solution) 1 2 3 0 4 4 12
Terephthalic Acid 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Thiodianiline* 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Chromium* 2 17 19 24 106 130 138
LEGEND: CasTT: number of toxic tort "case hits" on chemical
CasWC: number of occupational "case hits" on chemical
CasT: total of toxic tort and occupational "case hits" on chemical
EPI: number of epidemiology studies on chemical (>100 persons in study)
Clinical: number of clinical studies on chemical (<100 persons in study
HumTot: total of epidemiological and clinical studies on chemical
SciTot: total of all studies on chemical (HumTot + RtxT)
